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ABSTRACT 
The successful completion of political, institutional and social transformation, which 
accompanies the new democracies of East Central Europe, urgently requires the 
establishment and consolidation of new forms of social security, called to ensure the 
sustainability and durability of reforms. By explaining the path of extrication from state 
socialism, this study aims to: a) compare different social policy theories and to elaborate 
new ones; b) identify the patterns of the welfare state’s transformation in Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia, at the national and EU level; c) investigate the attitudes towards social inequality 
in the European region; and d) explore the impact of social transfers in seven Central and 
Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia). This research also aims to highlight the factors responsible for 
institutional change and democratic consolidation and to identify the prospects for the 
successful implementation of future welfare state reforms. This investigation identifies the 
emergence of a peculiar Eastern European model of solidarity coming from the fusion of 
pre-communist (Bismarck social insurance), communist (universalism, corporatism and 
egalitarianism) and post-communist features (market-based schemes), and maintained 
together by a strong support for redistributive policies. Finally, this book examines the 
challenges that modern welfare states are facing, such as the acceptance of a new 
welfare consensus, globalization and the Europeanization of national social policies. It 
concludes by reflecting on how Eastern welfare states will fit in the future EU welfare 
regime.   
 
 
Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, comparative social policy, welfare states, 
transition economies, labour markets, pension, health care, family policies, social 
assistance, European Social Policy, European Social Model, democratization.   
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Introduction 
 
A Brief Overview of East Central Europe 
“Central and Eastern Europe seems easier to define by what is 
not, than by what it is. It is an area without clear geographical 
borders, stretching from the Baltic Sea southwards to the Adriatic 
and south-eastward to the Black Sea. In the north, it comprises 
part of the Great European Plain which extends to west across 
north Germany into the Low Countries and to the east deep into 
Russia. In the centre is the upland plateau of Bohemia-Moravia, 
and the Danube Basin spreading out between the Alps and the 
Carpathian Mountains. Further south still is the mountainous, 
often remote and inaccessible region of the Balkans, and to the 
south-east the land stretches away into the steppes of Ukraine. 
These are sometimes called the “Lands in Between”: in between 
Russia and Germany, Europe and Asia, East and West. This is 
frontier country, part of Europe, but on the edge of it and not fully 
integrated with it.” (Batt 1998, p. 1; Batt 2003) . 
As Judy Batt has correctly outlined, Central and Eastern Europe is 
easier to define by what it is not, than by what it is. This is, of course, 
not only a problem of geographical location. Although Central and 
Eastern Europe is a frontier region, it is also something more. It is a 
conglomerate of populations with different historical backgrounds, 
different religions and different languages. In the late nineteenth 
century, for instance, the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Slovaks and the 
Slovenes were ruled by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; the Estonians, 
the Latvians, the Lithuanians were subjected to Tsarist Russia, while the 
Bulgarians were part of the Ottoman Empire. The situation becomes 
even more complicated if we consider the Poles and the Romanians, 
who were divided respectively between the Austro-Hungarian and the 
Tsarist monarchy and between the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman 
Empire (see Batt 1998, Table 1.1).  
As far as the religious orientation is concerned, the Poles, the 
Slovaks, the Lithuanians and the Slovenes are mainly Catholic; the 
Czechs and the Hungarians are Catholic, but have also significant 
Protestant minorities; the Latvians and Estonians are for the majority 
Protestants, while the Bulgarians are for the most part Orthodox. Also 
the languages differ significantly. Bulgarian, Czech, Latvian, Lithuanian, 
Romanian, Polish, Slovak and Slovene languages are part of the Indo-
European group, while Estonian and Hungarian are not. More 
specifically, Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Slovak and Slovene are Slavonic 
languages. Latvian and Lithuanian are part of the Baltic group. 
Romanian is latin-based, while Estonian and Hungarian are closely 
related to Finnish (see Batt 1998, Table 1.2 and Table 1.3; Batt 2003, 
Table 1.1 and 1.2).      
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In studying Central and Eastern European politics, one cannot be 
surprised, to discover how foreign influences have shaped the history of 
this region. The change of territorial borders is perhaps the most 
emblematic example and reveals how the national identities and 
aspirations of these populations have systematically been subjected to 
political decisions made by foreign, more influential nations. As Rupnik 
(1994, pp.98-9) cites:  
 “Eastern and Central and European borders are relatively new and 
they do not coincide with ethnolinguistic dividing lines. Less than a 
quarter of them predate the nineteenth century, about a quarter had 
been established around the time of World War I (1910-1922), and 
about one-third emerged in the aftermath of World War II. […] No 
less important, however, is the fact that the overwhelming majority 
of these borders had been established at post-war international 
conferences rather than by bilateral agreements (only 18 per cent) 
and thus were often perceived as having being imposed by the 
Great Powers”  
Freedom and stability for these nations seems to have been arrived at 
only after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but their consolidation is still an 
open question. In fact, if, on the one hand, it is possible to prove that 
most of territorial disputes have immediately been regulated after the 
collapse of communism (leaving in most cases, however, the situation 
almost unchanged, such as the territorial issue of Transylvania between 
Hungary and Romania, the borders between Poland and Germany or 
the question of the property claims of the Sudeten Germans in the 
Czech Republic), then numerous other problems still remain 
unanswered. For example, the improvement of the countries’ economic 
performance or the consolidation of democratic institutions are still 
unsolved issues. 
Unquestionably, these remain all crucial questions that regard not 
only the Eastern European region, but also the European continent as a 
whole. Several times, indeed, Eastern and Western politicians have 
called attention to the unrepeatable necessity to enlarge the European 
Community in the fastest possible way. Numerous variations of the 
same concept have been provided. Close to the undiplomatic dream to 
create a bigger and stronger Europe, capable of dealing with the two 
main superpowers from a position of parity, the inclusion of these 
countries has often been addressed as a new and historic opportunity: a 
train, which simply could not be missed. Others have recalled the notion 
of a “return to the past”, in which Europe had the possibility to start 
again in the ruins of World War II, leaving behind forty years of the Iron 
Curtain. According to this point of view, the last wave of the EU 
enlargement represented, in reality, nothing new for Europe, but simply 
a “return to normality”. As a consequence of the complex strategic goals 
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of the international community, all issues that go far beyond the 
objectives of this book, East Central Europe has been seen as the 
perfect political laboratory in which new equilibria could be tested, while 
the study of the factors responsible for the democratic consolidation of 
this region has become of crucial importance in predicting the destiny of 
these countries, and in understanding the future patterns of European 
political development. 
  
The Political Transition of 1990s 
As it is well known, on 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall collapsed and 
with it the world order in place since the end of World War II. This date 
is, however, only a formal one. It is a day to celebrate, to remind the 
world that what we currently know as true is in fact new, and that it once 
had a different, probably less human face. In reality, the collapse of 
communism might equally be traced back to the 23 October 1956 (day 
of riots against the Soviet occupation in the streets of Budapest), to the 
17 August 1962 (day of Peter Fecter’s death, the first East German shot 
while trying to climb the Berlin Wall), to the 21 August 1968 (day of the 
military intervention of Warsaw Pact forces during the Prague Spring), 
to the 27 June 1989 (day in which the Hungarian Foreign Minister, 
Gyula Horn, and his Austrian colleague, Alois Mock, cut the barbed wire 
in Sipron representing the symbolic opening of the borders between 
Austria and Hungary1), or to the 16 October 1989 (day of the biggest 
anti-communist demonstration in Leipzig during the visit of Gorbachev 
to celebrate the birth of the GDR). Whatever date one decides to take 
as example for the beginning of the end of the communist order, this 
date will also coincide with a new wave of democratization in Europe, 
which is now supposed to bring peace and stability in the region, or, if 
such aim sounds too unrealistic, at least, to facilitate this process.  
Despite the existence of a common belief, which looks at the 1989 
events as something that arrived completely unexpected, for Central 
and Eastern Europeans, regime change did not suddenly occurred from 
one day to the other, but it was the natural result of the continuous 
internal tensions that the communist system was producing in each of 
the associate states. Interestingly, Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) did not react to the dissolution of communism in the 
same way, but the transformation took numerous roads, resulting in a 
variety of political transitions (Szablowski and Derlien 1993; Lewis 
1997). Regime change has been negotiated in Poland, the result of 
evolution in Hungary, followed by police violence in Bulgaria and 
Romania, caused by the implosion or collapse of the old system in 
Czechoslovakia (Lewis 1997) and Slovenia, or the consequence of 
Russian internal reforms in the Baltic States. In this context, an indepth 
analysis of the voting behaviour of these populations clearly shows how 
volatile the political transition has been in this region.  
                                              
1 In reality, however, the borders with Austria were only opened on 11 
September 1989 to GDR citizens seeking political asylum in West 
Germany.  
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The Electoral Behaviour  
In Poland, the Solidarity trade union, declared as outlaw by the 
communist regime in 1982, was finally admitted to negotiations with the 
Jaruzelski2 government after a series of strikes in the spring/summer of 
1988. At the end of the so-called Round Table talks (April 1989), the two 
parties came to an agreement on the modalities for the first semi-free 
elections that had to be held on 4 and 18 June 1989. According to the 
new electoral rules, 65 per cent of the seats in the Sejm (Polish 
Parliament) were assigned to the communists in advance, while the 
remaining 35 per cent would be freely distributed between the ruling 
party and the opponents, on the basis of the votes received. In the 
Senate, recently re-established in 1989, the 100 seats available were 
not subjected to any restriction. This first round of elections saw the 
appointment of Jaruzelski as President, while Tadeusz Mazowiecki3 was 
designated as Prime Minister. In 1989, the Sejm approved the 
Balcerowicz4 plan, a neo-liberal set of economic reforms, which became 
the key feature of the Polish road toward market economy. The final end 
of the communist supremacy in Poland was signed on two subsequent 
dates. The first was in 1990 and coincided with the resignation of 
Jaruzelski and the appointment of Lech Walesa5 as President. The 
second was in 1991 with the first fully democratic parliamentary 
elections. While the inconsistency of having a communist President 
elected under non-democratic rules was soon resolved by the 
resignation of Jaruzelski, the defeat of the ex-communist party (the new 
called Democratic Left Alliance -SLD-) followed a more tortuous road. In 
fact, while in the parliamentary elections of 1991 the Democratic Left 
Alliance lost most of its power, receiving only 9 per cent of votes, the 
highly fragmented composition of anti-communist groups resulted in 
fatal voting in the following elections of 1993. In 1993 a new centre-left 
government formed by the Democratic Left Alliance (20 per cent of 
votes) and the agrarian Polish People’s Party (PSL, 15 per cent) 
unexpectedly won the majority of votes, and subsequently seats in 
parliament. This probably represented the first reaction of citizens to the 
high social costs caused by the economic transition (Lewis 1997). In 
1997, the electoral support changed again, this time in favour of non-
                                              
2 General Jaruzelski was a high rank official of the Polish Politburo 
since 1970s and the first secretary of the Communist Party since 
October 1981. He has been charged by Polish courts for responsibility 
in the shooting of demonstrators by the secret police in 1970s.   
3 Tadeusz Mazowiecki was one of the most influential members of 
Solidarity (“Solidarnosch”) and personal advisor of Lech Walesa. 
4 Leszek Balcerowicz was Minister of Finance of Poland from 1989-1991 
and from 1997-2000. He has been one of the strongest supporters of 
shock therapy. 
5 Lech Walesa was one of the founders, and the leader, of “Solidartiy”, 
the first free non-communist trade union. He has often put in jail by 
the regime. 
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communists. A new Solidarity-led government formed by the Solidarity 
Electoral Alliance of the Right (AWSP) (33 per cent of votes) and the 
Union for Freedom (UW with 13 per cent of the votes) was reinstalled 
and the economic reforms initiated in the first round of elections, but 
temporarily blocked by the left coalition, were completed. As the voting 
behaviour in 1993 demonstrated, the Polish governments that pursued 
drastic economic reforms had also to pay, in some way, the costs of 
transition. In the next elections of 2001, a centre-left coalition of three 
parties, the Democratic Left Alliance, the Labour Union (UP) (together 
with 41 per cent of votes) and the Polish People's Party (9 per cent), 
obtained the majority of seats in the parliament (258 seats) against a 
fragmented and disorganized centre-right union (Jasiewicz 1998; 
Auswärtiges Amt 2003: Poland; Millard 2003; Elections around the 
World 2003: Poland; Parties and Elections in Europe 2003: Poland). 
In Hungary, similar negotiations to those conducted in Poland, but 
primarily sponsored by reform-minded members of the communist party, 
took place with groups of the united opposition in the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF) and other social movements (trade unions) in 
the Round Table of 1988. After several months of consultations, the 
communist nomenklatura agreed on the possibility to introduce the first 
totally free elections, which could be held, thanks to the positive result of 
the national referendum of November 1989, in the spring of the 
following year (1990). The electoral support for the opposition was, 
however, not as expected, primarily due to the fragmented nature of the 
centre-right union. Despite this electoral impasse, a conservative 
coalition of three new parties, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (with 25 
per cent of votes and 164 seats), the Independent Smallholders Party 
(FKGP) with 12 per of votes and 44 seats, and the Christian Democratic 
People’s Party (KDNP) with 6 per cent of votes and 21 seats, formed a 
new government under József Antall6 (as Prime Minister of the new 
Republic of Hungary7). The second free elections of 1994 witnessed, 
similarly to the Polish case, a return of the ex-communists (the MSZP 
under Prime Minister Gyula Horn8 gained 33 per cent of votes and 209 
seats). The coalition was formed thanks to the partnership with the 
Union of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), which obtained 20 per cent of votes 
that corresponded to the necessary 70 seats needed to create a 
majority.  
In the third parliamentary elections of 1998, the ex-communists 
were not re-elected, but a new government formed by a centre-right 
                                              
6 Jószef Antall was the first Prime Minister of Hungary after its 
independence from the Soviet Union. He is known for his statement 
that he was not merely the premier of Hungary, but of 15 million 
Hungarians with reference to the Hungarian minorities living abroad. 
7 The former name of the Republic of Hungary in force until October 
1989 was the Socialist People's Republic of Hungary. 
8 Gyula Horn was one of the founders of the Hungarian Socialist Party 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He was also a member of the 
Hungarian communist party since 1954. 
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alliance of three main parties, the Alliance of Young Democrats 
(FIDESZ) with 30 per cent of votes and 148 seats, the Independent 
Party of Smallholders with 13 per cent of votes and 48 seats, and the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum with only 3 per cent of votes and 17 
seats, took office. The new elected Prime Minister Viktor Orbán9 
declared that neo-liberal reforms, which too often were blocked by 
protesters, would be finally introduced to the country. Despite the fact 
that most of these reforms were not implemented as announced 
(especially in the years close to the new electoral campaign), this did 
not prevent the centre-right government from being defeated in the 
elections of 2002 by a coalition formed by the Hungarian Socialist Party 
of Péter Medgyessy10 (elected Prime Minister) and the Union of Free 
Democrats11. These forces set an increase in public sector expenditures 
as a key policy priority (Jasiewicz 1998; Auswärtiges Amt 2003: 
Hungary; Elections around the World 2003: Hungary; Parties and 
Elections in Europe 2003: Hungary; Pittaway 2003). 
In Czechoslovakia, political transformation was not initiated by the 
countries political institutions, as happened in Hungary and Poland, but 
rather it was the consequence of the requests coming from the civil 
society (groups often formed by veterans of the Prague Spring), which 
engaged in a series of violent demonstrations (the so-called velvet 
revolution) in November 1989. In December of the same year, the 
Federal Assembly, under Dubček12, elected Václav Havel13 as President 
of the new democratic Czechoslovakia. After having successfully 
convinced the ruling communist party to renounce power, the two main 
social movements, the Civic Forum (CF), under the leadership of Václav 
Havel, of the Czech Republic and the Public against Violence (VPN), of 
Vladimir Mečiar14, for Slovakia, went to the first free elections. Both 
groups won the majority of votes in June 1990 against the communist 
nomenklatura. This finally signed the end of the communist monopoly, 
                                              
9 At the time, Viktor Orbán was a thirty-five year old lawyer trained in 
prestigious universities (such as Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest 
and the University of Oxford) and known for his strong belief on the 
potentials of market-oriented reforms. 
10 Péter Medgyessy was a technocrat under the former communist 
regime. He has been accused of being a counterespionage agent in the 
late 1970s. 
11 Remarkably, the ex-communists alone received an unexpected 42 
per cent of votes against a total of 41 per cent of the Alliance of Young 
Democrats of Orbán and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. 
12 Alexander Dubček was the first secretary of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party and withdraw from his functions in 1969 because of 
his active involvement during the Prague Spring. 
13 Václav Havel was a political dissident, writer and founding member 
of the first anti-communist group, Charter 77.  
14 Vladimir Mečiar was a member of the communist party since the 
1960s, expelled because of a pro-reform speech given to the national 
congress during the Prague Spring. Mečiar has often been accused of 
pursuing political power through authoritarian means. 
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which for too many years had stopped the democratic aspirations of the 
citizens initiated in the riots of the Prague Spring of 1968. The following 
elections in 1992 saw a new electoral composition and, more precisely, 
the victory for the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Václav Klaus15, with 
30 per cent of votes, and for the new Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS) led by Vladimir Mečiar, who obtained a remarkable 37 
per cent. On 25 November of the same year, the Federal Parliament 
adopted the Law on the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak republics 
as unified entities. This decision was the result of the strong socio-
economic differences that existed between the two parts of the country 
and also the result of divergences in the policy orientation required to 
stop the asymmetries in the economic development16. On 1 January 
1993, the ex-Czechoslovakia was finally divided into the Czech 
Republic with the capital in Prague and the Slovak Republic with its 
capital in Bratislava. 
In the new Czech Republic, Václav Klaus and Václav Havel 
became respectively the new Prime Minister and the new President. 
Václav Klaus formed his second cabinet in 1996, but the second Klaus 
government did not last the expected period. Despite his certainties on 
the successful completion of neo-liberal reforms, the increasing protests 
of citizens, exasperated by the deterioration of the economic situation, 
forced Klaus to resign on 30 November 1997. In the new polls of 1998, 
a new centre-left administration under Milos Zeman17 of the Czech 
Social Democratic Party (32 per cent of votes), indirectly supported by 
the Civic Democratic Party of Václav Klaus (28 per cent), came into 
power. They immediately set about remodelling the ways in which the 
Czech economic reforms had to be conducted. Finally, the fifth Czech 
parliamentary polls took place in 2002, where a centre-left alliance 
formed by the Czech Social Democratic Party (30 per cent of votes) and 
Coalition18 (14 per cent) won the majority of votes. The government 
restarted discussions on the privatization of the social security system, 
but significant reforms were only to some extent implemented. 
                                              
15 Václav Klaus studied economics in the Czech Republic, Italy and in 
the United States, held various positions in the State Bank of 
Czechoslovakia from 1971 to 1986 and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
became Governor of the World Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. He is known for his radical orientation toward economic 
reform. In his speeches, he has often affirmed to pursue the aim of 
the transition toward a market economy without adjectives, in 
particular without the adjective “social”. 
16 The Slovaks often accused the Czechs of pursuing a discriminatory 
economic policy, which tended to privilege the Czech Republic at the 
expenses of the less developed Slovakia (Williams 2003).  
17 Milos Zeman was a former member of the Czechoslovak communist 
party expelled during the Prague Spring. He is one of the founders of 
the Czech Social Democratic Party. 
18 Coalition was formed by the Christian and Democratic Union, 
Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL) and the Freedom Union - 
Democratic Union (US-DEU) 
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In the new Slovak Republic, Vladimir Mečiar became the first Prime 
Minister, while Michal Kovac19 was appointed as the new President. 
Due to strong internal tensions (caused by the authoritarian style of 
leadership of Mečiar), Slovakia went to elections in 1994. The 
anticipated ballot, however, did not result in a drastic change in the 
parliamentary composition and Mečiar re-emerged as the strongest 
leader20 (with approximately 35 per cent of votes). In 1998, the fourth 
elections of the Slovak National Council marked a drastic reduction in 
the support for Mečiar and his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(from 35 to 27 per cent). This allowed the Slovak Democratic Coalition21 
(26 per cent) to rule the country until the natural end of the mandate. 
Finally, the fifth Slovak parliamentary polls took place in 2002, where a 
conservative liberal alliance of the Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union (15 per cent of votes), the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (11 
per cent), the Christian Democratic Movement (8 per cent) and the New 
Civic Alliance (8 per cent) formed a new government. These parties 
intensively discussed the privatization of the social security system, 
implementing significant reforms especially in the pension sector 
(Jasiewicz 1998; Auswärtiges Amt 2003: Czech and Slovak Republic; 
Elections around the World 2003: Czech and Slovak Republic; Parties 
and Elections in Europe 2003: Czech and Slovak Republic; Williams 
2003).  
In Romania, political transition took a different road in which a 
widespread use of police violence and intimidation of citizens became 
the key features of a senseless and desperate strategy that aimed to 
block the democratic aspirations of the opposition groups and the civil 
society. The violent anti-communist demonstrations of 16 December 
1989 in the west of the country and in the streets of Bucharest, were 
bloodily suppressed by the police (who shot on the crowd and injured 
several thousand protesters), and were concluded few days later, on 25 
December, when a special military tribunal sentenced Ceausescu22 to 
death for mass murder and several other crimes. The death sentence 
for the Head of State and his wife was broadcasted by national and 
international televisions, becoming another dramatic image of the fall of 
                                              
19 Michal Kovac was a lecturer of economics expelled from the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1970. He then worked as a 
scientific researcher at Institute for Financing and Credit of Bratislava.  
20 The new government was formed thanks to a coalition with the 
Slovak National Party (5 per cent of votes) and the populist left-wing 
Union of Slovak Workers  (7 per cent of votes). 
21 The Slovak Democratic Coalition was formed by the Christian 
Democratic Movement (KDH), the Democratic Union (DU), the 
Democratic Party (DS), the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) 
and the Green Party of Slovakia (SZS).  
22 Nicolae Ceausescu succeeded Gheorghiu Dej, the former head of the 
Romanian Communist Party, in 1965. Since the beginning of his office, 
he was accused of a monopolistic and authoritarian management of 
power, involving the replacement of party officials with his protégés or 
family members. 
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communism. Unexpectedly, such impressive events, which were 
supposed to open a new wave of democracy in the country, did not 
automatically coincide with the beginning of political stability. Fragile 
communist governments were indeed followed by equally delicate non-
communist coalitions. After the death of Ceausescu, the power passed 
to the National Salvation Front of Ion Iliescu23, who was immediately 
elected as President, while Petre Roman24 was designated as new 
Prime Minister. In June 1990, a new series of violent demonstrations 
focused the attention of the international community again on Romania. 
In this case, the widespread use of force, once again, was one of the 
key characteristics of the repressive strategy of Romanian authorities. In 
order to give a more democratic image of the repression, the violence of 
security agents was, this time, accompanied by the joint efforts of coal-
miners, called to re-establish order in a country close to civil war. New 
elections soon arrived in 1992, giving victory to the successor of the 
National Salvation Front, the Social Democracy Party of Romania 
(PDSR), and Ion Iliescu, with 28 per cent of votes. Iliescu was re-
elected as President, while Nicolae Vacaroiu, an ex-bureaucrat, was 
chosen as the new Prime Minister. In the third parliamentary elections of 
1996, a centre-right coalition, named the Democratic Convention of 
Romania (CDR), won the majority of seats with 30 per cent of votes, 
and this time succeeded to govern until the natural end of the mandate. 
Unexpectedly, in November 2000, the party of Iliescu came to power 
again with a remarkable 37 per cent of electoral support. The 
government was formed by a left-wing coalition (with the Democratic 
Social Pole of Romania25), which saw extreme left and social 
democratic parties joined together to fight the new emergent ultra-
nationalism of Vadim Tudor and his xenophobic Party of Great 
Romania26 (Auswärtiges Amt 2003: Romania; Elections around the 
World 2003: Romania; Gallagher 2003; Parties and Elections in Europe 
2003: Romania).  
                                              
23 Ion Iliescu was a high ranking official of the Romanian communist 
party, who was gradually excluded from the political life for his 
opposition to the common communist ideology, for his critiques of the 
policies of Ceausescu and his critism of the involvment of the Warsaw 
troops in Prague. 
24 Petre Roman was an engineer with no prior political past, but co-
founder of National Salvation Front. 
25 The Democratic Social Pole of Romania was formed by the 
authoritarian/extreme left-wing Democratic Social Party of Romania, 
the Romanian Social Democratic Party (social-democratic) and the 
Humanist Party of Romania (social democratic). The coalition 
succeeded in governing thanks to the support of deputies of minority 
parties, such as the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 
(UDMR), which obtained 6.8 per cent of votes and 27 seats. 
26 The PRM was the largest opposition group in the Romanian 
parliament with 19 per cent of votes and 84 seats. 
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In Bulgaria, the democratization process began with the overthrown 
of Todor Zhivkov27 on November 1989. The ex communist leader was 
replaced by a less exposed party member Andrei Lukanov28 of the new-
called Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), who was immediately appointed 
as new Prime Minister. In the elections of 1990, the former communist 
party obtained an extremely positive result (47 per cent of votes and 
211 seats), which was unexpected if compared to the performance of 
other communist successors in CEE. This was, however, not sufficient 
to reach the majority in the Grand National Assembly, which was 
obtained by a coalition with 40 minor parties. Among these political 
forces, the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) ended up being the 
biggest opposition group with 36 per cent of votes and 144 seats. In the 
following parliamentary elections of 1991, the Union of Democratic 
Forces was reconfirmed as the biggest opposition group (34 per cent of 
votes and 110 seats), successfully reducing its gap from the ex-
communists of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (33 per cent of votes and 
106 seats). In November 1994, the parliament was dissolved and the 
country went to elections. This time, a coalition led by the ex-
communists won the majority in the parliament, obtaining 43 per cent of 
votes against a meagre 24 per cent from the SDS. Zhan Videnov29 was 
then elected as new Prime Minister, but the severe economic crisis of 
1996, which forced the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to grant loans 
to Bulgaria in exchange for painful austerity measures and the 
establishment of a currency board, turned out to be the worst electoral 
enemy of the socialist party. In the new elections of 1997, the ex-
communists saw a drastic reduction in their electoral support to 22 per 
cent (a fall of 21 per cent if compared to the previous election). This 
gave the Union of Democratic Forces, together with the People’s Union 
(NS), the possibility to form a new government coalition (52 per cent of 
votes, corresponding to 137 seats). Although this clear electoral 
preference might have been an indicator of future political stability, the 
most recent elections of 2001 have been, once again, the theatre of a 
drastic change of government, this time in favour of the personalist 
National Movement of Simeon II (NDSV). The former King, in exile since 
the end of World War II, was unexpectedly elected as Prime Minister 
with 43 per cent of votes, and formed a new coalition government with 
the centre-liberal Movement for Rights and Freedom (which had 7 per 
                                              
27 Todor Zhivkov was the first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party's Central Committee. He maintained this office from 1954 to 
1989, when the communist block collapsed. 
28 Andrei Lukanov was a former member of the communist party of 
Bulgaria who served as deputy minister from 1986 to 1990 and as 
Primed Minister after the end of communist monopoly. He was 
arrested in 1992 for misappropriation of State funds. He was 
assassinated in his house in Sofia on 2 October 1996. 
29 Zhan Videnov was a former member of the Bulgarian communist 
party. His political escalation in the party ranks began, however, only 
after 1989. 
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cent of the vote) (Auswärtiges Amt 2003: Bulgaria; Elections around the 
World 2003: Bulgaria; Gallagher 2003; Parties and Elections in Europe 
2003: Bulgaria). 
The Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), on the other side 
of the political transition, remained for a much longer time under direct 
control of the Soviet Union, gained electoral autonomy only with the 
reformulation of Article 6 of the Russian Constitution of 1990, which 
introduced the possibility of competitive elections. Opposition parties, 
which already existed as illegal entities in these communist regimes, 
were then allowed to legally enter the Baltic political arena. In the 
elections of 1990, non-communist governments were soon installed in 
all three states and declarations of independence from the Mother 
Russia immediately followed. As could be expected, the requests of the 
Baltic republics were not heard by Russian political leaders, who denied 
them their independence until 1991, when political referendums clearly 
showed the impossibility of refusing the citizens’ aspirations for self-
determination (Birch 1998).  
In Estonia, the first parliamentary elections of 1990 witnessed a 
clear victory for non-communist parties led by the Centre Party (K), 
which obtained 41 per cent of votes, corresponding to 43 seats over a 
total of 105. In the elections of 1992, the electoral support for this 
opposition group drastically diminished to a meagre 12 per cent. This 
did not coincide, however, with a return to the past. In fact, a new 
centrist-conservative coalition was formed thanks to the good results of 
the Fatherland Union (IL) (22 per cent). In the elections of 1995, the 
support shifted in favour of the less liberal-oriented Coalition Party and 
Rural Union30, which gained a majority in the parliament (32 per cent), in 
comparison to the Centre Party (14 per cent) and the radical-liberals of 
the new Estonian Reform Party (ER) (17 per cent). In the elections of 
1999, the Centre Party recovered the support lost in the past elections 
gaining 23 per cent of votes. The Fatherland Union and the Estonian 
Reform Party both received 16 per cent of votes; whilst the People's 
Party Moderates (M) gained 15 per cent. Finally, in the last polls of 
2002, the support for centre-liberal ideas did not change and the Centre 
Party was reconfirmed as the most important political party (25 per cent 
of the vote), followed by the conservative Union for the Republic -Res 
Publica- (RP) (24 per cent), and the Estonian Reform Party (18 per 
cent) (Auswärtiges Amt 2003: Estonia; Elections around the World 
2003: Estonia; Parties and Elections in Europe 2003: Estonia).  
In Latvia, there were elections in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2002. 
The Latvian People’s Front (LTF) was the first political formation to 
break the communist monopoly by winning the elections in March 1990 
with 68 per cent of votes, against the 21 per cent of the Latvian Socialist 
Party (LSP). In 1993, electoral consensus was consolidated on liberal 
and centrist ideals, which were promoted by the Latvia’s Way (LC) (32 
                                              
30 The Coalition Party and Rural Union was a partnership of four main 
forces: the Coalition Party, Country People's Party, Farmer's Assembly, 
and Pensioners' and Families' League. 
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per cent), the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) (13 per 
cent), the centrist of the People’s Harmony Party (TSP) (12 per cent) 
and the Latvian Peasants Union (LZS) (11 per cent). In 1995, political 
consensus did not shift from centrist and liberal parties, but this time it 
included an extreme right wing movement. The four main centre-right 
forces in these Estonian elections were the national conservative 
Fatherland and Freedom (12 per cent of votes), the Latvia’s Way (15 
per cent), the centre-liberal Democratic Party Saimnieks (15 per cent) 
and the extreme-right Peoples' Movement (15 per cent). In 1998, the 
conservative reformist People's Party (21 per cent), the Latvia’s Way 
(18 per cent) and the Fatherland and Freedom (15 per cent) won the 
majority of seats in the parliament, but the elections in 2002 saw the 
formation of a new centrist coalition under the guide of the New Era (24 
per cent of votes)31. Other parties that gained a large percentage 
included the progressive centrist People's Harmony Party (19 per cent) 
and the conservative reformist People's Party (17 per cent) 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2003: Latvia; Elections around the World 2003: 
Latvia; Parties and Elections in Europe 2003: Latvia). 
In the first free Lithuanian parliamentary elections, of 24 February 
1990, the Sajudis (a new political movement formed by the scission of 
the ex-communists) won the majority of seats, and in March 1990 the 
Parliament declared the country’s independence from the Soviet Union. 
In the second elections of 1992, the former communist party (the newly 
called Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania, the LDDP) obtained the 
majority of seats (43 per cent of votes). In the following elections of 
1996, however, three main centre-right movements32 formed a new 
government, which succeeded in ruling the country until the natural end 
of the mandate in October 2000. In the 2000 elections, consensus was 
centred again on centre-liberals ideas promoted by the “New Union” 
(NS). This early wave of political stability lasted, however, only until July 
2001, when a new government was formed when the social-democratic 
and social-liberal parties joined together33. This allowed Algirdas 
Brazauskas of the Social Democratic Party (LSDP) to become the new 
Prime President of Lithuania (Auswärtiges Amt 2003: Lithuania; 
Elections around the World 2003: Lithuania; Parties and Elections in 
Europe 2003: Lithuania). 
Finally, the first free elections in Slovenia, held in April 1990, 
brought about the formation of the first non-communist government. The 
Parliament proclaimed independence from the ex-Yugoslav Republic in 
1991 after a referendum in which 88 per cent of Slovenes expressed 
                                              
31 The new government was formed by the New Era (24 per cent), 
Latvia’s  First Party (10 per cent), Green and Farmers Union (9 per 
cent) and Fatherland and Freedom (5 per cent). 
32 These were: the Fatherland Union (TS) (30 per cent), the Lithuanian 
Christian Democratic Party (LKDP) (10 per cent) and the Lithuanian 
Centre Union (LCS) (8 per cent). 
33 The new government coalition was formed by the LSDP, NS and 
others. 
   21
their clear intention to form a new and separate state. The second 
elections in 1992 saw, to some extent, a return of the ex-communists 
with the victory of a centre-left coalition. This coalition was formed by 
the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) (with 23 per cent of the vote), 
the Slovenian Christian Democrats (14 per cent), the United List of 
Social Democrats (9 per cent) and the Social Democratic Party of 
Slovenia (3 per cent). In the third elections of 1996, the role of the left 
parties was drastically reduced and a more centre-oriented government, 
formed by the liberal democrats of the LDS (27 per cent of votes and 25 
seats), the Slovenian People's Party (10 per cent of votes and 9 seats) 
and the Democratic Party of Retired People of Slovenia (4 per cent and 
5 seats) was installed. This coalition succeeded in ruling the country 
until the new polls of 2000, when, due to the negative performance of 
the Slovenian People’s Party and the Slovene Christian Democrats 
(together only managing to get less than 10 per cent of votes), a new 
centre-left coalition formed by the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (36 
per cent of votes), the United List of Social Democrats (12 per cent), the 
new-united Slovenian People's Party and the Democratic Party of 
Retired People of Slovenia (5 per cent) took office. This new 
parliamentary coalition made the maintenance of a comprehensive 
welfare state a citizen right, which could not easily be amended 
(Auswärtiges Amt 2003: Slovenia; Elections around the World 2003: 
Slovenia; Parties and Elections in Europe 2003: Slovenia). 
This very brief overview of the electoral transition of East Central 
Europe shows not only how volatile the political transformation has been 
in these countries, but also how dramatic regime change has been for 
the populations involved. Economic factors, new institutional 
arrangements and political consensus around democratic ideas have all 
played a crucial role in dictating the patterns of regime change and the 
roads that the transition toward democracy had to follow. Although the 
prospects for future electoral stability are still difficult to elucidate, these 
clearly remain linked to the improvement of the economic performance 
of these new market economies. 
 
A New Wave of Democratization 
Inside the academic world, much ink has been spilled in the debate on 
the causes responsible for democratization, but the results of numerous 
discussions involving very famous scholars are still controversial. The 
most classical approach to democratization is the one introduced by 
modernization theory, according to which the level of socio-economic 
development remains a key factor to predict the growth of a stable 
democracy. For Dahl (1989), high levels of income per capita, 
urbanization and literacy are all crucial indicators of democratic 
development. Other authors, by contrast, have viewed democratization 
in less restrictive terms. Lewis (1997) has highlighted that modernization 
and democratization have become two close terms, which are not easily 
distinguishable and that can be subjected to numerous critics. By 
overemphasising the role played by socio-economic influences, 
modernization theory has neglected, for instance, numerous other 
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aspects, such as the elite strategies and leadership choices in place to 
foster or to block the birth of democratic institutions (Lewis 1997).  
As Huntington (1991) has correctly emphasized, no single factor 
can be sufficient to explain the development of democracy in a 
determined country. Democratization seems to be more the result of a 
combination of causes and, of course, of events. Economic 
improvements as discussed by Lipset (1960; 1993) or the positive 
development in five key arenas (Civil Society, Political Society, Rule of 
Law, State Apparatus and Economic Society) introduced by Linz and 
Stepan (1996) are by no means the only influential elements. This 
thesis has also been supported by Gastil (1985), who defined the 
democratization process as a “struggle for ideas”, and by Diamond et al. 
(1989) and Pinkney (1993), who emphasized the importance of a multi-
causal explanation (Cerami 2000). For these authors, historical and 
cultural backgrounds of a nation are all crucial for the successful 
transition toward democracy. Nevertheless, it is evident, as Arat (1991, 
p.152) has affirmed, that “as long as social and economic inequalities 
persist, developing countries that go to a process of democratization 
today are doomed to return to some form of authoritarianism”. 
This last aspect, more than any other single factor, has raised the 
question of the sustainability of economic reforms in the region. As it is 
well known, immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Central and 
Eastern European governments have embarked in a painful, but 
necessary restructuring of their economies. This process has taken 
different forms: from the drastic “shock therapy” or “bing-bang” strategy 
of more ambitious Polish decision-makers to the “gradualist” or “step-by-
step” approach of more cautious Hungarian officials. Whatever decision 
has been taken, citizens have paid high social costs.  As Przeworski 
(1991, p.136) has pointed out: 
“Rationalizing the allocation of resources requires new markets, 
deregulating prices, attenuating monopolies, and lowering 
protection. Making the state solvent entails reducing public 
expenditures, increasing revenues, and, at times, selling public 
assets. […] Even if governments that launch such reforms often 
hate to admit it, a temporary economic deterioration is inevitable. 
Inflation must flare up when prices are deregulated. Unemployment 
of capital and labor must increase when competition is intensified. 
Allocative efficiency must temporarily decline when the entire 
economic structure is being transformed. Structural transformations 
of economic systems are costly.” 
Despite the unquestionable necessity of taking painful decisions, it is 
now clear that the social costs of economic transformation have been 
underestimated and the price that Eastern Europeans have paid (and 
still continue to pay) to “democratize” their countries might have been 
substantially lower. The assumption following the 1990s events, to a 
large extent, consisted of the idea that these countries in transition 
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might have been democratized primarily through “westernization”. This 
concept has clearly been too simplistic and should have been weighed 
more carefully. As it has been explained above, democratization is far 
less a clear-cut process with more uncertain outcomes than those 
predicted by political analysts. The myth of democratization as simply a 
matter of alignment toward western standards proposed by many 
influential experts34 has also suffered from numerous endemic 
weaknesses. In particular, it has continued to neglect the historical and 
cultural heritage, considering countries in transition nothing more than a 
tabula rasa in which western societies could simply write on it their 
understanding of modernization.  
 
The Consolidation of Democratic Institutions 
Even more complicated is the definition of democratic consolidation, 
since it starts when the democratization process is concluded, but it is 
unpredictable in its end. The temporal factor becomes, in this context, 
crucial, although it is not the only important factor. It is, in fact, 
necessary to explain not only the time required for a democracy to be 
consolidated, but also what factors may influence the stabilization of 
democratic institutions (Merkel 1996; Rüb 1996). The patterns of regime 
change have usually been divided into three main phases, according to 
the classical distinction of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), which 
includes: 1) liberalization of authoritarian regimes; 2) democratization; 
and 3) consolidation of democracy. As can be imagined, the first phase 
involves the cessation of the prior totalitarian system. The second 
implies the construction of the most important institutions of the political 
regime. Finally, the third consists of the consolidation of democratic 
institutions and begins when the other two phases are concluded (see 
also Rüb 1996; Merkel and Lauth 1998). 
Clearly, the last step of transition is by far the most complex 
process to analyse. In fact, for Merkel (1996), the consolidation of 
democratic institutions can only be explained in the light of a multi-level 
model, which takes into consideration the successful expansion of four 
main elements: 1) institutional consolidation; 2) representative 
consolidation; 3) behaviour consolidation; and 4) consolidation of the 
civic culture. Institutional consolidation is seen as the stabilization of 
central political and constitutional organisms (such as parliament, 
government, political system and so on), which exist to define the rules 
of the game, and to ensure social and political inclusion (in the sense 
that no huge differences among social groups emerge). Representative 
consolidation refers to the territorial arena and includes the actors called 
to represent particular political interests, such as political parties and 
trade unions. The degree of democratic stabilization in this level permits 
to the citizens to have a real access to the basic freedoms mentioned by 
Linz35 (1975) and thus should be better represented in the new 
                                              
34 See the debate over Modernization Theory in Zapf et al. (2001). 
35 Linz (1975) addresses a political system as democratic when it 
guarantees the possibility to formulate individual political preferences 
   24
democracy. Behaviour consolidation, by contrast, concerns the absence 
of a strong support for actors, which might seriously endanger the 
consolidation of democratic institutions. Examples of these “de-
consolidating” forces can be found in deviant military personnel, radical 
parties, clandestine groups, populist and charismatic leaders and so on. 
Finally, the forth and last level of democratic stabilization entails the 
existence of a consolidated civic culture, which, for numerous authors, 
represents the socio-political foundation of democracy (Almond and 
Verba 1963, 1980; Merkel and Lauth 1998; Putnam 1993, 2000). Civic 
traditions and culture can thus help to improve a sense of social 
cohesion, which turns to be essential for the long-term sustainability of 
democratic institutions.  
As O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986) have correctly emphasized, the 
process of regime change inevitably implies a significant degree of 
uncertainty in the sense that transformation requires something that is 
still unknown to move towards. In this unpredictable process of 
transformation, new political actors are called to reduce uncertainty by 
providing a new form of legitimacy. Unquestionably, this new form of 
legitimacy depends on numerous factors and not on any single one. 
What cannot be denied, however, is that a new and more equal division 
of rights and resources may be vital for the successful conclusion of the 
consolidation of democratic institutions. As Offe (1994) and Rüb (1996) 
have highlighted, new democratic rules must be institutionalized and 
shared by the community according to the principles agreed in advance 
with the citizens (the so-often quoted “social contract”). In this context, 
social security systems remain the most crucial forces, helping to confer 
a moral legitimacy to the transformation towards a capitalist-based 
society and facilitating the creation of a new consensus around the new 
democratic rules (Offe 1994; Rüb 1996). 
 
Main Objectives of this Study  
As mentioned, the dissolution of the Iron Curtain has opened the door to 
a new wave of democratization and modernization in Europe. The 
reasons for its breakdown, however, remain only in part explored. For 
Ettrich (2003), the causes leading to the collapse of communism should 
be seen in the light of a multidimensional approach, in which numerous 
factors are all crucial to explain the dissolution of communist rules. 
Ettrich (2003) affirms that the unexpected destructive results of 
Gorbachev’s glasnost, the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the 
economic defeat in the competition with the West, the lack of political 
legitimacy and the formation of movements of opposition (civil society), 
the oil crisis of the 1970s, the absence of a coherent strategy of 
economic and technological development and the internal differentiation 
of communist political elite were all co-actors in the dissolution of state-
socialism. Fehér et al. (1983) have also emphasized the existence of 
self-destructive mechanisms inside the communist state apparatus, 
                                                                                                      
through the access of basic freedoms, such as association, information 
and communication.  
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which were created by the “informalization” of political and social 
activities and by the incapacity of the communist elites to reproduce the 
power resources in force in the early period of communism. In other 
words, the state-socialist system also played a significant role in its own 
collapse.  
This study does not deal with the death or re-birth of old institutions, 
but rather with the emergence of new ones. By explaining the path of 
extrication from state socialism, the book aims to: a) compare different 
social policy theories and to elaborate new ones; b) identify the patterns 
of the welfare state’s transformation in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia, at the national and EU level; c) investigate the attitudes 
towards social inequality in the European region; and d) explore the 
impact of social transfers in seven Central and Eastern European 
countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia). Finally, this research aims to highlight the 
factors responsible for institutional change and democratic consolidation 
and to identify the prospects for the successful implementation of future 
welfare state reforms. 
There are well known practical, theoretical and political problems 
associated with any attempt to achieve and maintain significant and 
permanent reforms in the region. These are connected with the 
difficulties of the transition towards market-based economies, in a way 
that does not produce distorted effects in household incomes. Poverty 
and its associated disadvantages remain an intractable and long-term 
problem in these societies. Thus far, it has not been successfully 
overcome through successive social policies, which have been in place 
since 1989.  
A way to escape social inequality, as it has been argued, might be 
to empower welfare institutions. This, however, should be conducted in 
a manner that avoids excessive increase in welfare expenditures, which 
would contradict the recommendations of the EU and other international 
organizations. The risk for CEECs is that most social policies become 
distorted or undermined by political interests, external pressures or 
bureaucratic inefficiency. With regard to the reform of the welfare state, 
CEE governments plan to develop EU recommendations into coherent 
national strategies, in which not only the central administrations will be 
involved, but also local authorities, private organizations and volunteers 
will also take part. Subsequently, it appears that privatization, means-
tested welfare provisions and decentralization of tasks are the new 
trends (Kapstein and Milanovic 2001). The necessity of reform is 
beyond question and will involve less generous benefits, reduction of 
eligibility criteria and a shift from universal to means-tested benefits. In 
more practical terms, such reforms will, very likely, mean the transition 
toward a “residual” welfare state (Standing 1996). 
With the first introduction of market-oriented reforms, numerous 
observers have affirmed that post-communist countries will finally 
converge to the model present in the West and that no clear 
differentiation will soon be possible. As a consequence of globalization, 
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Burawoy (2001) has argued, that a new form of global capitalism is 
emerging. Other scholars, in sharp contrast, have pointed out that, due 
to national historical backgrounds, the study of capitalism means in 
reality the study of “comparative capitalisms” (Stark 1996; Stark and 
Bruszt 1998, 2001; Eyal et al. 2001, 2003; see also Albert 1993; Esping-
Andersen 1990; Rhodes and van Apeldoorn 1997; Streeck 1997; Hall et 
al. 2001). Researchers should therefore focus their attention not on a 
single capitalist model, but on a variety of capitalisms. If this pattern is 
real, then comparative social policy should attempt to answer the 
question of whether the post-communist capitalism (or capitalisms) will: 
a) reproduce the welfare state already in place in Western Europe; b) 
result in a common peculiar Eastern welfare state; or c) create so many 
welfare states as many economies in transition. In other words, it has to 
be asked whether we are witnessing the emergence of a new European 
model(s) of solidarity and, if yes, whether this model is in accordance to 
EU standards. 
 
The Research Design 
This study has followed the classical stages of any research design in 
social sciences: examination of previous theoretical frameworks, 
formulation of hypothesis, operationalization of concepts, selection of 
the areas of study, collection of data, analysis of the empirical material 
and explanation of findings.  
The starting point of the investigation has been the search for a 
suitable theoretical domain. Here, the most debated theories on welfare 
state dynamics have been explored. The aim was not only to compare 
different social policy theories in order to see which one was the most 
appropriate, but also to see whether there was the need of some 
addition or revision. As a result, three other theoretical frameworks have 
been taken into account: path dependency theory, new-institutionalism 
and neoclassical sociology. These are all sociological approaches that 
primarily focus on institution building but have become crucial in the 
explanation of Central and Eastern European welfare states. In this 
region welfare structures face not only processes of natural 
development and mutation, as it could happen in the West, but also 
processes of institutional creation. The most appropriate theory able to 
elucidate these processes has been identified in a synthetic approach, 
which considers historical legacies, institutional settings and social 
interactions of individuals as determinant factors for the 
development/creation of new welfare institutions.  
The second step consisted of the formulation of a clear hypothesis, 
which could test the theoretical domain recently proposed and which 
could also highlight the logical consequences of the theory adopted. 
More concretely, the principal hypothesis has followed this logic. Since 
there is now a significant agreement on the fact that different capitalist 
models may result in the formation of different welfare regimes, and that 
the development and creation of a determined welfare regime is strictly 
connected to the historical, institutional and cultural legacies of the 
countries in which welfare institutions grow (see chapter one), a 
   27
common socio-political background should lead to the emergence of a 
common, unique welfare regime. In case of this study, the assumption is 
that forty years of communism may have produced a system of values 
and institutions, which is likely to survive the homogenising pressures of 
more recent transformation, resulting in the materialization of a common 
post-communist welfare state.  
The third stage has involved the operationalization of concepts. 
Here, it has been necessary not only to define, in the clearest possible 
way, the hypothesis mentioned above, but also to find the necessary 
measures to test it. The basic concept has been found in the 
convergence/divergence principle, which examines the factors of 
divergence from western European welfare states, but also the factors 
of convergence within the Central and Eastern European region36. 
Consequently, this conceptualization has been turned into variables and 
indicators with the aim of allowing more precise empirical observations. 
In particular, it is crucial in identifying a common set of characteristics 
which unites these welfare states in transition37 and which makes them 
a particular “model”. These have been identified in the persistence of 
common features origined in the communist or pre-communist past.  
The fourth step has involved the identification of the areas of study. 
Here, it is essential to test the convergence/divergence principle in three 
main domains. First, the convergence/divergence principle has been 
tested on the western model of welfare. Instead of simply focusing on 
how a determined scheme may be “transferred” from one region to the 
other, it is considered more important to examine whether a social 
security system proposed from outside can successfully be introduced 
by design in the region without defensive or adaptive strategies. This 
would inexorably change the nature of the model suggested in advance. 
In this case, the western model per se has not been taken into account 
(assuming it exists), but instead the ways in which it changed in order to 
adapt to the new environment are taken into consideration. Second, the 
convergence/divergence principle has been tested on countries within 
the Eastern European region. In particular, it crucially attempts to 
identify the persistence of special path-dependent features in five main 
welfare state sectors (pension, health care, protection against 
unemployment, social assistance and family support). These five areas 
are the core of each welfare state and represent the place in which 
cohesive, and disgregative, factors are easily identifiable. Finally, the 
convergence/divergence principle has been investigated in the attitudes 
of European citizens toward social inequality.  The aim of this is to 
discover whether clear-cut differences within Europe and among social 
groups persist in the support for a determined model for welfare.  
In the final stages of the research, the data is collected, analysed 
and the main findings summarized. In particular, this has involved the 
                                              
36 I owe a huge debt to Frank Ettrich for valuable discussions on this 
topic. 
37 For the definition of “welfare states in transition”, see Esping-
Andersen (1996). 
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study of official reports prepared by the European Commission and 
other research institutions on the transformation of Central and Eastern 
European social security systems, but it has also included discussions 
and interviews with policy makers of the region. In addition, close to the 
analysis of the ISSP dataset on the attitudes toward social inequality, an 
indepth examination has been conducted on the Luxembourg Income 
Study datasets. Here, the aim was to improve understanding of the 
impact of social transfers in seven Central and Eastern European 
countries to suggest future possible reforms. 
 
Organization of the Book 
In order to facilitate the reader, the book has been constructed on three 
different levels. Part I focuses on the most debated theories and 
classifications about the establishment and development of welfare 
structures in Europe. More specifically, while chapter one introduces to 
the study of comparative welfare states, chapter two provides a brief 
overview of path dependency theory and the most discussed 
approaches to institution building. This chapter also offers a 
comprehensive description of the role played by international 
organizations in the creation of post-communist social policies. The 
main objective here is to supply a more comprehensive conceptual 
framework able to explain the transformation of Central and Eastern 
European welfare states.  
Part II investigates the most recent developments in Central and 
Eastern European social policy. Chapter three, four, five, six and seven 
look at the changes occurring in five main welfare state sectors: 
pension, health care, protection against unemployment, social 
assistance and family support. By providing the most up-to-date 
information on the current structures and reforms implemented, these 
chapters aim to present a clearer picture of Central and Eastern 
European welfare reforms.  
Part III analyses two household surveys. Chapter eight examines 
the attitudes towards social inequality among European citizens, by 
using the dataset Social Inequality III provided by the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP). This chapter tries to quantify the 
support for a more re-distributive policy-making. Chapter nine 
investigates the change in income inequality and the impact of social 
transfers in seven Central and Eastern European countries. This 
chapter is based on a set of 16 household income surveys made 
available by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Its main aim is to 
monitor and to analyse possible repercussions of reforms on the 
population. Finally, this book examines the challenges that modern 
welfare states are facing, such as the acceptance of a new welfare 
consensus, globalization and the Europeanization of national social 
policies. It concludes by reflecting on how Eastern welfare states will fit 
in the future EU welfare regime.   
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Chapter 1 
The Theory of Welfare 
 
    Introduction 
As an introduction into welfare state dynamics, this chapter looks at the 
development of the welfare state in Europe and gives an overall 
assessment of the most debated theories and classifications used in 
comparative social policy. Heidenheimer et al. (1990, p.3) defined 
comparative public policy as: “the study of how, why, and to what effect 
different governments pursue different courses of action or inaction”. In 
very few words, this implies identifying and explaining similarities and 
differences across regions, countries and localities using a determined 
theoretical framework, which can help to identify the problems that need 
to be addressed. This also involves the explanation of constellation of 
policies, the way in which they developed across the years and the 
manner in which they differed across space and over time (Carmel 
1999). One of the most difficult parts in comparative social policy is, 
thus, the necessity to look beyond ones own social system, cultural 
background and personal opinions about how a society should be.  
Comparative social policy is, however, of little help if the study is not 
associated with a necessary criticism or excluded from its historical and 
global context. For these reasons, this chapter does not only deal with 
the birth of Western European social policies, as numerous monographs 
do, but it provides an analysis of the origins of Eastern welfare states. 
Going more into details, while Section one focuses on the class based 
origins of modern social policy summarising the most discussed 
explanatory models, Section two pays attention to the system of social 
security during communism. In particular, it provides a brief overview of 
the central planned economy, of its repercussions on social stratification 
as well as on social policies. Finally, Section three examines well-known 
classifications of the welfare state.  
 
    1.1 The Class-Based Origins of Modern Social Policies 
The birth of modern social policy in Europe is undoubtedly paradoxical. 
The first attempt to create some form of institutionalized solidarity is 
commonly attributed to Bismarck with the establishment of the first 
pension and sickness insurance system in 188938. According to the law, 
urban workers were covered by insurance from old age and misfortune 
at work. Moreover, they were implicitly recognized as a risk community, 
sharing common interests in light of a new social contract. In this 
process of transformation, social insurance was the cornerstone.  
Although this act certainly helped to place workers into a risk 
category, it is widely argued that Bismarck’s interest in social insurance 
                                              
38 Gesetz zur Krankenversicherung of 1883; Gesetz zur 
Unfallversicherung of 1884; Gesetz zur Invaliditäts- und 
Altersversicherung für Arbeiter of 1889.   
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was far from the egalitarian vision of “class solidarity” and was probably 
moved by reactionary intentions. The state made concessions to the 
industrial working class in the form of social policy with the aim of 
avoiding a possible victory for the Social Democrats, who might have 
pursued more ambitious plans (Baldwin 1990, pp. 3-6). In this context, 
Bismarck’s main concern was in gaining a consensus for the 
government rather than to establish new forms of social solidarity.  
According to the Bonapartist and Marxist approaches, social policy 
was the price paid by the German elites to preserve their own privileges; 
the urban workers were just the passive objects of these reforms, 
occupying a minimal if not marginal role39. Also, a “rational choice” 
explanation, which considers humans as being rationally calculating 
individuals, would support the thesis of an interest of the German middle 
classes in maximising their well-being by improving the living conditions 
of the urban working class40. As Baldwin (1990, p.6) suggests: 
“pensions for empowerment”.   
Whether industrial workers were really the passive actors of the 
Bismarckian reforms is not easy to confirm, but what is certain is that no 
other category (for example, farmers) was considered to have benefited 
from the then-new social insurance. Furthermore, the earnings-related 
system of benefits based on contributions also helped to define the 
German model of the 19th century as largely absent of social solidarity. 
This was probably the first case of the clientelistic welfare state, which 
mainly focused on political goals rather than on the real essence of 
social solidarity. 
The first challenge to the Bismarckian vision of social policy came 
quite early. In 1891, Denmark introduced a new law on pensions: an all-
inclusive, non-contributory, tax-financed system, which became the 
main feature of the Nordic model (Baldwin 1990). In 1913, Sweden 
imitated the Danish government’s move with a similar law on retirement, 
which guaranteed a minimum provision to all citizens, regardless of 
class, status or income. Who in this case comprised the main actors of 
Scandinavian social policy at the time? As Baldwin explains, the biggest 
role was played by the newly emergent Scandinavian middle-class: the 
farmers. Through a universal, non-contributory and tax-financed system, 
the agricultural based middle class aimed to increase their privileges 
while, at the same time, avoiding the risk of paying more for financing 
their welfare state. An increase of productivity might have been very 
costly in a contributory system and this was obviously their main 
concern. This approach to social insurance, which was an extension of 
the concerns held by farmers, who were for the first time united as an 
interest group, also met the liberal and conservative belief of the 
inapplicability of the contributory system in a state where most of the 
people were still too poor to pay for their own benefits. An all-
embracing, egalitarian and tax-financed approach was, therefore, the 
best way to put together different interests and needs (Baldwin 1990). 
                                              
39 See Alber (1979) quoted in Baldwin (1990, p. 39). 
40 See Boulding (1962) quoted in Baldwin (1990, p.24).  
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Even in this case, the beginning of social policy was linked to a 
clientelistic vision of the welfare state. 
The law on old-age pensions came in Great Britain on the 1 August 
1908 following the Danish vision of social solidarity. As Ferrera (1993, p. 
9; translated from Italian) describes:  
“For the first time, the elderly with low incomes could go to the post-
office and claim their rights expressed in five pence a week. Not all 
the old people, who were entitled to get the pension, claimed their 
right, incredulous of what was seen, in the best case, as the 
magnanimity of Her Majesty. For many other months, the elderly 
brought to the office workers bunch of flowers and baskets of fruits 
in exchange for their benefits”.  
In 1911 the National Insurance Act moved the system towards the 
Bismarckian model and again with the advent of Beveridge41 towards 
“Scandinavian Universalism”. These early perplexities were not easily 
resolved.  But during this period, Great Britain created a system that 
pursued egalitarianism as a moral choice. As Titmuss42 would later 
affirm, this was probably the result of a sense of social cohesion created 
by the amenities of World War II. During this phase, British social policy 
was characterized by flat-rate benefits. Baldwin (1990, p.100), again, 
identifies two main reasons in explaining this peculiarity: first, because 
British policy did not share Bismarck’s interests, aiming to aid the 
poorest, and not only to secure working class standards; second, 
because flat-rate or uniform benefits were suggested by considerations 
of administrative practicability.  
In the eastern half of Europe, reforms of the system grew even more 
radical. On 17 October 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution sought to ensure 
the liberation of the Proletariat from the Tsarist oppression. The 
acquisition of social rights was linked to the expropriation of property at 
the expenses of the Tsar and the noble upper classes. For many 
historians and Marxist philosophers, the Russian workers were, for the 
first time, united in defending their interests.  
                                              
41 Sir William Beveridge is famous for his report, presented to the 
British Parliamnet in November 1942, on the ways to reduce poverty in 
Britain. At the core of the report lies a system of social security in 
which all people of working age pay a national weekly contribution. 
The new system of social protection will then grant benefits in case of 
sickness, unemployment, retirement or widowed to all citizens. In 
brief, the main aim of Beveridge’s Report was to provide a minimum 
living standard to all British families through a comprehensive and 
“socially-just” welfare state (Source: Wikipedia: The Free 
Encyclopedia, William Beveridge, URL: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Beveridge. Last log-in: January 
2004). 
42 See Titmuss (1950, 1963) quoted in Baldwin (1990, p.25). 
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Whether the Russian working class was really the main actor of the 
October Revolution is difficult to prove. As Lane (1971) explains with an 
accurate analysis of Bolshevik party membership, only a handful of the 
delegates at the party’s founding congress were from the working class. 
This, however, should not lead to a misunderstanding of the class-
based origins of socialist welfare states. There is in fact no doubt that 
future developments in communist social policies were strongly 
characterized and dictated by a peculiar understanding of class 
solidarity based on Marxist principles, which emphasized social equality 
among individuals as a main moral and political value.   
 
    1.2 Theories of Welfare State Dynamics 
Over the last few decades, a revival of academic interest on this subject 
has characterized the study of the welfare state. Many authors have 
tried to provide a theoretical framework explaining the peculiarities of 
national welfare systems. Despite all efforts, an all-embracing 
conceptual apparatus is still not available. The reason for this is 
probably found in the explicative method, which has mainly focused on 
determined aspects, to the neglect or exclusion of other aspects. What 
follows is an attempt at consolidating these different approaches into a 
more unified viewpoint.
According to the classification made by Pierson (1998, pp.15-97), the 
welfare state can be described as:  
• the product of the needs generated by the development of 
industrial societies43;  
• the consequence of political mobilization to attain full 
citizenship44; 
• the outcome of both, industrial and political mobilization in the 
context of Keynesian reforms45; 
• the result of a struggle between political powers of social 
democracy and the economic powers of capital46. 
This is undoubtedly a remarkable and innovative approach: a new 
“Weltanschauung”, or in other words, a new way to see the emergence 
and existence of welfare institutions as the outcome of human actions 
delimited by the specific socio-economic and political context. In 
particular, the welfare state has been seen as a necessity of modern 
societies to adjust to recent industrial developments, providing the 
necessary support to economic changes and, at the same time, as an 
                                              
43 Industrialization Thesis: see Wilensky (1975, 1976) quoted in 
Pierson (1998, p. 15). 
44 Modernization Thesis: see Flora and Heidenheimer (1981) quoted in 
Pierson (1998, p. 22). 
45 The Social Democratic Thesis quoted in Pierson (1998, p.27). 
46 Power Resources Model: see Korpi. (1989) quoted in Pierson (1998, 
p. 30).   
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important tool for improving social cohesion. For more than one century, 
welfare institutions were supposed to help the achievement of, what 
Goodin et al. (1999, p.22) described as, six moral values:  
• promoting economic efficiency;  
• reducing poverty; 
• promoting social equality;  
• promoting social integration and avoiding social exclusion; 
• promoting social stability; 
• and promoting autonomy. 
From this point of view, concepts such as nationhood and citizenship 
have been built within the borders of the welfare state, whilst the 
realization of social rights has been a fundamental prerequisite of a fully 
mature democracy. For modern societies, citizenship has been 
synonymous of “belonging to a specific nation-state”, but this has also 
meant “being the owner of determined rights”. Welfare institutions were 
therefore the best way to translate the theoretical assumptions of 
modern constitutions (for example, right to work, to education, to health 
and, more generally, to a normal life) into practical material evidences 
(ensuring job, income, health services and so on) 47.    
In contrast to this positive attitude, many other theorists have 
described the welfare state as:  
• an unprincipled intrusion to a functioning liberal market 
economy48;  
• a form of developed capitalist state aiming at securing the long-
term circumstances for the accumulation of capital49; 
• a system embodying the essentially contradictory nature of 
developed capitalism and chronically subjected to the logic of fiscal 
and administrative crises50; 
• an organism now undermined by the process of globalization and 
characterized by an unsustainable development51. 
The limits of the welfare state have been strongly emphasized and 
defined as strictly connected to its same essence, that is to say a 
                                              
47 For the classical argument re-proposed by Esping-Andersen that 
“social citizenship constitutes the core idea of the welfare state” 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, p.21), see Marshall (1963, 1970, 1981). 
48  The New Right Explanation quoted in Pierson (1998, pp. 45-6). 
49 Neo Marxist Analysis I:  see Ginsburg (1979) quoted in Pierson 
(1998, p. 50). 
50 Neo-Marxist Analysis II: see Offe (1984) quoted in Pierson (1998, 
p.59). 
51 Globalization and  Green Thesis quoted in Pierson (1998, pp. 65,92). 
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system born in a specific industrialized context and characterized by the 
same contradictions of the environment in which it was growing. Thus, 
developed capitalism and its contradictions have been translated into 
welfare contradictions. In addition, it has been broadly argued that 
welfare regimes also acted as a system of social stratification (Esping-
Andersen 1990) widening class, race and gender divisions52. 
A good understanding, and comparison, of the welfare state has been 
a crucial issue for many scholars, who defined it a “unique” system only 
comprehensible in a comparative and historical context53. The continuity 
in the establishment and development of welfare structures seems, 
indeed, to be common to most, if not to all, European countries. Baldwin 
(1990), for instance, emphasizes the link between the Bismarckian 
understanding of institutionalized solidarity in the post-war 
establishment of the German system of social insurance. The same has 
been affirmed for the Scandinavian countries and their universal 
coverage due to the social democratic forces present in the respective 
governments as well as for Great Britain and its understanding of social 
solidarity developed by Sir William Beveridge in his well-known Report 
(see note 4 of this chapter). Italy with its populist/corporatist tradition, 
which finds its basis in the pre-fascist and fascist period, would not be 
an exception to this trend. Even in this case, the concession of welfare 
rights has continued to depend on the achievement of specific national 
political goals. The Italian monarchy introduced in 1898 the first 
insurance against old-age, sickness and work accidents for factory 
workers with the aim to prevent the spread of socialist ideals. Mussolini 
made a strumentalistic use of populist and agrarian-oriented social 
policies with the main objective to find a consensus around the new 
fascist regime. Finally, the post World War II governments led by the 
Christian Democrats persevered in this direction by granting special 
privileges to determined professional groups, particularly the notables of 
the main cities in the South of the country, with the aim to enlarge their 
electoral support (for more information on Italian history and social 
policy, see Colarizi 1994; Ferrera 1993). Nevertheless, it is crucial to 
remember that despite national differences and peculiarities, common 
trajectories in the building of common values can be drawn. Words such 
as “social equality” or “social solidarity” have crossed national borders, 
achieving a multi-national meaning. Moreover, traditional, cultural and 
political formations may have differed from country to country, but the 
aspirations of modern societies to pursue social equality in the coin of a 
minimum living standard for their citizens has not been substantially 
different, at least in the written constitutions.  
                                              
52 The Dialectic of Sex and Anti-Racist Thesis: see Lewis (1992), 
Ginsburg (1992) quoted in Pierson (1998, pp. 70,79). For the feminist 
critique see also Sainsbury (1994), Lewis and Ostner (1995), Orloff 
(1993). 
53 Thesis of the “uniqueness” of welfare states: see Ashford (1986), 
Skocpol and Ikenberry (1983), Baldwin (1990) quoted in Pierson 
(1998, p.97). See also Leibfried and Pierson (1995), Ferrera (1993). 
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    2. Social Policy under Communism  
    2.1 The Soviet Economy 
In order to understand communist social policy, a brief introduction to 
the Soviet economy is required. One reason for this is that despite 
possible criticisms, the central planned economy provided material 
subsistence for many hundred million people. For Ettrich (2003), the 
central problem of state-socialism was not its economic inability to 
ensure decent living standard to its citizens, rather it was its inability to 
establish a democratic society. This undermined in the long-run the 
political legitimacy of the system itself.  
As far as the state-socialist economic structure is concerned, Kornai 
(1992) describes three main prototypes as belonging to three different 
evolutionary periods: 1) the revolutionary transitional system; 2) the 
classical system or classical socialism; 3) the reform system or reform 
socialism. In the first transitional period, the main objective of the 
leading class was to establish the transition from the tsarist capitalism to 
socialism in the fasted way possible. This period involved the 
expropriation of property, the collectivization of resources, and a rapid 
industrialization. This was followed by massive efforts for improving the 
educational standard of a large mass of illiterate citizens with the aim of 
establishing class-consciousness based on Marxist principles, which did 
not exist beforehand (Lane 1971). This kind of “shock therapy” was 
implemented through fast and, in most cases, undemocratic policies. 
Once that the revolutionary period finished (nothing is “revolutionary” 
forever) and the Soviet “enlargement” into Eastern Europe became a 
reality, the Soviet system focused, from the establishment of a socialist 
society, to the consolidation of the system. The bureaucracy took 
control over all the spheres of the state-socialist life. Economic plan 
management and implementation, appointment and dismissal of 
leaders, management of production, allocation of products and labour, 
regulation of economic relations became all a “matter of state”. The 
entire banking system became state-owned. The state budget was also 
responsible for spending on the administration, for state investments, for 
subsidization of firms and consumer prices, and also for free public 
services. This was possible through the state’s main revenues, which 
were: a) the revenue generated by state-owned firms; b) tax payments 
by cooperatives; c) turn-over taxes (included in the price of every 
goods); d) and loans raised by the budget. As regards employment and 
wages, the state controlled: e) management of production; f) 
supervision of the workplace to which workers had been assigned 
compulsorily; g) representation of political and trade union power; h) 
local representation of the administrative organizations of the state; i) 
and, very importantly, the local representation of the income distribution 
authorities (Kornai 1992, pp. 121-138). This last aspect is of particular 
interest in understanding socialist social policy. Indeed, the major 
control over the income distribution authorities gave local bureaucrats a 
great deal of power in the allocation of benefits creating circles of loyalty 
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to the state apparatus. As one might expect, the entire social life 
became state-managed. 
The third period (reform socialism) was characterized by the first 
attempt to challenge and bring into discussion the soviet System and its 
lack of democracy. On 23 October 1956 began the protest against the 
Soviet occupation in Hungary that culminated a week later with the 
bloody suppression in the streets of Budapest. This rebellion was 
moved by claims for reforms in the economy as well as in the political 
and social sphere. A similar protest exploded in Prague during the 
Spring of 1968 (the so-called Prague Spring), but, once again, the 
democratic aspirations of Eastern citizens were followed by a bloody 
suppression by Soviet military forces. In 1968, however, the New 
Economic Mechanism (NEM) opened the doors in Hungary to a “quasi-
private” economy. For the first time, employees could change their job if 
they wished to do so. The concept of “private property” came timidly into 
light and the state monopoly began to diminish. This was the beginning 
of two different economies: the first one where the state was still the 
main player retaining special rights, and a “second economy” where 
citizens could also play an important role in the positive development of 
their economic situation. In the case of Hungary, these two different 
systems operated side by side, becoming the expression of a particular 
style of communism, defined as “Goulash Communism”. The existence 
of this second, parallel economic system led numerous scholars to 
affirm that state socialist societies were never pure in their communist 
essence, but rather they had a “hybrid character” (Szelényi 1988; 
Hankiss 1991; Ettrich 2003). Hankiss (1991), for instance, emphasized 
that the “second economy” was responsible for the creation of a 
“second society” inside the communist order, undermining in the long-
run the same legitimacy of the dominant communist rules. 
 
2.2 Social Stratification under Communism 
The standard view on communist social stratification describes state-
socialism as the most successful attempt to create a classless society. 
Did things really go in this way? Did state-socialism achieve its main 
aim to create a non-antagonist society, gradually withering differences 
away? To some extent, this did not happen at all and the communist 
system produced, voluntarily or not, new forms of social differentiation. 
According to Slomczynsky (1994), social status can be measured on 
the basis of the relationship between education, occupation and income. 
In this context, the criteria of class differentiation in a central planned 
economy could be identified as: a) control over the utilization of the 
means of production; b) immediate control over labour; c) the mental 
component of performed work (non-manual versus manual workers); d) 
production and non-production of work; e) and, ownership of the means 
of production. On the basis of this conceptualization, while in the first 
period of communism there were three main classes –the working class, 
the intelligentsia and the peasantry. In the late 1960s these classes 
became internally more differentiated resulting in the late stage of state-
socialism in managers, first-line supervisors, experts and professionals, 
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office workers, state-factory workers, service workers, petty bourgeoisie, 
farmers and private enterprise workers (Slomczynski and Mach 1997). 
If we accept, as Davis and Moore (1994, p.39) suggest, “that the main 
functional necessity explaining the universal presence of stratification is 
precisely the requirement faced by any society of placing and motivating 
individual in the social structure”, then state-socialism might be 
described as a non-antagonist and anti-meritocratic system. In the 
1960s, for example, the wage differences in Czechoslovakia were 
reduced to the point that engineers and high skilled workers earned only 
5 per cent more than unskilled workers (Lenski 1994). Social mobility 
also decreased significantly during communism (Kivinen 1994). This 
produced the undesired effect to limit work performance in absence of 
incentives, to produce stagnation or even regression of modernization 
(Machonin 1997). In other words, the systemic problems of Marxist 
societies were the results of their own inadequate arrangements in 
promoting a classless society (Davis and Moore 1994; Lenski 1994; 
Tumin 1994). 
As regards social inequality, defined by Lane (1971, p.13) as “the 
uneven distribution of goods and values among the population in the 
sense that one group may have more income or education than other”, 
the reasons for social inequality in USSR and in the states modelled on 
her has been perpetuated, firstly, by property relations, secondly, by the 
system of political power, thirdly, by the division of labour and, fourthly, 
by the human nuclear family (Lane 1971). Data on communist social 
stratification have shown that the life chances and the possibility to go 
onto higher education were significantly higher among children of 
fathers in managerial or professional positions rather than of unskilled 
workers (Ferge 1997). Thus, as Ferge (1997, p.48) emphasizes, “the 
chain of social reproduction was not fully interrupted even by a system, 
which ideologically deadly set against it”.    
 
 
    2.3 Communist Social Policy 
As far as the social security system is concerned, as Simpura (1994, 
p.150) emphasized, social policy became an empty concept due to the 
fact that all the policies during communism were “social” by definition. In 
particular, the state provided: a) free health care; b) employment (the 
system worked on full-employment); c) housing; d) public pensions; e) 
and a “safety net” for those incapable to take active part in the socialist 
working life. Put in these terms, communist social policy might seem the 
paradise of egalitarianism and the best expression of social solidarity. In 
reality, it was characterized by lacks and inefficiencies. This led some 
authors (see Ettrich 1999; Ferge et al. 2002) to affirm that the problem 
of state socialism was not merely the existence of an excessive welfare 
state, but rather the absence of an efficient welfare state. 
With regard to the housing sector, there was a structural lack of 
apartments and living conditions were fixed at a very low level. In 
Central and Eastern Europe things went a little better due to a lesser 
structural lack of housing stock. The housing sector was also less state-
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managed and cooperatives, as well as private owners, were allowed to 
play a significant role in the “quasi-private” economy. The state also 
provided credits for private single-family houses. With respect to wages, 
“full-employment” was the basis of the communist social contract. 
Unfortunately, the security of job was connected to a real obligation 
(being parasites of the society could directly lead to jail). Retirement 
was regulated by contributions (which was relatively irrelevant due to 
the fact that wage differences were very low) and settled among 50 per 
cent to 100 per cent of a base usually calculated on the average of the 
best five years within the final 10 years of work. Again, the level of 
benefits was very low. This situation was aggravated by the non-
indexation of pensions to living standard or average wages (Connor 
1997). As Connor (1997, p.34) correctly emphasized: “a poor working 
life was followed by a poor retirement”. The state also acted on the 
subsidization of prices, thus preferring shortages, instead of an increase 
in the price of food. This policy-making resulted in food scarcity in the 
shops and discontent among the citizens, who tended to compare their 
situation of economic deprivation to what they saw on western TV 
shows. Health services were available free of charge, but 
underdeveloped and inefficient. There were high mortality and morbidity 
rates (Deacon 2000). The presence of a high number of doctors per 
capita (much higher in comparison to western standards) was not 
followed by an adequate structural situation. In general, a lack of funds 
for hospitals was the norm. 
Communist social policy, however, was not only characterized by 
lacks, but also by some excess in social protection. In GDR and 
Hungary, the existence of three years childcare grants did not 
automatically help socialist working-mothers from the hardness of work. 
In particular, this excessive protection facilitated the establishment of 
high welfare dependency and very low incentives to go back to work 
(high replacement rates54). The resulting distorted effects in the labour 
market could still work under a system based on full-employment. But, 
once the Berlin Wall collapsed and unemployment came out, this 
situation became unsustainable for the state budget, also preventing 
employers from employing women wanting to start a family.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
54 „High replacement rates“: “people receiving pretty much the same 
from social benefits when not working as they would have done from 
working”. Description by Goodin et al. (1999, p.80). 
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    3. Welfare State Classifications 
The first theorist to attempt to explore and to categorize different welfare 
systems was Richard Titmuss (1974), born in a working-class family, he 
later became a professor at the London School of Economics. In his 
well-known classification, Titmuss affirms the existence of three different 
typologies. In the “Residual Model”, welfare institutions come into play 
when the market and the family, seen as basis of modern societies, 
have terminated their function to promote social equality. Examples of 
this include the USA or Great Britain. In the “Industrial Achievement 
Performance” cluster, welfare institutions work together with the market. 
Within this cluster, social benefits are understood in terms of work 
performance according to a determined class status. Examples of this 
kind of system include Germany, France and Italy. In the “Institutional 
Redistributive” model, welfare institutions are fully integrated with the 
wider society according to a universal basis. Examples of this universal 
basis include the Scandinavian countries, where social rights and 
access to welfare benefits are conditional upon citizenship (Hantrais 
1995). 
In 1990, Esping-Andersen wrote what probably has been the most 
quoted and discussed book in the history of social policy. In his The 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen describes the 
welfare state as a principle institution in the construction of different 
systems of post-war capitalism. In addition, he affirms the existence of 
three welfare regimes on the basis of an index of “Decommodification55” 
and “Stratification56”. According to the author, the “Liberal Welfare 
Regime” is characterized by means-tested benefits, modest social 
insurance, social rights and entitlements rules are conditional upon 
demonstrable and object needs, and are usually associated to social 
stigma. The “liberal regime” is also dominated by a liberal work ethic 
and the market remains the main provider of welfare services. 
Examples of this include the United States, Canada, Australia and Great 
Britain. For these countries, the “sanctity of the market” is understood as 
a main moral value. In the second model, described as “Conservative-
Corporatist Regime”, the preservation of status differentials is the chief 
characteristic. Rights and welfare entitlements are, therefore, the output 
of class, status and financial contributions. Examples of this include 
France, Germany and Italy. For this group of countries, the Church and 
the Family remain crucial actors in subsidising the deficits of the welfare 
state. In the third model, defined as “Social Democratic Welfare 
Regime”, welfare institutions do not play a subsidiary role, waiting until 
the market or the family capacity to promote social equality is 
exhausted, but they are strongly committed to the preservation of social 
rights defined upon citizenship, rather than upon class status. The best 
examples are the Scandinavian countries (Carmel 1999).  
                                              
55 Ability of a worker (employee) to survive outside the labour market. 
Description by Carmel (1999). 
56 Extent to which occupational/class status in market place is 
produced or reproduce by the state. Description by Carmel (1999). 
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During the last fifteen years, the three-fold classifications of Titmuss 
and Esping-Andersen have been subjected to numerous attacks. 
Titmuss’ typology has been strongly condemned because of its 
inapplicability. Often, it has been shown that most welfare states 
embrace elements of all three models (see Pierson 1998). Esping-
Andersen’s distinction has also attracted its own critiques. Rieger (1998) 
criticized the conceptualization, arguing that the conceptual apparatus 
did not fulfill Weberian standards of sociological accuracy. Obinger and 
Wagschal (1998), on the other hand, called into question the research 
method itself, affirming a procedural weakness and a possible 
manipulation of the data, which might show a four-fold, rather than a 
three-fold, cluster (see also Castles and Mitchell 1993).  
Other observers have also pointed out that Esping-Andersen 
neglected several important peculiarities of the welfare state57. Lewis’ 
analysis (1992), for instance, focused on the relations between paid and 
unpaid work in the establishment of current welfare regimes. As a result, 
the author affirmed the existence of three different typologies built on 
the idea of a “male-breadwinner” model. “Strong Male-Breadwinner” 
countries (for example, Ireland and Great Britain) are based on 
women’s part-time labour market participation, lack of childcare services 
and maternity rights. The presence of inequality between husbands and 
wives with regard to social security is also a main characteristic. These 
countries are, therefore, described as strongly based on the dividing line 
between public and private responsibility (obviously at the expenses of 
women). France is an example of the second classification, defined as 
“Modified Male-Breadwinner”. Characteristics of these welfare systems 
are full-time jobs for women, who can also benefit from a relatively 
comprehensive social security system. Nonetheless, the role of wives-
mothers and paid workers place women in a condition of inferiority in 
relation to the full-covered and working male. The third example, called 
“Weak Male-Breadwinner” or “Dual-Breadwinner”, is the case of 
Sweden. Characteristics are women in paid employment by the 
introduction of separate taxation and parental leaves, and by increasing 
of childcare provision (Lewis 1992)58.  
Also the Italian political scientist Maurizio Ferrera (1993) stressed the 
importance of the labour market attachment in the establishment of 
welfare institutions. In his book Modelli di Solidarieta’ [Models of 
Solidarity], Ferrera suggested a four-fold model plus two 
underdeveloped welfare systems. These welfare states are described 
according to the axis “occupational” versus “universal”59. On the side of 
the work-related welfare states, France, Belgium, Germany and Austria 
are defined as “pure occupational”, while Switzerland, Italy, Netherlands 
                                              
57 For a response, see Esping-Andersen (1999) 
58 For the feminist critique to Esping-Andersen see also Lewis and 
Ostner (1995); Orloff (1993, 2002); Sainsbury (1994, 1996). 
59 In the essence, this two-fold classification is similar to the “Bismarck 
vs. Beveridge” typology provided by Palier and Bonoli (1995) and 
Bonoli (1997). 
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and Ireland are addressed as “mixed occupational”. According to 
Ferrera, this last group of countries is characterized by hybrid 
occupational structures in which a corporatist pension system is placed 
side by side to universal health care services. On the other side of the 
spectrum and precisely in that comprising the universal welfare 
systems, New Zealand, Canada and Great Britain are categorized as 
“mixed universal”, while Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are 
seen as “pure universal”. While the first group of nations seem to have 
slowly abandoned Beveridge-oriented social policies, the persistence of 
highly egalitarian values still characterizes the Scandinavian countries. 
Finally, due to the lack in the development of a coherent system of 
social protection, the United States is described as “underdeveloped 
occupational”, while Australia is seen as an “underdeveloped universal” 
welfare state.  
In 1996, Ferrera put aside this first classification affirming the 
existence of a “Southern Model60” of welfare, covering the 
Mediterranean part of Europe (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal). 
Peculiarities of this model are identified as (Ferrera 1996, p.17):  
“a) a highly fragmented and “corporatist” income maintenance 
system, displaying a market internal polarisation: peaks of generosity 
(for example, as regards pensions) accompanied by macroscopic gaps 
of protection; b) the departure from corporatist traditions in the field of 
health care, and the establishment (at least partially) of National Health 
services based on universalistic principles; c) a low degree of state 
penetration of the welfare and highly collusive mix between public and 
non public actors and institutions; d) the persistence of clientelism and 
the formation – in some cases- of fairly elaborated “patronage 
machines” for the selective distribution of cash subsidies”. 
Pre-empting these possible classifications61, Deacon made the first 
attempt to categorize the peculiarities of Central and Eastern European 
welfare states in 1992. In the last paragraph of the book The New 
Eastern Europe (Deacon 1992), the author suggested the emergence of 
a possible future “post-communist conservative corporatist” model 
related to Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. In his conceptualization, 
Czechoslovakia would have been a good example of social democratic 
welfare state, while Hungary and Slovenia examples of future liberal 
capitalist regimes. In the following years, however, this three-fold 
classification has not been supported by the necessary empirical 
evidence and seems to have been abandoned by the author who 
focused in later works on globalization and social policy (see Deacon et 
al. 1997).  
                                              
60 For the “Latin Rim” model of social policy see also Leibfried (1992) 
and Ferrera (1998). 
61 For a comprehensive synthesis of welfare classifications see also 
Arts and Gelissen (2002). 
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    Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a brief introduction to the most debated 
theories regarding the development of the welfare state in Europe. 
Paraphrasing Pierson (1998), it can be argued that the welfare state 
was the product of industrialized societies (both capitalist and state-
socialist), in terms of a struggle between political, economic and class-
based powers. It was a form of capitalist and state-socialist 
development, embodying the essentially contradictory nature of 
developed capitalism as well as the essentially contradictory nature of 
state-socialism. While on the one hand, it has secured the long-term 
circumstances for the continued accumulation of capital and power in 
both societies, being constituted through and divided by gender, race 
and class status, on the other, it has also fostered the development of a 
fully mature conception of citizenship. Its path-dependent development 
has been associated to and caused by the environment in which welfare 
institutions were growing. This has included: political configurations, 
political culture of the civil society, and historical background of the 
nation62. As a result of these forces, different national settings have 
produced a variety of welfare structures, which Esping-Andersen and 
numerous other authors (see above) have tried to summarize and to 
categorize, neglecting, however, to develop a logical social policy 
framework. This lack of development will be examined in more detail in 
the following chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
62 For a comprehensive list of authors see chapter 1, §1.2. 
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Chapter 2 
Path Dependency, Social Policy Vacuum, Institutions and 
Innovation: Toward a Neoclassical Social Policy 
 
    Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the factors responsible for the establishment of 
a determined model of welfare have been highlighted. In particular, it 
has called attention to the power relations between political and social 
actors. Moreover, the study of the culture and the history of a nation has 
been identified as a necessary step for the understanding of future 
welfare state developments. The relationship among social, political and 
historical forces remains, however, mostly unexplored. For this reason, 
the following section operates at two distinct levels (theoretical and 
practical) and has two main objectives. At the theoretical level, it offers a 
synthesis of three recent conceptual frameworks (which will be 
important for this research) developed to clarify the aspects behind an 
institutional transformation: path dependency theory, new-
institutionalism and neoclassical sociology. The intention is to provide a 
new paradigm in which the outcomes of any social policy re-
organization can be better studied. At the practical level, it tries to 
identify and to describe the role of the actors that shaped the social 
policy change in Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 
aim here is to provide a better picture of the relations between external 
influences and internal constraints in national decision-making. 
 
    1.1 Path-dependency Theory 
The notion of path-dependent transformation has only recently come to 
the attention of social and political scientists. The path dependency 
theory grew in the field of technological development, economics and, 
only at the end, reached political and post-communist studies (Beyer 
and Wielgohs 2001, p. 357). In its simplest sense, path dependent 
development means that the transformation in the technological, 
economic or political field highly depends on the environment in which 
conditions for change have been created. The classic statement of this 
theory is that small events produced in the past are likely to cause long-
last consequences (Bianco et al. 1997; Pierson 2000b).  
With regard to post-communist studies, the leading proponents of 
path dependency theory rejected the approach suggested by Karl and 
Schmitter (1991) who argued that the dissolution of the communist 
order resulted in a “political” or “institutional” vacuum in which new 
values could be easily implemented (Beyer and Wielgohs 2001). In Karl 
and Schmitter’s view once an important rupture with the past has begun 
new rules encourage some interests to enter the partisan political arena 
and discourage others (Karl and Schmitter 1991). In the case of Central 
and Eastern European societies, these new rules corresponded to neo-
liberal values. According to path dependent theorists, however, neo-
liberal principles recently introduced in post-communist societies have 
still to face the violent and long-lasting impact of historical legacies. 
Crawford and Lijphart (1997), for instance, pointed out that the social, 
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cultural and institutional structures created under the Leninist regimes 
and Soviet domination in Eastern Europe represent not only a long 
shadow on the present, but shape the environment in which the battle 
for new institutions will take place, ultimately undermining the 
liberalization process itself. For Offe (1996, p.217), “state socialist 
institutions have, as a rule, generated a state of mind, a set of 
expectations and assumptions that now often turn out to be inimical to 
the growth of democratic capitalist and civil institutions”. Views such as 
these portray communist legacies in largely negative terms. The 
communist heritage is seen as responsible for blocking the process of 
modernization of Central and Eastern European societies, and, 
perhaps, even in facilitating the return to some form of authoritarianism 
(Jowitt 1992). 
A substantially less brutal conception of path dependency theory 
rejected the idea of “political” or “institutional” vacuum as well as the 
notion that communist legacies might have produced negative effects in 
the process of transformation. Advocates of this view affirmed that even 
during the first years of transition there was still place for path-
dependent, but innovative decisions (Hausner et al. 1995; Stark 1992, 
1995; Stark and Bruszt 1998, 2001). For Stark (1992), the variety of 
privatization strategies in Central and Eastern Europe indicated that 
politicians could still implement different policies in accordance to the 
country’s cultural and historical heritage. In his words (Stark 1992, 
p.20), “it is in the ruins of communism that these societies will find the 
materials with which to build a new order” and not out of it. Moreover, it 
is “not by design” that capitalism can be introduced in these societies, 
but the “path of extrication” from state-socialism will be the result of 
mutations, reconfigurations and “recombinations” of pre-existent 
features (Stark 1995; Stark and Bruszt 1998, 2001). In brief, path 
dependence means for these authors neither restoration of the previous 
structure nor incapacity to build new institutions.  
Nonetheless, according to the most influential economists of this 
theory, the freedom of choice for innovative decisions tends to be 
confined (locked-in) in the early transitional period. In other words, once 
that a change has been made, all other possible solutions are 
automatically locked out from the early path of transformation (Arthur 
1989; David 1985). The reasons why this happens are explained by the 
fact that each change imposes significant net costs and, as a 
consequence, the actors involved in such change may find 
transformation unattractive in comparison to the status quo (David 1985; 
North 1990; Pierson 1993, 2000b). For Ackermann (2001), however, 
even though actors do not take the best possible decision (“pareto 
optimal”), this is more the result of the logical implications of any path 
dependent process, rather than the explicit evidence of “evolution’s 
failure”. 
In sharp contrast to the assumption that future changes will unlikely 
happen once that a path of transformation has been introduced, Beyer 
and Wielgohs (2001) argued that later changes in the political 
constellation were not irrelevant for the further course of privatization in 
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East Central Europe. In the hands of these authors, path dependency 
theory would be abandoned, being at the moment “not more than a 
metaphorical formula that history matters and that there is continuity 
also in the process of social change” (Beyer and Wielgohs 2001, p. 
387). According to their point of view, the process of transformation in 
Eastern Europe is still an on-going process, which does not allow stable 
observable outcomes. Thus, path dependency theory might be helpful 
only once that the “mode” of transition has been concluded.  
Is path dependency theory, as expressed so far, sufficient to explain 
the “path of extrication” from state-socialist welfare states? Or, again, 
fifteen years after the dissolution of communism, some modification is 
required? To defend the importance of path dependency theory, this 
book will demonstrate that contemporary Eastern European welfare 
states were not introduced by design or by dictation, but have been built 
on communist and pre-communist ruins. As Stark has insisted, the 
communist and pre-communist heritage did not block, but created 
opportunities for great innovation. Interestingly, innovative decisions did 
not remain confined to the early transitional period, but were possible 
also in later stages of development. This last statement proves by no 
means the inconsistency of path dependency theory, but simply, as Di 
Palma (1990, p.129) has emphasized, that “rules are adaptable to 
changes”. Indeed, each path dependent change cannot be simply 
explained in terms of stable transformation over time, but needs to be 
reconsidered in developmental terms. For this reason, I am tempted to 
use the expression “developmental path dependence” to define the 
multi-linear approach to transformation of post-communist societies, 
which is certainly characterized by legacies, but it is also highly 
innovative and in continuous reconstruction.  
Finally, this kind of definition allows us to introduce the concept of 
“path creation” coined by Garud and Karnøe (2001) and extensively 
discussed by Lessenich (2003). According to this new version, path 
dependency must be reconciled with an actor-centred theory (Crouch 
and Farrel 2002), which includes the action of “institutional 
entrepreneurs” (Beckert 1999). In particular, as Lessenich (2003) 
describes, social and institutional actors can succeed to create a new 
path (path creation) by “playing with the old one”, or, in other words, 
“using embeddedeness to disembed” (Lessenich 2003, p.8; see also 
Beckert 1999; Garud and Karnøe 2001; Crouch and Farrel 2002; 
Crouch 2003). It is thus evident that, through such a mechanism of 
institutional creation, path dependence, deviation from the early 
transitional logic and innovation do not exclude each other, but are part 
of the same process. 
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    1.2 New Institutionalism and Neoclassical Sociology 
But how do we explain the relationships among the numerous actors 
involved in the process of transformation of Central and Eastern 
European societies? In fact, one of the main concerns of social 
observers of all epochs has always been the identification of actors able 
to shape the directions of change. The institutionalist, and later new-
institutionalist, approach in sociology has correctly focused on four 
important factors to improve understanding of the development of 
modern societies: history, institutions, environment and social 
interactions. According to the (new)-institutionalists, any analysis of 
societal change should consider the complex mediation among the 
historical background, institutional settings and social interactions of 
individuals and organizations. More precisely, it is argued that not only 
history matters, but also institutions and the social environment in which 
they are embedded63.  
The concept of “embeddedness” was formally introduced by Polanyi 
et al. in 1957, but it can be traced back to the work of Max Weber on the 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ([1904-1905] 1958) and in 
Economy and Society ([1922] 1968). In the Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber affirmed that different religious settings 
influenced the construction of different, peculiar forms of capitalism. 
What the author envisaged was the existence of a variety of rationalities 
coming into light from different socio-cultural contexts. The idea of 
“context-bounded rationality” was developed more clearly in the book 
Economy and Society. According to the author, the analysis of different 
organizational structures should be carried out within the context of the 
specific institutional framework of a given society in a given historical 
period, in which conventions, social norms, religious and cultural beliefs 
grow up and reproduce themselves64 (Nee 1998).  
The historical and comparative analysis of different forms of market 
organizations, pioneered by Weber, was later developed by Karl Polanyi 
in the Great Transformation ([1944] 1957). In his most famous and 
debated book, Polanyi attacked those theorists who portrayed the 
market as a self-regulating, self-sufficient organism, able to reproduce 
itself without intervention from outside. For the author, a pure form of an 
unregulated market simply never existed. Rather, the institutional 
approach proposed by the author identified the State as a crucial 
institution in limiting the satanic effects of uncontrolled market forces 
                                              
63 For more information on new-institutionalism in sociology, see Brinton 
and Nee (1998).  
64 In Economy and Society, Weber ([1922] 1968) also identifies a 
fourfold typology of action: a) instrumentally rational (zweckrational) 
according to which individuals rationally choose means and action; b) 
value rational (wertrational) according to which action is determined by 
individual’s moral values or cultural beliefs; c) affective (affektuell) in 
which action is chosen on the basis of an emotional decision; d) 
traditional (traditional) in which action is determined by the “habitus” of 
everyday life. 
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(Nee 1998). In a subsequent publication, Polanyi et al. (1957) 
expressed more clearly the relationships among market development, 
institutions and social interaction. For these authors, economic 
outcomes depend not only on institutional settings, but also on how 
economic actions are embedded in social structures (Porter and 
Sensenbrenner 1998). Thus, as Nee (1998) has emphasized, the 
concept of “embeddedeness” expressed by Polanyi et al. was not very 
dissimilar from the idea of “context-bounded rationality” introduced by 
Weber half-century before.  
Granovetter (1985) and North (1981, 1990) provide a more recent 
contribution to this debate. According to Granovetter’s institutional 
approach, social networks of interpersonal relationships highly influence 
economic behaviour and, thus, contribute to different outcomes, shaping 
directions of change. In particular, as North (1981, 1990) has pointed 
out, institutions are crucial to shape economic performance by: a) 
determining the structure of incentives; b) reducing uncertainty in 
human interactions; and c) helping to solve the problem of coordination 
(see also Ingram and Nee 1998). In a more recent publication, North 
(1998) clarifies this early argument. According to North (1998, pp. 248-
9),  
“institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction. They are made of formal constraints (for 
example, rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (for 
example, norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together, they 
define the incentive structure of societies and, specifically, 
economics […] It is the interaction between institutions and 
organizations that shapes the institutional evolution of an economy. 
If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and their 
entrepreneurs are the players. Organizations are made up of 
groups of individuals bound together by some common purpose to 
achieve certain objectives. Organizations include political bodies 
(political parties, the Senate, a city council, regulatory bodies), 
economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), 
social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic associations) and 
educational bodies (schools, universities, vocational training 
centers”.  
Moreover, North explains that ideas, ideologies, myths, dogmas and 
prejudices must not be separated by the historical context in which they 
are embedded (timing matters!) and that the study of societal change is, 
in effect, the study of a learning process in which individuals’ mental 
models do play a crucial role. Again, for North (1998, p. 251): 
“Learning entails developing a structure by which to interpret the 
varied signals received by the senses. […] A common cultural 
heritage provides a means of reducing the divergence in the mental 
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models that people in a society have and constitutes the means for 
the intergenerational transfer of unifying perceptions. […] Belief 
structures get transformed into societal and economic structures by 
institutions – both formal rules and informal norms of behavior. The 
relationship between mental models and institutions is an intimate 
one. Mental models are the internal representations that individual 
cognitive systems create to interpret the environment, institutions 
are the external (to the mind) mechanisms individuals create to 
structure and order the environment”.   
According to the cognitive/institutional approach proposed by North, 
history, institutions and culture – understood in terms of collective 
learning – are key elements to understand the path-dependent evolution 
of modern societies. Similarly, Homans ([1961] 1974) emphasizes that 
norms (both formal and informal) are forms of social capital, which 
highly influence individuals and group performance (Nee 1998). In 
particular, formal and informal norms shape individuals’ activities by 
means of sanctions associated to a determined “deviant” social 
behaviour. In the course of their life, individuals learn to distinguish what 
is socially acceptable for the rest of the community from what it is not. 
The result of this learning process, which is the product of social 
interaction, leads to the acquisition of new and important tools, which 
will guide individuals in the realization of long-term benefits by 
constraining their short-term private gains (see Homans [1961] 1974; 
Nee 1998). 
So, according to what pattern do history, institutions, norms and 
cultural beliefs shape societal change? Similarly, for Talcott Parsons 
(1990), the institutional framework is an organized system of cultural 
beliefs and norms common to most individuals who are part of a 
determined society. This organized system of cultural beliefs develops 
according to an evolutionary mutation characterized by a continuous 
process of upgrading previous (sub)structures. As a result of the 
“adaptive upgrading” of past characteristics, differentiation and 
integration are synthesized in a new, more complex organism (Parsons 
1966). Although Parsons understands evolution merely as a continuous 
process of upgrading with relation to the strongest characteristics that 
survive, comparing Israel and the Ancient Greece, the author 
remembers that “the fact the Kingdom of David and Salomon and the 
Polis of Athens were eliminated did not destroy their future cultural 
contribution” (Parsons 1966, p.110). In other words, even if some 
element may disappear from the scene as a result of “successful 
adaptive upgrading”, this does not imply that other characteristics, such 
as cultural influences, did not continue to play an important role in future 
developments. Not very far from Parsons’ theory of societal change, is 
the evolutionary approach of Luhmann (1991). Even in this case, the 
author understands evolution as a causal process, a form of 
differentiation and integration of systems, in which functions of variation, 
selection and stabilization are combined through different mechanisms. 
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For Luhmann, the analysis of evolutionary processes cannot be 
discerned by the historical and social context in which functional 
mechanisms take place. According to the author, indeed, “every 
economic action is social action” (Luhmann 1988, p.8).  
In a similar vein, neoclassical sociologists (Eyal et al. 2001, 2003) 
have moved the debate on new-institutionalism a step forward. Taking 
East Central Europe as a laboratory to test new sociological theories, 
Eyal et al. (2001, 2003) have argued that neither sociological theories of 
network and embeddedness, nor a rational choice explanation65, can be 
exhaustive in understanding the path of state-socialist transformation. 
The main reason for this lies in the fact that these theories have 
assumed the existence of a single unifying form of capitalism (see, for 
instance, Burawoy 2001). By contrast, for these authors, social 
positions, points of view, identities and alliances of national and 
international actors as well as habitus of individuals and existence of 
peculiar institutions are decisive to the development of new forms of 
capitalism in CEE (Eyal et al. 2001, 2003). As a consequence, recalling 
Max Weber, neoclassical sociologists affirm that a variety of rationalities 
coming from different socio-cultural contexts will result in a variety of 
capitalism(s) in which the Eastern European might form a unique model. 
The authors, however, do not exclude that, in the long-term, post-
socialist societies will converge to the neo-liberal capitalism, but this 
speculation seems to be more part of futurology rather than of social 
sciences, which must focus on observable empirical evidences. 
 
 
1.3 Actors and Strategies in the Making of Post-Communist Social 
Policy  
When addressing the implications of changes in Central and Eastern 
European welfare states, the reasons behind the decision to carry out a 
determined reform must be defined. It must be made clear why national 
governments opted for a specific policy orientation, as well as the extent 
to which other non-domestic actors influenced this decision. In other 
words, it is essential to define the level of freedom in national decision-
making. In fact, it is now widely accepted that international organizations 
considerably influenced the path of transformation of Central and 
Eastern European welfare states, substantially limiting governments’ 
                                              
65 According to rational choice theorists, “action” can be simply explained 
by the individual’s personal and economic expectations. As a result, 
every action is essentially instrumental and made on the basis of the 
specific material benefits that the individual may receive. For Boudon 
(1998), however, action can also be made on the basis of non-
instrumental reasons. As Boudon (1998, p. 825) affirms, “in some 
circumstances actors do X not because they expect any desirable 
consequence, but because they are convinced that X is good, since it is 
grounded on strong reasons. […] I vote because I think I should vote. I 
think I should vote because I have strong reasons to believe in 
democracy”.  
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autonomy in carrying out the necessary reforms (Deacon et al. 1997; 
Kapstein and Milanovic 2001). According to Deacon et al. (1997), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and, more recently, 
the European Union (EU) and the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) were among the first international institutions, which used their 
power to shape post-communist social policies. From the date of the 
article’s and book’s publication onwards (Deacon and Hulse 1997; 
Deacon et al. 1997), the list of possible “intruders” in national decision-
making is exponentially increased, including the WHO, WTO, private 
insurance companies (such as the German Allianz AG), and 
international non-state actors (such as international consultancies and 
international NGOs). Needless to say, market fundamentalism was the 
way chosen by most of these actors. The day after the end of the Cold 
War, the main idea leading the path of extrication from state-socialism 
was, indeed, the one theorized by the US social analyst and political 
commentator Francis Fukujama  (Blazyca 2003). In his book, The End 
of History and the Last Man (1992), Fukujama celebrated the liberal 
democracy and the economic performance of capitalism as the final 
forms of human government. Regardless of academic accuracy, this 
vision of modernization had a huge impact not only on the New 
American Right, but also on less neo-liberal-oriented political fractions 
of the old continent.  
Once that political and economic rules were defined, all spheres of 
transformation of Central and Eastern European societies had to follow 
accordingly. Bismarck social insurance was obviously the favourite way 
for three main reasons. First, because this kind of welfare arrangement 
was already in place in the pre-Soviet period, and, in many cases, parts 
of its structure survived also to the most drastic Soviet re-organization 
(see for example Poland and Hungary). Second, because the Bismarck 
orientation allowed the fast privatization of important state sectors (such 
as pension and health care system). Finally, because the communist 
welfare state had a mix character: corporatist and universal at the same 
time. The state-socialist system of social protection was work-related 
with respect to coverage, but basically all citizens were employed by the 
state. As a result, there was no contradiction between these two 
principles: the command economy artificially resolved the problem. 
 
 
1.3.1 The European Union and the Enlargement 
After many years of negotiations, the enlargement of the European 
Union has finally become a reality. The benefits of enlarging the 
European Union have been frequently emphasized and identified as 
being political, economic and cultural. For the thirteen countries that 
expressed their interest to join the EU, the accession was not free of 
charge. These candidates needed to fulfil the economic and political 
conditions known as the “Copenhagen Criteria”. These criteria implied 
a) be a stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and 
the protection of minorities; b) have a functioning market economy; c) 
   53
adopt the common rules, standards and policies that make up the body 
of EU law (source: DG Enlargement web site). 
In more practical terms, the candidate countries were (and some 
applicants still are) engaged in negotiations, which involved the 
completion of 31 Chapters. These chapters were the observable 
expression of the so-called “acquis communitaire”, which was the set of 
laws and rules defined by the Treaty of Rome, Maastricht and 
Amsterdam (the EU’s funding treaties). The four most important 
chapters were: 
• Chapter 1: Free Movement of Goods; 
• Chapter 2: Free Movement of Persons; 
• Chapter 3: Freedom to Provide Services; 
• Chapter 4: Free Movement of Capital. 
These chapters corresponded to the four basic freedoms of the 
European Union (Peterson and Bomberg 1999, p. 62). Chapter 13 dealt 
with employment and social policy. The Employment and Social Policy 
Chapter covered health and safety issues, labour law, equality of 
treatment between women and men, social dialogue, employment and 
social protection66. According to the EU legislation, “in these areas there 
were no legal obligations to implement precise policy-measures, but a 
very important general obligation to co-ordinate the respective policies 
in order to develop a homogenous social framework in line with the 
principle and rules of the EU treaties” (source: DG Enlargement web 
site67). The most important financial assistance programmes to assist 
these countries in adopting EU laws were PHARE (institution building), 
SAPARD (agricultural and rural development support), and ISPA 
(environment and transport investment support). In addition, the 
candidate countries had access to TAIEX  (Technical Assistance 
Information Exchange Office) which concerned “twinning” (training) of 
civil servants.   
Unquestionably, the prospect of enlargement played a crucial role in 
influencing government’s decisions to modernize their respective 
democracies. Nonetheless, many authors have emphasized the 
incapacity of the European Union to promote a clear vision of social 
policy (Deacon et al. 1997; De la Porte and Deacon 2002). De la Porte 
and Deacon (2002) noted, for instance, that social policy was not a 
priority in the Enlargement process. PHARE aid spent on the 
                                              
66 For further information on European social policy see Leibfried and 
Pierson (1995) and Hantrais (1995). For recent updates, see the Journal 
of European Social Policy Digest or the web site of the EU DG-
Employment and Social Affairs Directorate General official web site: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/employment_social/index_en.htm. Last 
log-in: January 2004. 
67 Available URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index.htm 
Last log-in: January 2003. 
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modernization of the social security system corresponded, indeed, to a 
very small part of the total budget, approximately 3.6 per cent during the 
period 1990 to 1998 (see also Lendvai 2004). This amount also 
decreased to 3.2 per cent in the following years (see PHARE Annual 
Report 1998, 1999, 2000). Ferge (2002) arrived to a similar conclusion, 
observing that the European Union was in reality developing different 
social policy agendas: one for the member states promoting solidarity 
values as part of the so-called “European Social Model68”; and one for 
the candidate countries, favouring privatization of pensions and health 
care. Interestingly, Ferge (2002) noted that this last agenda was rather 
close to that of the monetarist supranational agencies69.  
Critiques focused not only on the work of EU institutions70, but also 
the PHARE programme itself. The European Court of Auditors often 
expressed its disappointment for the “disruption caused to the candidate 
countries by introducing too many changes [in the organization of the 
programme] at the same time, some of which had not been sufficiently 
worked out in advance” (European Commission 2000a, p 7). Special 
attention was also requested for further improvements in project design 
and management (Eureval-C3E and PLS RAMBØLL Management 
2003), with only about 56 per cent of the projects rated as satisfactory at 
the end of 2000. With respect to the “Twinning“ of civil servants, the EU 
Court of Auditors repeatedly stated that the European Commission 
should still “demonstrate that it was achieving adequate value for 
                                              
68 The EU frequently points out in its official papers that Western Europe 
spends more money in social protection than other countries and, thus, 
this is, according to EU officials, the clearest evidence of the emergence 
of a “European Social Model” (see De la Porte and Deacon 2002), which 
should involve „high levels of social protection for all citizens” or, at 
least, an extensive basic social security. For some observers, however, 
this European Social Model simply doesn’t exist, but it is more a political 
slogan (Wincott 2003), or “a good term to use in the presentation of 
project proposals” to be submitted for EU financing (Interview 1). 
69 In this account, the crucial role played by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in the privatization process of 
East Central Europe is worthy of note. The main policy strategy of the 
EBRD was, in fact, “to combine its particular strengths with those of 
other international financial institutions and of the European Union to 
achieve common objectives” (EBRD 2003). The EBRD’s Transition 
Reports, for example, ranked countries on the basis of the successful 
implementation of reforms from a planned to a market economy, with 
the highest mark corresponding, of course, to successful privatization 
strategies (EBRD 1999).  
70 For Grabbe (2003), the EU accession process has primarily been 
conducted on the basis of the model implemented in previous waves of 
enlargements. This has inexorably involved a systematic 
misunderstanding of the needs of the new acccession countries. 
According to the author, the structure of economic and regulatory 
policies imposed by the EU has often been inappropriate for countries 
facing a painful economic restructuring.  
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money” (read cost/benefits) (see European Commission 2000a, p 7). 
Finally, the absence of a coherent social policy strategy in ‘projects’ 
implementation was frequently highlighted in numerous independent 
evaluation reports. The majority of these documents affirmed that “there 
was in general no specific PHARE strategy determining the activities, 
including what should be funded - and what should not be funded […] 
(GOPA 1998, pp. 4-5; see also Gaude and Vinard 2000)”. The main 
conclusion was that “PHARE was, in general, a policy-taker” and that “in 
order to enhance EC leverage over outputs and results, PHARE should 
have moved from an inputs-driven approach to a conditionality driven 
approach with direct payments in function of effectively adopted and 
implemented acquis” (Euroservices Developments Belgium 1999, p.12; 
Office of International Policy Services and HUKS 1999). 
 
    1.3.2 World Bank  
The World Bank has often been recognized as the most influential 
international organization in the making of post-communist social policy 
(see Orenstein 1998; Müller 1999, 2002, 2004). The policy directives of 
the World Bank have been extremely successful during the entire period 
of reforms. This has involved not only the achievement of economic 
objectives (for example, financial viability), as it would be expected from 
a credit institution, but also the achievement of political aims. 
The World Bank’s main strategic goal in East Central Europe has 
been to promote the transition to a market-based economy, by: 1) 
supporting macroeconomic stabilization mainly through the request of 
carrying out austerity measures (often in conjunction with the IMF); 2) 
promoting the expansion of private sector activity; and 3) addressing 
poverty establishing a financially sustainable, neo-liberal oriented 
welfare state. This has involved: a) policy advice (and workshops) b) 
loans, and c) technical assistance.  
As far as the social security system is concerned, the World Bank’s 
main areas of interest are: 
• Pension (three-pillar scheme71) 
• Health Care (health insurance) 
• Residual Social Safety Net (residual unemployment 
insurance and targeted social assistance in order to avoid 
welfare dependence) 
Lending did not always materialize as planned, but strongly depended 
on the successful implementation of the proposed reforms. In the 
Bulgarian case, for instance, lending volumes fell to 65 per cent of 
proposed levels because reforms were not implemented as discussed 
(World Bank -OED- Bulgaria 2002, p.3). Also in the case of Poland, 
which began negotiations with the Bank three years before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, no lending was granted because the conditionality of the 
                                              
71 See World Bank (1994). 
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agreement with the requests of the IMF was not met. As the World Bank 
Evaluation Department describes  (World Bank -OED - Poland 1997, 
p.27):  
“After initially opposing lending to Poland, some of the Bank’s major 
shareholders reversed their position in the months leading up to the 
appointment of the Solidarity-led government in 1989 and began to urge 
the Bank to accelerate project preparation. In six weeks at the end of 
1989 the Bank shifted its proposed strategy in response to calls from 
shareholders to clearly demonstrate the Bank’s full endorsement of the 
reform program and exploit opportunities for assistance.”  
The reasons why the World Bank created a US$2.6 billion program in 
such a short period of time have been explained by the same officials 
that recreated the program (World Bank - OED – Poland 1997, p.29): 
• “the World Bank was under great pressure from shareholders 
to support the reform program in Poland and to lend”; 
• “the Bank was able to influence policy and encourage 
macroeconomic discipline and tough but necessary reforms 
through loan conditions”  
Without going into a detailed identification of all World Bank’s 
shareholders72, it is worth noting that according to the World Bank’s 
Articles of Agreement the Executive Directors of France, Germany, 
Japan, United Kingdom and United States have the largest number of 
shares and, consequently, the biggest power in decision-making. In 
many cases, these countries are now actively involved with their private 
insurance companies in the privatization of the social security system in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This obviously raises the question of 
whether the policy directives of the World Bank were only trying to 
achieve democratic stabilization through the message “loans in 
exchange for reforms” or whether national economic interests of 
shareholders were not part of the influences behind the reform package.  
In conclusion, the aims and objectives of the World Bank have been 
clearly in line with a global and all-embracing understanding of the 
reform process, which has been carried out through the following main 
strategies: 
 
 
 
a) Policy Advice ⇒ Lending ⇒ Technical Assistance Strategy 
                                              
72 The World Bank is a group of four banks (IBRD, IFC, IDA, MIGA) 
governed by its 184 member countries through the Board of Governors 
and the Board of Executive Directors. These bodies make all major policy 
decisions for the organization. See World Bank web site: 
http://www.worldbank.org. Last log-in: January 2004. 
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Policy Advice: The World Bank often financed workshops on the 
reform of the pension system or health care financing. These workshops 
were a good starting point to promote the three-pillar scheme of pension 
insurance or the health insurance model of financing. These workshops 
were also very useful in involving national experts and clarifying the 
World Bank’s expectations (examples can be found in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and so on).  
Lending: once that political agreement on the proposed reforms was 
found, discussions about the possibility for granting loans started and, if 
carried out according to the time-table, loans were granted as planned. 
Technical Assistance: once that loans were granted and reforms 
began, the World Bank sent a few, influential experts to monitor the 
implementation of projects. The World Bank emphasizes, for instance, 
in a recent Evaluation Report on Technical Assistance in Bulgaria the 
positive results achieved by “intensive, high quality technical assistance, 
through two permanent advisers, that were available to the NSSI 
[Bulgarian National Social Security Institute] for one week in every 
month” (World Bank - OED - Bulgaria 2002, p.9). 
 
b) Multi-disciplinary Strategy 
The multi-disciplinary strategy was carried out involving numerous 
sectors in the process of reforms (for example, financial, 
telecommunications, and social protection). This was associated to the 
strategy of conditionality for granting loans (lending granted in one 
sector, for instance, the railway sector, was conditional upon reforms in 
another sector, for instance, the pension sector). The “conditionality 
strategy” had a huge impact on the overall process of reform. To clarify, 
the EU granted a total of 10 931 million Euros in financial assistance 
during the period 1990-2002, but approximately only 3 per cent was 
spent for social policy reforms (for example, pension sector). In the EU 
case, the total impact of aid in the social policy sector was thus equal to 
the 3 per cent effectively spent in this field. Although the World Bank’s 
commitments for Central and Eastern Europe reached a similar sum of 
13 316 million USD73 during the same period with only about 3 per cent 
of total amount (414 million USD) spent for social protection issues. Due 
to a domino effect, the strategy of conditionality produced a final impact 
on social policy reforms, not of 3 per cent as in the case of EU 
assistance, but equal to 100 per cent. 
 
 c) Strategy of global context 
While the strategy of the EU backed projects that could be 
immediately identified by their clear planning, implementation and 
timetabling, (Interview no. 1, Interview no. 2, Interview no. 7) in this 
research, the strategy of the World Bank involved specific and broad 
projects, but in strategic sectors, which influenced further reforms of the 
social security system. The reorganization of the National Social 
Security Institute (NSSI) in Bulgaria is again an emblematic example. As 
                                              
73 Exchange rate 1 USD is close to 1 Euro.  Date: October 2002. 
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a member of the Bank’s staff affirmed “[although] the project did not 
include a policy component but it aimed simply to strengthen capacity of 
the NSSI in administration and policy analysis, […] without waiting for 
agreement on policy changes […], the NSSI developed policies that 
were technically sound and publicly acceptable, allowing quick passage 
through parliament of legislation to support the introduction of second 
and third pillars in the pension system” (Interviews with Bank staff and 
others in Bulgaria, quoted in World Bank -OED- Bulgaria 2002, p. 9). 
 
d) Strategy of Direct Involvement. Both the EU and the World Bank 
involved local partners in the implementation of projects. Nonetheless, 
the extent of local involvement and the impact varied considerably. The 
World Bank organized workshops, financed conferences, granted loans 
and, at the end of this bargaining process, controlled the implementation 
through constant technical advice. The EU had a similar approach, but 
two main problems emerged. The first problem was with respect to the 
level of expertise of the specialists in charge for technical advice, which 
was frequently rated, to use a euphemism, as dubious (Interview no. 274 
and Interview no. 1075; see also De la Porte and Deacon 2002). The 
second problem was with regard to the dispersion of PHARE funds to 
western consultancies, which resulted in lower financial aid at disposal 
for CEECs.  
 
   1.3.3 International Monetary Fund  (IMF)  
Amongst the most important international financial institutions, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was certainly the one, which 
promoted more firmly liberalization, privatization and macro-economic 
stabilization as a main conditionality for granting access to loans. Legal 
and institutional reforms were the main political science tools for 
assessing the feasibility and sustainability of planned transformation. 
The Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, concerning general 
                                              
74 Interview no. 2: “There is a lack of reliable EU civil servants (experts). 
For example, we currently have a guy in this Ministry (EU junior expert), 
who has no idea about his job. We have to give him an office and we 
have also to teach him what he has to do. At the end, we’re providing 
him with technical assistance and not the other way around. I 
understand that this is useful for his career, but this is not supposed to 
be our job”.  
75 Interview no. 10: “It would be undemocratic to say that the EU 
“experts” are too expensive. The problem is that they’re not always 
serious. We don’t need experts, who treat us as unskilled civil servants. 
When you talk with “experts” (from the EU or from Western countries), 
you have almost always the feeling that they know better what is good 
for you. They know better what should be done. What is particularly 
annoying is the fact that they still think that you have to be trained from 
the basics. Every time a new expert comes, he/she always starts from 
the very beginning (ABC). We don’t really need this kind of experts. 
What we really need is “advanced training”.  
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obligations for members, provides the basis to the IMF to influence 
national decision-making. The introductory section 1 states:  
“Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international 
monetary system is to provide a framework that facilitates the 
exchange of goods, services, and capital among countries, and that 
sustains sound economic growth, and that a principal objective is 
the continuing development of the orderly underlying conditions that 
are necessary for financial and economic stability, each member 
undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to 
assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable 
system of exchange rates. In particular, each member shall 
endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the 
objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable 
price stability, with due regard to its circumstances […]”. 
Section 3. (Surveillance over Exchange Arrangements) supplies the 
tool for the implementation of IMF’s objectives: 
“The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order 
to ensure its effective operation, and shall oversee the compliance 
of each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article 
(Section 3.a)[…]. In order to fulfill its functions under (a) above, the 
Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate 
policies of members, and shall adopt specific principles for the 
guidance of all members with respect to those policies. Each 
member shall provide the Fund with the information necessary for 
such surveillance, and, when requested by the Fund, shall consult 
with it on the member’s exchange rate policies (Section 3.b.). This 
involves official IMF staff missions to the member countries, who 
aimed at monitoring the exact implementation of planned reforms”. 
In a period in which “No Global” demonstrations take place on a 
regular basis in all the most important European and non-European 
cities, every critique on the work of international organizations seems to 
be superfluous. It is difficult to quote all the voices that call for a 
“globalization with a human face” (see for instance UNDP 1999; Deacon 
1999, 2003; ILO 2004; World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalization 2004), but the most interesting and probably painful 
critique came from inside the World Bank itself. The Bank’s ex-chief 
economist and winner of the Nobel Prize for economics in 2001, Joseph 
Stiglitz, condemned, throughout his book on Globalization and its 
Discontents (2002), the political economic approach of the IMF, arguing 
that the “IMF structural adjustment policies –the policies designed to 
help a country adjust to crises as well as to more persistent imbalances- 
led to hunger and riots in many countries; and even when results were 
not so dire, even when they managed to eke out some growth for a 
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while, often the benefits went disproportionately to the better-off, with 
those at the bottom sometimes facing even greater poverty” (Stiglitz 
2002, p.XIV). For Stiglitz, the IMF excessively focused on austerity 
measures, trying to contain external debt by making unfair pressures on 
national economies. According to the author, governments of 
developing countries were often so afraid they might lose IMF funding, 
and with it funding from others, that they even avoided to express their 
doubts on very questionable policy guidelines (Stiglitz 1997, 2002). 
Stiglitz concluded that the IMF was playing the role of a political 
institution and that its political aims only rarely corresponded to the 
needs of developing countries. The IMF was also accused of making 
mistakes in  “sequencing” the order in which institutions and reforms 
were implemented. In other words, wild liberalization was often initiated 
before a well-functioning market mechanism and safety nets able to 
amortize its high social costs were put in place. The results of this 
policy-making were thousand of new and unprotected unemployed. 
 
1.3.4 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 
Debate about the nature of the OECD strategy for East Central Europe 
has often emphasized the fact that the institution’s priorities 
corresponded to the political and economic interests of its most 
influential member states (Deacon et al. 1997). The OECD policy advice 
and recommendations are disseminated through the Country Economic 
Surveys, which aim to let member and non-member countries know 
what the Organization expects from the respective governments. 
Regardless of differences among nations, “market fundamentalism” is 
the main policy priority of the Country Surveillance Reports, which 
should take place through: a) the reduction of social security 
expenditures; b) the privatization of all remaining state-owned 
enterprises (as quickly as possible); c) the three-pillar system of pension 
insurance; and d) residual safety net concerning all other sectors of 
social protection.  
In the light of the OECD “market fundamentalism”, observers have 
argued that the emphasis on free trade in the international agreements 
between advanced countries can be seen as the equivalent of the 
conditionality imposed by the IMF and World Bank (Grinspun and 
Kreklewich 1994). This especially applies when it takes the form of 
“moral suasion” (McBride and Russel 2001). An example of “moral 
suasion” is observable in all OECD policy recommendations. In the case 
of Bulgaria (OECD: Bulgaria 1999), for instance, the OECD welcomed 
the government’s announcement to adhere to the budgetary balance in 
the area of social policy, as proposed by the Currency Board76, arguing 
that “a difficult and painful process of restructuring must precede 
sustainable growth” (OECD: Bulgaria 1999, p.11). For the Baltic 
States, included in a special session of the Economic Review (OECD: 
                                              
76 The Currency Board was instituted by the IMF in order to control 
monetary policies. 
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Baltic States 2000), the recent increase in labour market flexibility was 
not evaluated as a sufficient measure to speed the economic growth, 
but social policies in general needed better targeting. For the authors of 
the report “in the long-run minimum pensions and means-tested social 
assistance benefits should be gradually increased up to the level of an 
objective defined poverty line. But this can only be done in line with 
economic progress so as not to prejudice economic potential” (OECD: 
Baltic States 2000, p. 17).  As far as the Czech Republic is concerned, 
the OECD (OECD: Czech Republic 2001) suggested that a less 
generous benefit indexation system and the expansion of private 
pension schemes were necessary to improve the sustainability of the 
social insurance fund. In an economic survey two years later (OECD: 
Czech Republic 2003), the introduction of a second private tier, the 
adoption of more privately sponsored health care and the decrease in 
labour protection were seen as the most urgent reforms. Regardless of 
the possible repercussions on the population, radical rather than 
palliative changes should have been the main characteristics of such 
reforms. Following the same pattern, the OECD openly suggested to the 
Hungarian authorities to reconsider the most recent reforms aimed to 
lower the role of private-tiers in the new pension scheme (OECD: 
Hungary 2002, 2004). According to OECD experts, the long-term 
sustainability of reforms should not be put in danger by reasons 
connected to the transitional deficit of the three-pillar scheme. In the 
case of Poland, on the other hand, little regret was expressed on the 
current reforms of the pension system. The main focus was rather on 
labour market policies. Despite the possible danger of mass lay-offs, the 
OECD (OECD: Poland 2002, pp.5-17) strongly recommended that “high 
unemployment should not be a reason to retain state controls over the 
enterprise sector”. Privatization of state-owned enterprises, decrease of 
the tax wage and reduction of labour costs were also the right measures 
to implement, “as quickly as possible”. Similar suggestion “to remove all 
possible barriers for new business” was given to Romania (OECD: 
Romania 2002, p.10). Finally, in the case of the Slovak Republic, the 
Parliament decisions to increase retirement age in the pension system 
and to switch to a funded scheme was particularly welcomed. However, 
“first, the envisaged funded pillar should play a much larger role to cope 
with population ageing. Second, the retirement age should be raised to 
65” (OECD: Slovakia 2002, p.13; OECD: Slovakia 2004). 
In many ways, the requests of the OECD support the hypothesis of 
those scholars who affirm that the global market creates incentives for a 
“race to the bottom” in which standards in social protection are 
systematically lowered because of cross-national competition77. By 
contrast, Armingeon and Beyeler (2003) have emphasized that although 
the OECD is a coherent think tank that promotes clear and coherent 
advice, it is not capable of playing a prominent role in national welfare 
state retrenchment, partly because of its limited possibilities to apply 
                                              
77 For a detailed discussion on the issue of “social dumping” see § 
Conclusions in this book. 
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sanctions to the recommendations expressed in the Country Surveillance 
Reports. In any case, however, it should be remembered that the 
exposure of workers to greater insecurity caused by the forces of 
globalization would require more comprehensive and more effective 
welfare states, since they are now called to face new challenges. In critical 
response to the OECD recommendations, McBride and Russell (2001) 
have demonstrated that there is little or no convergence between the 
implementation of the OECD strategy and successful economic 
development. In other words, the countries that have adopted more firmly 
the OECD employment strategy did not perform better than those 
countries that did not.  
 
1.3.5 Other Actors: ILO, WHO, WTO, International Non-State Actors 
(ICCs and INGOs), Private Insurance Companies  
Close to the aforementioned trans-national actors, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) was certainly a crucial actor in providing know-
how, on labour market issues, to ministries and policy-makers in Eastern 
Europe. The main tasks of the ILO Subregional Office for Central and 
Eastern Europe78 in Budapest are: a) to provide technical assistance by 
training; b) to carry out research; c) and to monitor the employment 
situation. The office has also been responsible for implementing numerous 
programs, such as the project “Strengthening Social Security in Central 
and Eastern Europe through Research and Technical Cooperation” 
(Interview no. 3), and in organizing workshops and seminars, not only on 
labour issues, but also on the reform of the social security system.  
In the course of its history, the policy orientation of the ILO has been 
subjected to numerous changes. Many authors have argued that the ILO’s 
contribution during the entire Cold War was to perpetuate the hegemony 
of the American capitalism, whilst neglecting marginalized workers (Cox 
1980; Prugl 1999; Whitworth 1994; Vosko 200079). Deacon et al. (1997), 
on the other hand, have emphasized that the ILO policy orientation was by 
no means unitary and that internal struggles did exist. According to the 
authors, the ILO headquarter in Geneva has tended to promote more 
firmly the Bismarck model of social insurance, while the Subregional 
Office in Budapest has been less convinced of this approach. A more 
recent contribution to this debate has focused on the change in policy 
direction given by the Decent Work Strategy, which, again, seems to be 
the product of the escalating tensions inside the ILO. According to Vosko 
(2002), NGOs, women’s organizations and trade unions are now forcing 
the Organization to reconsider its role in the new globalized society by 
shifting preferences from classical to atypical forms of labour, such as the 
unprotected workers in the informal economy80 (see also ILO 2002).  
                                              
78 Former name: ILO Central and Eastern European Team, ILO-CEET. 
79 Quoted in Vosko (2002, p.20) 
80 Similar considerations may apply with regard to the ILO Global 
Campaign on Social Security and Coverage for All (see ILO web site).  
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With regard to the power that the ILO may exercise on member 
countries in order to ensure that its conventions are implemented as 
planned, Vosko (2002, p.28) explains that:  
“the existing ILO supervisory machinery provides the means for 
ensuring that member states that have ratified certain conventions fulfill 
their obligations. […] Article 12 of the Constitution of the International 
Labor Organization (1998) requires states that have not ratified core 
conventions to submit reports to allow the ILO to monitor progress made 
towards implementing the principles enshrined in these conventions”. 
Thus, even in the case of the ILO, technical advice, policy 
recommendations and binding directives have been the fundamental part 
of an all-embracing strategy aiming to ensure the implementation of the 
institution’s objectives.  
As far as the health care sector is concerned, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has been active in Central and Eastern Europe since 
the first years of transition, providing technical assistance and monitoring 
the development of the health care systems. The major part of its activities 
are aimed at providing a detailed overview of reforms, including a 
comprehensive set of statistics (see WHO 2002, Health for All Database), 
rather than suggesting or promoting a specific health care model. Specific 
projects to modernize the health care sector have been also sponsored in 
most transition countries, but no clear policy preference is observable. 
According to paragraph 5.5 of the Ljubljana Charter on Reforming Health 
Care (1996):  
“The financing of health care systems should enable such care to be 
delivered to all citizens in a sustainable way. This entails universal 
coverage and equitable access by all people to the necessary care. 
That, in turn, requires the efficient use of health resources. To 
guarantee solidarity, governments must play a crucial role in regulating 
the financing of health care systems”.  
Beside the general call for a more egalitarian health care system, it is 
worth noting that this document did not confer legal rights and, thus, did 
not imply binding directives for its implementation. Reasons for this 
impasse are manifold, including the differences in health care systems 
among the WHO member states. The ratification of the agreements with 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) is also often quoted as another 
cause for the inaction of the UN agency for health. For Koivusalo (2003), 
the neo-liberal orientation in the trade of health services promoted by the 
WTO through the GATS (General Agreements on Trade in Services) has 
not necessarily corresponded to an improvement in the effectiveness of 
the health care delivery system. According to the author, more 
commercialized health care systems have tended to be more costly and 
less equitable (Koivusalo 2003, p.7). Less equitability has not only 
   64
involved the GATS discussed above, but also the so-called TRIPS 
(Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property). According 
to the TRIPS, an exclusive right is granted to the holder of a patented 
product for at least twenty years. The existence of this form of monopoly, 
invoked by the pharmaceutical multi-nationals as necessary to cover 
research costs, has seriously limited and still continues to limit the access 
to cheap medicines for countries in transition (Correa 2002). Examples of 
the constrictions created to national governments are the huge increase in 
expenditures for medicines in Eastern Europe, or the impossibility of 
affording anti-HIV drugs in Africa. 
Sub-contracting the implementation of projects has been the favourite 
strategy of many donor institutions. The beneficiaries of this strategy have 
been, in particular, international NGOs (INGOs) and international 
consultancy companies (ICCs), which have successfully attracted a good 
part of the funds available for aid and have, consequently, affected global 
welfare reforms according to a market-driven approach (see Donini 1996; 
Weiss 1999; De la Porte and Deacon 2002; Ramia 2003; Stubbs 2003a, 
2003b). The reasons for sub-contracting are manifold. Often, it has 
depended on the lack of technical personnel of the donor institution (De la 
Porte and Deacon 2002). In some cases, however, sub-contracting has 
also implied indirect subsidies to western companies (Wedel 2001). 
According to the Rule of Nationality and Rule of Origin of Equipment and 
Material of the European Commission’s Practical Guide to PHARE, ISPA 
and SAPARD (2000b), for instance, contracting and the implementation of 
PHARE aid projects has been restricted to European resident companies 
(see also Interview no. 1). Beyond the well-known problems of the 
incompetence of external experts who often demonstrated to have little or 
no knowledge of national peculiarities (Wedel 2001; De la Porte and 
Deacon 2002; Interview no.1; Interview no.2; Interview no. 10), Stubbs 
(2003a, p.8) has pointed out that sub-contracting the management of 
financial aid has “fuelled short-terminism and projectization detracting from 
critical development, thinking and action”. In this environment of unclear 
policy directions and insufficient implementation skills, a good part of 
financial aid did not arrive in Eastern Europe at all, but remained locked-in 
in the western borders, increasing market competition among non-state 
actors, rather than the effectiveness in projects’ implementation.     
Concluding the list of external actors, the efforts of national private 
insurance companies to speed the privatization process of the social 
security sector in East Central Europe is certainly noteworthy. Just to 
make an example, in the years preceding the accession of the candidate 
countries, the Deutsche Bank published (on a regular-basis) a report with 
the meaningful title: “Monitoring the EU Enlargement”.  In the issue 9 
(2002), the report of the Deutsche Bank Research Group81 strongly 
emphasized the dubious success of Polish reforms, and also called for 
more determination in the introduction of a three-pillar scheme in the 
Czech Republic. The uncertainties of Hungarian reformers with respect to 
                                              
81 Deutsche Bank Research Group (2002).  
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the sustainability of private tier were also evaluated negatively82. In the 
bank’s report, critical considerations concerning the costs of transition to a 
funded system were also cautiously avoided83. To clarify this, a brief 
overview of the history of Deutsche Bank and its “Partner Gesellschaften” 
is required. In the years preceding the enlargement, the German Allianz 
AG, Europe’s biggest private insurance company, actively expanded in 
Eastern Europe, acquiring control over the most important pension funds 
in Bulgaria and Croatia. At the end of 2002, German Allianz AG was also 
present in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
represented in the Baltic States by its Finnish joint-venture Sampo and 
contended the privatization of the leading Slovak insurer Slovenska 
poistovna84. The German Allianz AG and the Deutsche Bank are usually 
referred in the German press as “Deutschland AG” (Germany Joint-Stock 
Company), which is, according to the definition provided by Jürgen Beyer 
(2002, §abstract), “a popular label for the dense network of interlocking 
directorates and ownership ties between German companies”. The history 
of Deutschland AG can be traced back to the nineteenth century and the 
reason for its establishment was to provide a form of “coordinated 
capitalism”, according to which the mutual interests of German companies 
were recognized and enhanced. In the light of this evidence, it should be 
asked whether the strong interest of Germany, and recently of the 
European Union, for the privatization of pension schemes in CEE has 
been led by objective motivations regarding the long-term sustainability of 
pension schemes or whether it was also the result of the expansion 
strategy of German and other European insurance companies that aimed 
to dominate the new pension markets of transition economies85.  
 
1.4 Domestic Actors, Freedom of Choice and Social Policy Vacuum 
The list of international organizations’ activities carried out to influence 
national decision-making seems to offer enough empirical evidence to 
support the thesis that a neo-liberal welfare state was introduced by 
design. International organizations set their agenda, implemented their 
policies accordingly, and the game was soon over. In this account, 
                                              
82 In order to decrease financial constraints on the first pillar, the 
participation in the second private tier in Hungary is since January 2002 
no more compulsory. 
83 For a recent research on the difficulties of collecting pension 
contributions in the new three pillar system see Fultz and Stanovnik 
(2004). 
84 Source: GermanData.com. (2002) 
85 Please note that in Hungary, for instance, the great majority of the 
pension funds are now in the hands of German, Austrian and Dutch 
insurance companies. ÀB-Aegon is owned by the Dutch Group, while 
another five were founded by the National Netherlanden, OTP (Hungary), 
The Hungária Insurance Company (owned by German Allianz) and 
Winterthur (Colonia). The other owners include: The Budapest Bank 
(General Electric), and Bank Austria Creditanstalt. These groups are 
collecting pensioners’ contributions with the obligation to provide some 
benefit only in 15 years  time (Borbély  2000, p.4). 
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domestic actors did not need to play any significant role, because the 
rules of the game were already defined in advance. This was possible, 
as Karl and Schmitter (1991) would suggest, by a “political” or 
“institutional” vacuum. In this situation of chaos and anarchy, experts of 
international organizations could finally bring order to these those 
societies in ruin. But was really the chaos and anarchy caused by a 
“political”, “institutional” or “property” vacuum (Böröcz 1992) the main 
feature of post-communist welfare reforms? In the course of this book it 
will become clear that what characterized the Central and Eastern 
European path of transformation was, in reality, a “social policy 
vacuum”: a situation in which all social policies established by the 
command economy became obsolete and, thus, needed to be replaced 
immediately.  
In an attempt to clarify the nature of post-communist transformation, 
Ettrich (2003) noted, for instance, that the leading ideas of the 1989 
revolution were not new ideas, but old ideas concerning human rights, 
democratic and civil rights. The aim of the “peaceful” revolution was to 
re-establish the “normality” of the pre-Soviet period, rather than to 
create entirely new forms of government. As Ettrich (2003) points out, 
the former Hungarian communist party spontaneously renounced its 
monopoly to power well before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Similar 
dissolution of communist rules were taking place at the “round table” in 
Poland on February 1989, where members of the Solidarity trade union 
sat together with the communists to decide the future of the nation. 
Similarly, Kis (1999) describes the events of 1989 as a “coordinated 
transition” to democracy, rather than as a “revolution” or “reform”, while 
Poznanski (1993) observes that the process of transformation was more 
the result of a compromise among political parties, rather than the 
consequence of revolutionary events. 
In brief, after the collapse of communism, Central and Eastern 
European societies were by no means a no-man’s-land. There were 
already political and property owners: the first were the communist 
adversaries, while the second were the citizens who had lost their 
property rights because of the Soviet occupation. Numerous observers 
have, in fact, emphasized the crucial role played by Central and Eastern 
European political and economic elites in the establishment and 
consolidation of democratic institutions (Konrád and Szelényi 1979; 
Szelényi 1988, 1993; Szelényi et al. 1995; Szelényi and Szelényi 1993, 
1995; Eyal et al. 1997, 1998, 2001; Ettrich and Utz 2002). According to 
Eyal et al. (1997, 1998), the transition to democracy was led by a new 
post-communist leadership described as a coalition of, to a large extent, 
pre-existent elites: the intellectual dissidents, the new political class and 
the managerial technocrats. For Eyal et al. (1997, pp. 61, 70), “the new 
power elite of post-communism is not composed of owners, but rather of 
the technocratic-managerial elite together with the new politocracy 
which constitutes its dominant fraction, and elite humanistic and social 
science intellectuals which form its dominated fraction. […] The power 
to make investment decisions was effectively monopolized by 
managers, not because of their rather insignificant property rights, but 
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by virtue of their claim to technical know-how”. The result was the 
creation of a new form of governance based on “managerialism”, in 
which capitalism could grow even without the existence of significant 
property owners (capitalists). Studies on the mobility of the political or 
economic elite have confirmed that no drastic reproduction or revolution 
of political and managerial leaders has been observed in East Central 
Europe since 1989 (Böröcz and Ákos Róua-Tas 1995; Szelényi 1993; 
Szelényi et al. 1995; Szelényi and Szelényi 1993, 1995; Eyal et al. 
1997, 1998).  
In such a debate, Bockman and Eyal (2002) have also illustrated that 
discussions about the reform of the command economy were already 
initiated during the 1970s through a transnational network of American 
and Eastern economists. Interestingly, during academic exchanges with 
American universities, such as Yale, Harvard, Stanford and MIT, or with 
western European think tanks, such as the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) of Vienna or the Centre for the Study 
of Economic and Social Problems (Centro Studi e Ricerche su Problemi 
Economico-Sociali) of Milan, leading Eastern European economists 
came to the conclusion that any possible reform of the command 
economy should be conducted in the fastest possible way. Their 
western colleagues, by contrast, were more sceptical about the 
successful completion of such drastic reforms. The reasons for such 
determination, unexpectedly advanced by those who should have 
promoted a smooth reform, should not have been a surprise, since they 
were motivated by the numerous failed attempts to implement 
significant reforms of the command economy during the period of state-
socialism. In other words, Eastern economists, who often had strategic 
positions in the state-socialist bureaucracy, had identified the future 
bankruptcy of the command economy due to its extreme 
macroeconomic imbalance and had already taken the necessary 
decisions and developed the necessary tools in order to transform it into 
market capitalism. 
Once the Iron Curtain disappeared, the resulting cooperation among 
pre-existing elites became not only necessary to ensure a more rapid 
economic prosperity, but also was crucial for the survival of their own 
career. In account of this, it has been emphasized that monetarism, 
promoted by the international institutions as the leading economic 
principle, became the cohesive factor in amalgamating the fragile 
elective affinities among these elites. In other words, even though the 
interests and needs of the old and new leaders did not often coincide, 
the internal tensions were resolved in the light of a new Weberian 
“capitalist ethic”, which would have introduced a new form civilization 
(Eyal 2000). Taking as a case study the Czech Republic, Eyal (2000) 
argued that the new “spirit of capitalism” corresponded to the requests 
of international organizations, not only because neo-liberal reforms were 
addressed as necessary to the economic prosperity of the country, but 
also because they implicitly introduced a new lifestyle, which would 
have been distant from the “corrupt” communist one.  
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But if everyone was at the right place in the wrong time, what did 
disappear then? In brief, neither the people representing the leading or 
opposite political ideology, nor the managers in charge of the economy, 
but the social policies themselves disappeared from the scene. That is 
to say the set of social programs that constituted the practical 
implementation of the communist political and economic organization 
disappeared. This social policy vacuum undoubtedly facilitated the view 
of modernization proposed by the international organizations, but this 
did not automatically correspond to implement capitalism or a welfare 
state by design.  
As Fultz (2002a, 2002b) and Müller (2002, 2004) have correctly 
emphasized, the existence of high external debt and the presence of 
agenda-setters coming from abroad were undoubtedly crucial factors for 
the implementation of neo-liberal reforms. Nevertheless, the will of 
economic transformation had still to be mediated either with the 
presence of strong egalitarian aspirations promoted by the civil society 
(such as in Czech Republic or Slovenia), or with the risk of loosing the 
elections caused by the public disapproval for a drastic reduction of 
welfare rights (for example, in the case of the Bókros package in 
Hungary). In this context, although it can still be affirmed that many 
governments of transition made the choice of privatization primarily to 
boost the country’s credibility in the eyes of international organizations 
(Stiglitz 1997, 2002), and this can certainly help to clarify why many left-
oriented governments did not implement left-oriented policies as 
expected, as in the case of Hungary (Ferge and Tausz 2002), Poland 
(Cook and Orenstein 1999) or Bulgaria (Müller 2002, 2004). This 
account, however, is by no means sufficient for explaining the variety of 
policies implemented. Domestic actors demonstrated that they were 
able to block or to make changes to the prescriptions coming from the 
international institutions and to realize hybrid social policies in line with 
the country’s historical and cultural heritage. In the next chapters, it will 
be shown that these governments had at their disposal a broad range of 
policy options, which have been used to preserve national peculiarities 
or, at least, to avoid that a “social policy transfer” occurred. 
 
 
    Conclusion: Toward a Neoclassical Social Policy 
By providing an overview of the existing literature on institution building, 
this chapter has aimed to clarify the relationship among social, political 
and historical forces in the making of post-communist transformation. 
The path of extrication from state-socialism has been described as 
“developmental path dependent” in that it is certainly a process 
characterized by legacies, but it is also in continuous evolution. The 
concept of “embeddedness” reintroduced by the new-institutionalist and, 
more recently, by neoclassical sociology has been particularly helpful in 
elucidating the limits that external actors may face when influencing 
internal policy outcomes. These have been identified as strictly 
connected to the socio-political environment in which any institution 
building takes place. If, on the one hand, it has been affirmed that a 
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social policy vacuum (and not an institutional or political vacuum) 
facilitated the acceptance of the advice expressed by the international 
organizations, then this has not automatically implied that a social policy 
transfer occurred. The variety of rationalities, which characterize these 
countries in transition, is indeed the best vaccine to avoid the 
introduction of a welfare state by design. 
In conclusion, for the purpose of this study, a synthetic conceptual 
framework, which, for simplicity, we will call “neoclassical social policy”, 
is proposed. The neoclassical social policy approach not only 
emphasizes the crucial role played by historical legacies, culture86, 
institutional structures, political organizations and social interactions in 
the “path of creation” of Central and Eastern European welfare states, 
but also, as Hall and Soskice (2001) have called attention to, focuses on 
the strategic interactions of economic, political and social actors as well 
as the set of formal and informal rules, which govern human behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
86 Recently, Pfau-Effinger (2004) has called attention to the necessity to 
use a broader concept of path-dependence, which also includes cultural 
factors in the explanation of the welfare state’s transformation. 
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PART II 
 
 
 
Important Note: If not differently stated, all background information regarding 
pension, health care, unemployment, social assistance and family support 
policies presented in this part of the volume are based on unpublished seminar 
papers prepared by the author for the seminar “Social Policy in Central and 
Eastern Europe: A New European Model of Solidarity?” conducted at the 
University of Erfurt, Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät (WS 2002/2003). The main 
sources of these documents are: a) Official Reports financed by the 
CONSENSUS II Programme (1999); b) MISSCEEC (2002); c) ISSA - Social 
Security Programs throughout the World - (2002); d) Studies on the Social 
Protection Systems in the 13 Applicant Countries prepared by the Gesellschaft 
für Versicherungswissenschaft und- gestaltung e.V. for the European 
Commission Employment and Social Affairs DG (2003); and e) Information 
available at the web sites of Ministry of Family and Social Affairs and MISSOC 
(2004). All information represents the situation of the social security systems 
until January 2004. 
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Chapter 3 
Pension Sector87
 
     Introduction 
As already mentioned (see chapter one, §2), during communism the 
state was the main guarantor of the social security system. The state 
allocated the work force to the state-owned firms and these paid the 
contributions for their employees to a social security fund within the 
state budget88. Workers did not need to transfer any money to the 
fund because their firms were already doing this job. The communist 
pension scheme was highly centralized and essential part of the state 
apparatus. Retirement age was low and usually set at 60 years for 
men and 55 for women, with approximately 25 years of service. There 
was also the possibility of early-retirement and, as a result, many 
“baby pensioners” kept on working while receiving benefits. Since the 
communist system was primarily aimed at redistribution, pension 
benefits were almost flat-rate and only based on a first pay-as-you-go 
component. In brief, public responsibility and a mix of corporatism and 
universalism characterized this highly egalitarian pension scheme. 
Despite the egalitarian orientation, however, special privileges existed 
for certain professional groups, often in strategic sectors of the state. 
As will be shown, most of the peculiarities of the communist scheme 
have survived even after the most drastic reforms. 
 
     1. Political Background 
At the beginning of 1990s, Central and Eastern European 
governments responded to the dissolution of the Iron Curtain by 
immediately aligning themselves with the West and by attempting to 
mirror its economic system. This transition took several forms, one of 
which was basic shock therapy (e.g. Poland) while others were of a 
less painful nature (e.g. Hungary). At the core of these policies was 
the notion that joining their Western European brothers was the only 
way to forget the past and take advantage of the opportunities that a 
free market system might offer.  
The transition toward a market economy, however, has been, 
probably more than expected, extremely painful (UNDPAD 2003). 
Real GDP growth drastically declined in all countries during the first 
years of transition. A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, only in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, has 
the increase of the domestic production reached the same level that it 
was at in 1989 (TransMonee Database 2001). Economic deterioration 
hit countries in transition with varying degrees of intensity. The 
negative impact of the economic slowdown was particularly evident in 
                                              
87 I owe much to Markus Ruck (Expert on Social Security at the ILO 
Sub-regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe in Budapest) for 
his valuable discussion. For an introduction to communist pension 
systems see also Fultz and Ruck (2000). 
88 See Evans and Sansier (1999, p.32). 
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Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, but no country was 
an exception. Inflation also massively increased. Unemployment, 
basically non-existent before (or, at least, officially), was a further 
shock of transition, undermining political and social stability. The 
youth, the elderly, people with disabilities, unskilled workers, long-
term unemployed, and, to a lesser extent, women, remained the most 
vulnerable groups (Szelényi 2002; for detail information see chapter 
9). It goes unsaid that the consequences of the persistent economic 
crisis led to other negative effects. These effects can be identified in a 
political and social sense. The first involve political instability of 
governments and institutions, refusal of necessary reforms, and 
growing support for extreme-right or nationalist parties. The latter 
included social distress, intolerance of the poor (e.g. the Roma 
minority), intolerance of the rich, or, in other words, of those seen as a 
possible beneficiary of special and undisclosed privileges, the 
“different”. 
Restructuring pension systems already in place for more than forty 
years was, of course, not an easy task. Since the first years of 
transition, governments faced the problem, on the one hand, to carry 
out the transition to market-friendly schemes, whilst on the other, to 
avoid the collapse of the old system, ensuring that the beneficiaries 
still gained access to decent benefits. It goes unsaid that economic 
and social priorities often went opposite directions. In almost all 
countries, the priorities, regarding the transition, were, firstly, those 
involving the economic development and, only then secondly those 
involving social protection and inclusion. This was a necessity. 
According to the point of view of numerous experts interviewed, that 
were indirectly involved in the process of economic and structural 
transformation, it was impossible to ensure social inclusion without 
economic development (Interview no. 2; Interview no. 9; Interview no. 
10; Interview no. 11). Some countries, such as Bulgaria and 
Romania, attempted to post-pone reforms. This strategy lasted, 
however, only until the economic crisis became unsustainable and the 
requests for austerity measures coming from the international 
organizations turned out to be a fundamental pre-requisite for the 
continued existence of the country. 
 Political instability soon became one of the clearest outcomes of 
transition. The murder in Romania of Ceausescu and his wife is an 
emblematic example of such instability. Nonetheless, not always was 
blood required to sign the change of political rulers. In Bulgaria and 
the Slovak Republic, short-lived governments were the norm. In 
Hungary, the introduction of a package of austerity measures led to 
the immediate dismissal of the Finance Minister Lajos Bokros89, while 
in the Czech Republic, neo-liberal reforms strongly proposed by 
Václav Klaus were simply never implemented due to a strong trade-
union opposition. Uncertainty in the political sphere resulted in 
                                              
89 Bokros’ decisions, however, have received particular support 
among World Bank’s analysts and other experts.  
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uncertainties in the reform process (Fultz and Ruck 2000). This did 
not only mean unfinished (first period of Polish reforms), blocked 
(Bokrós Package in Hungary), or complete rejection of reforms (in the 
case of the Czech Republic and Slovenia: refusal of compulsory 
private schemes), but it also implied an increasing friction with 
international organizations (IMF and World Bank) that had agreed to 
grant financial aid under the specific condition of privatizing pension 
schemes. As mentioned in chapter two, in Bulgaria and Poland, the 
World Bank froze access to loans because less reform-oriented 
governments were not implementing the reconstruction of the pension 
system as planned.  
Resistance to reforms sometimes came from the back door, so to 
speak. In the case of Slovenia, scholars and trade-union leaders 
succeeded in convincing the government of the financial and political 
risks of switching to a compulsory pre-funded scheme. Stanovnik 
(2002, p. 48) describes an emblematic example of the reform 
process:  
“At the same time [1998], a mission of Slovene MPs and 
journalists visited Switzerland in a study and fact-finding mission 
on pension systems. MPs continued their trip to the Netherlands, 
and the journalists – lead by Tone Rop90 – visited Rome. Upon 
departure from Rome, a trade union leader presented Mr Rop 
with a gift: a video recording of the massive demonstrations 
against Prime minister Silvio Berlusconi in 1994. These 
demonstrations compelled the government to renounce plans for 
pension reforms, and eventually led to the fall of the Berlusconi 
government. [...] After this rapid succession of events, Mr Rop 
“simply pulled the mandatory second pillar out of circulation.”[...] 
This seems to be an accurate description, since the decision was 
never discussed at cabinet meetings”. 
While trade-unions leaders in the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
succeeded in blocking reforms, this was not the case in Poland, 
where “Solidarity” (Solidarnosch), instead of pushing for coverage and 
redistribution, expressed its strong support for market-oriented 
policies and differentiation of provisions. Although the reasons for the 
rejection of neo-liberal policy-making greatly differed from country to 
country, Laviec and Fultz (2002, p. 8) identify several common 
explanatory factors, including:  
“1) the presence of well-placed actors in both reform debates 
with serious concerns about the high financial costs of the 
transition from pay-as-you-go to pre-funded pensions; 2) 
governments compelled to engage in broad consensus building 
                                              
90 Slovenian Minister of Labour, Family and Social Affairs. Later 
Minister of Finance (2000) 
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by their coalition status (Slovenia) or by a succession of minority 
governments (the Czech Republic); 3) opposition from trade 
unions that were mobilised by what they saw in privatisation as a 
threat to the future financial strength of the public pension 
system; 4) strong national orientations toward the European 
mainstream, reinforced by the presence of EU-sponsored 
programs like Phare in the area of pension restructuring; and 5) 
relatively low levels of external debt, which may have rendered 
these countries less open to influence from international financial 
organisations favoring privatisation strategies”. 
Unquestionably, these are all crucial elements, which may help to 
explain the development of modern Central and Eastern European 
pension systems. What should not be forgotten, however, is that the 
transition toward market-based schemes has also been strongly 
influenced by the characteristics which permeated the past social 
policy organization. As it will be shown in the next section, pre-
communist and communist features still characterize these systems 
of old age protection. 
     2 Country Overview 
     2.1 Bulgaria 
In Bulgaria, the first legislations in 1924 introduced the Bismarck 
model of old-age security. During this period, wage earners were 
covered on the basis of their professional status. This lasted until 
World War II, when equalization of status differentials became the 
leading principle of the post war communist system. Most of the 
legislation in force during this period survived, though modified 
several times, until recently. The legislation in 1957 (with many later 
amendments) established numerous types of pensions (old-age 
pension, various invalidity pensions, survivors‘ pension and social 
pension) totally based on the principle of solidarity. Until 1999, the 
Bulgarian pension sector was divided into two pillars: the first PAYG 
tier was the most important, while the second one, voluntarily 
supplementary pension, was basically non-existent. The system was 
universal in scope and coverage, but it was financed through 
contributions. The communist legacies were preponderant. The 
employers were the most important, if not the only, source of funds; 
the state was responsible to guarantee and to preserve constitutional 
rights, and redistribution was the main priority of each Bulgarian 
policy-making.  
Bulgaria is one of the Eastern countries in which the transition has 
been more painful. For example, inflation increased constantly during 
the entire period of reforms, causing huge social costs. Under these 
circumstances, it is also easy to understand why immediate financial 
aid was needed. Discussions with the IMF and World Bank started 
immediately and large loans were granted. The access to aid was 
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approved under the implicit obligation of devaluating the Bulgarian 
currency and of starting austerity measures. Although not officially 
announced, the guidelines provided by the World Bank were clear 
enough to avoid any possible misunderstanding: first, the dismissal of 
the old state financed structure and, second, the establishment of a 
market-friendly social insurance, which should have replaced the 
universal pension and health care sector. In 1997, the conservative 
coalition of the Union of Democratic Forces won the elections and set 
the reform of the welfare state as a priority. The reorganization of the 
pension system was carried out through a partnership with USAID 
(US Agency for International Development) that firmly promoted the 
privatization of provisions.    
The Constitution of 1991 (art. 51 par. 1 and 3) is still the most 
important legislative act, defining the basic citizens’ rights. The right to 
social security is ensured to all citizens resident in the Republic of 
Bulgaria, covered, under state responsibility, by the risks associated 
to old age, sickness and maternity. The Bulgarian pension scheme is 
now based on three pillars. The first pillar is comprised of the state 
managed compulsory pay-as-you-go scheme. This tier is divided into: 
1) old-age pension; 2) various invalidity pensions; 3) survivors‘ 
pension; 4) and social pension (linked with social assistance). The 
second pillar is a privately managed compulsory funded scheme, 
which is earnings-related based and depends on private 
responsibility. The third pillar is a voluntary private scheme. According 
to the state public insurance (art.3), the new leading principles 
involve: a) obligatory and comprehensive insurance; b) solidarity of 
the insured persons; c) equality of the insured persons; d) social 
dialogue in the management of the insurance system; and e) a fund 
organization of the insurance payments. These principles aim, on the 
one hand, to increase the market orientation of the pension scheme, 
but on the other, to ensure the values of solidarity expressed by the 
constitution. 
 
     2.2 Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic has a long tradition of Bismarck social insurance 
going back to when it was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The 
first laws on old-age protection were introduced in 1906 and included 
salaried employees and in 1924 this also included wage earners. 
During communism, the Bismarck-orientation was drastically reduced 
and the enhancement of universal rights became the main priority of 
communist rulers. The contemporary pension system encloses parts 
of these two periods. Every pension is formed by two amounts: a 
basic flat-rate based on citizenship and is associated with an 
additional earnings-related component based on the professional 
status. The purpose of this redistributive policy-making is to ensure a 
smooth reform of the old communist system, while, at the same time, 
to avoid excessive disparities in the amount of benefits at disposal for 
the population. In addition, a “supplementary pension” scheme is 
available for those citizens who voluntarily decide to increase their 
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future pension income. This supplementary provision is run by joint 
stock companies91 that require special authorization and need to fulfil 
determined criteria (for example, prudent investments, enough capital 
basis, avoiding to purchase shares on other pension funds in issue 
bonds, and so on).  
The political debate of the Czech Republic has been strongly 
characterized by different interests and needs among the numerous 
forces present inside and outside the new elected parliaments. Václav 
Klaus and his supporters have been determined to promote neo-
liberalism as the best way towards successful reforms, but this rapid 
“westernization” has faced the reality of very different requests made 
by the opposition (very strong in the Czech parliament since 1997) 
and the civil society (especially delegates of Trade Unions and 
pensioners‘ associations). In particular, according to Consensus II 
specialists, four different forces acted on the pension reform process 
of the Czech Republic: 1) radical liberal economists and bankers; 2) 
demography experts of the Charles University of Prague and Masaryk 
Brno who pushed for funded schemes due to the ageing population of 
the Czech society; 3) experts of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs who had a cautious vision of reforms; 4) trade union experts 
who believed that only the current system can guarantee the real 
value of benefits (Consensus II 1999, Czech Republic, part 2, p.32). 
At the end of this struggle, the cautious and gradual vision of reforms 
promoted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and trade union 
delegates turned out to be the winning strategy and the planned 
introduction of a three-pillar scheme was blocked due to possible 
transition costs. Despite the apparent absence of drastic solutions, 
the pension system of the Czech Republic has met the needs of a 
market economy by increasing individual responsibility and by 
complying with international conventions. The result is a mixed 
system, which combines the corporatist orientation of the Bismarck 
period with the egalitarian principles in force during communism92.  
 
      2.3 Estonia 
Until 1989, the Baltic States were part of the Soviet Union and thus 
shared the same old-age security system. The Law on State 
Pensions of 1956 regulated the situation of employees, while the Law 
on Kolhoz Members (1964) covered the farmers. Enterprises paid the 
contributions for their employees to the state budget. In addition to 
these two separate schemes, several categories of workers received 
                                              
91 Please note that pension funds in the Czech Republic differ from 
other joint-stock companies especially by the way profits are 
distributed. 5 per cent must be vested in reserve; a maximum of 10 
per cent is distributed to shareholders; the rest for the advantage of 
the participants.  
92 On the egalitarian aspirations of the Czech pension system, see 
Mácha (2002) and Potucek (2001). For further information on 
pension reform, see Kral (2004). 
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old-age pensions on more favourable conditions (such as hazardous 
working conditions). A new legislation started immediately in 1990, 
aiming to separate the Estonian pension system from that of the 
Soviet Union. The final result was, however, not very dissimilar. The 
legislation tried to make pension benefits directly linked to the 
premiums paid, but this principle was suspended by the parliament in 
1992 because of feasibility problems (primarily issues related to the 
economic crisis and tax collection). As a result, flat-rate benefits 
instead of earnings-related benefits were immediately re-established. 
Only in a second period, due to protests of pensioners’ associations, 
did the government maintained its promise to increase the 
differentiation of pensions by introducing an earnings-related 
component (Leppik and Männik 2002). 
The Estonian pension system is not a clear contributory scheme: it 
has both flat-rate and earnings-related elements. The law establishes 
four types of pensions: 1) National Pension, which is flat-rate and paid 
to those citizens who have paid no contributions; 2) Old Age Pension, 
which applies to employees and is formed by the National Pension 
plus an additional work-related component based on the length of 
years of service; 3) Invalidity Pension; and 4) Survivors‘ Pension. In 
addition, there is the possibility of a “Superannuated Pension” for 
certain professional groups (for example, pilots, mariners, miners and 
some groups of artists). The Old Age Pension is formed by: a) a base 
amount; b) a component calculated on the basis of years of 
pensionable service; and c) an insurance part. Pensions are mainly 
based on the principle of solidarity and paid from the revenue of the 
state insurance budget (social tax). Coverage includes all permanent 
residents in the territory of Estonia. At the end of 2002, the 
government introduced a second pillar concluding the three-pillar 
scheme reform (the third private tier was already in place in 1998 for 
those citizens who voluntarily decided to increase their future pension 
income). Despite the introduction of such reforms, Estonia seems not 
to have renounced most of the peculiarities existent in the previous 
structure. In fact, the communist heritage was key in defining the 
parameters within which universal principles should be maintained, 
even in presence of drastic reforms. Leppik and Kruuda (2003) have 
outlined, for instance, that the flat-rate basic component still plays a 
vital role by focusing on solidarity and by providing vertical 
redistribution from higher-income earners to lower-income earners. 
 
      2.4 Hungary 
Hungary has a long tradition of Bismarck insurance. The numerous 
funded pension schemes in place since 1912 were based on a 
corporatist vision of social solidarity, primarily aiming to secure 
occupational standards. These funded schemes collapsed before 
and/or during World War II. In 1950, a new unified and unfunded pay-
as-you-go system covered about half the population, but only in the 
mid-1970s did the coverage and range of benefits reached all citizens 
(Augusztinovics et al. 2002, p.29).  
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In Hungary, three periods of pension reforms can be identified. In 
the first period (1990-1995), the main objective of policy-makers was 
to move away from the old pay-as-you-go system, by creating the 
basis for the future adoption of the three-pillar scheme. The Act 
84/1991 signed the first rupture with communism, establishing the 
National Pension Insurance Fund and the Health Insurance Fund. 
Both remained self-governing bodies until 1998. The second period of 
reforms (1995-2002), put in place the three-pillar scheme. The Acts 
LXXX, LXXXI, LXXXII of 1997 (which belong to the same family of 
legislation) are the core of the new system. The first pillar is state-
managed, mandatory and based on pay-as-you-go. The state, which 
is responsible for its operation and development, ensures the 
payment even if the expenses of the Pension Insurance Fund exceed 
its receipt. The second pillar is privately managed and compulsory 
funded. Mandatory private pension funds operate according to the 
principle of funding members’ contributions accumulated in a personal 
account. These two pillars may also be complemented by a third pillar 
where other funds are accumulated in the voluntary pension tier 
based on individual decision (a voluntary private scheme). The private 
pillars are administered by several independent pension funds under 
strict supervision by the state. Finally, the third period of reforms 
(2003 onwards) is characterized by attempts to reduce the negative 
impacts of the changes previously implemented. Adjustments 
primarily aim to reduce the excessive pressure on the first pay-as-
you-go pillar by making the two private tiers less attractive. The 
affiliation for career-starter to the private pillar is no more obligatory 
and the state guarantee for the second pillar has been abolished. 
Although these last changes might seem an attempt to return to a 
pre-reform system, each reform cycle should be seen as a necessary 
re-adaptation. According to experts’ opinion, such revisions aim 
indeed to ensure the long-term sustainability of previous reforms, 
rather than to abolish them.  
 
     2.5 Latvia 
As far as the pension sector in Latvia is concerned, the law on State 
Pension of 1990 created a unified system of pension insurance 
primarily based on pay-as-you-go, redistribution and social tax 
payments. Benefits were mostly flat-rate, while the earnings-related 
component played only a minimal role. Following the 1993 elections, 
drastic reforms were envisaged as imminent. The efforts of the 
Minister of Welfare (centre right coalition) to introduce a system fully 
based on private insurance achieved, however, little or no results, 
primarily due to strong trade union opposition (especially the Latvian 
Association of Free Trade Unions and the Pensioners’ Federation) 
(Bite 2002). As a consequence of internal struggles, the introduction 
of private tiers was, at least temporarily, postponed.   
In 1995, the persistent economic crisis provided a good opportunity 
to implement more drastic reforms as suggested by World Bank 
officials, which otherwise would not have found the necessary political 
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support. The three-pillar scheme was implemented by the State 
Pension Act of 1995 (see also Law on State Funded Pensions of 
2000), which introduced, for the first time, the concepts of 
differentiation of risks and responsibility. Old-age security in Latvia is 
now formed by: 1) a publicly managed pay-as-you-go tier; 2) a 
privately managed compulsory funded scheme (earnings-related); 
and 3) a voluntary private scheme. In addition, there are also special 
pensions financed through the state budget for the following 
professional groups: a) State President; b) police; c) State 
prosecutors; d) persons in active military service; e) MPs who voted 
for independence in 1990; f) children of people killed during the 
independence struggle of 1991.  
The NDC, notional defined contribution, was launched in January 
1996 well before it was introduced in Sweden and Italy93. The NDC is 
calculated on the amount of the insured’s contributions, plus annual 
growth adjusted according to changes in the earnings, divided by the 
average remaining life expectancy. At retirement, the insured can 
purchase an annuity or have the funds transferred into the insured’s 
NDC account. The NDC, on the one hand, is preferred because it is 
supposed to link benefits to changes in economic and demographic 
trends in a more effective way, but on the other hand, it is often 
criticized because of its radical departure from the pay-as-you-go. As 
indicated in chapter two, Central and Eastern European countries did 
not remain “locked-in” in their path of extrication from state-socialism, 
but had opportunities for innovative solutions. The introduction of the 
three-pillar scheme and the NDC in Latvia are few notable examples 
of this trend.  
 
      2.6 Lithuania 
For a long period, the Lithuanian pension sector remained 
characterized by the principles introduced by the first set of reforms of 
1991/1994, which aimed to maintain most parts of the previous 
communist structure. This involved a system primarily based on one 
mandatory pay-as-you-go pillar. The possibility to establish a private 
second-tier has recently been envisaged, though in this case only as 
an option (OECD: Baltic States 2003). The current legislation 
introduces different types of pensions: 1) old-age pension; 2) invalidity 
pensions; 3) survivors‘ pension; and 4) social pension; but also 
special schemes for determined categories of citizens/workers (for 
example, President‘s pension, scientists‘ pension; actors‘ allowance, 
1st and 2nd degree state pensions, military and state officers‘ pension 
and deprived people‘s pensions). The old-age pension is formed by 
two elements: a main component and a supplementary component. 
The first element or basic pension is a flat-rate payment for all citizens 
who have paid their contributions to the state social insurance. The 
                                              
93 For further information on pension reform in Latvia, see Bite 
(2002) and Vanovska (2004). 
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second element, the supplementary one, is earnings-related and 
applies for all those citizens who have worked under labour contract 
and, thus, have paid the obligatory contributions (the second element 
involves the self-employed on a voluntary basis). The Ministry of 
Social Protection and Labour and the Board of the State Social 
Insurance Fund are responsible for policy development and 
implementation. 
Article 52 of the Constitution of Lithuania (1992) guarantees the 
right of citizens to an old-age and disability pension. The constitution 
remains the most important pension act, defining not only basic 
citizens’ rights, but also introducing the concept of state social 
insurance. Since the Law on the Pension Scheme Reform (entered 
into force at the end of 2002), there is the possibility of a voluntary 
private-managed second-tier. A voluntary third pillar was already in 
place as part of the overall voluntary life insurance (Dobravolskas and 
Buivydas 2003, p. 41). Lithuania has therefore introduced a modified 
version of the three-pillar scheme, based on voluntary rather than on 
compulsory private insurance94. Also in this case study, legacies of 
the past persisted to the most drastic reforms. The communist 
heritage is still notable in the universal and redistributive orientation of 
pension insurance, but also in the existence of special provisions for 
determined professional groups.  
 
     2.7 Poland 
In Poland, social insurance is differentiated according to various 
groups of workers. ZUS is the institution responsible for collecting and 
administrating the contributions of the employees95, while KRUS 
bears responsibility for the insurance of farmers. In addition, various 
special provisions apply to different categories of workers such as 
coal-miners, or members of the armed forces and police. These 
provisions primarily involve privileges such as early-retirement, better 
pension formula, and so on. Thus, it might be argued that three 
different social policies exist in Poland, rather than a single one.  
The “old” pension system introduced in 1991 was divided into the 
so-called “social component” that was flat-rate and the “individual 
component” that depended on the length of the insurance period and 
earnings. In 1997, the report “Security through Diversity”, which 
represented the successful conclusion of many proposals, projects 
and recommendations prepared by experts of the ministries of 
Finance, Social Affairs and the “Solidarity” trade-union, opened the 
doors for the introduction of the three-pillar scheme. The financing of 
pensions now depends on the contributions equally paid by the 
employers and the employees to the fund account managed by ZUS. 
                                              
94 For further information on pension reform in Lithuania, see 
Morkuniene (2004). 
95 ZUS is also the biggest Polish bank, the biggest Polish cashier and 
the biggest Polish Tax Office. See ZUS web site: http://www.zus.pl/. 
Last log-in: January 2004. 
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KRUS (social insurance of farmers) is, however, primarily tax-
financed, since three-fourths of it is funded by the state budget 
(source: ZUS web site). The three-pillar scheme includes: 1) a 
mandatory pay-as-you-go scheme; 2) a second tier that is earnings-
related and privately funded; and 3) a third-tier, which involves a 
supplementary voluntary private pension. As for Latvia, the system of 
Poland is based on notional defined contributions (NDC) that makes 
the level of pensions dependent on the developments on the capital 
market and the moment of retirement (Golinowksa et al. 2003, p.57; 
Chlon-Dominczak 2004). 
The Polish pension scheme is work-related in scope and coverage, 
but this cannot be seen as a new introduction. The pre-Soviet 
experience (Bismarck-oriented insurance) was indeed reinforced 
even during the communist order. One example was the financing 
method, which remained based on contributions, though fully financed 
by the employers. Moreover, a high level of devolution of 
responsibilities to regional bureaus also existed prior to the end of the 
Cold War. In the Polish special case, the central planned economy 
remained the main engine of policy-making, but centralization in 
planning was coupled with high levels of devolution in the 
implementation of policies.  
The highly path dependent development of Poland has not 
precluded the introduction of innovative reforms, such as the three-
pillar scheme and the NDC. Interestingly, innovation was not confined 
to the early transitional period, as many path-dependent theorists 
would suggest, but was introduced even after a first set of reforms 
was successfully set up. 
 
     2.8 Romania 
In the last years, the Romanian pension system has faced huge 
reforms. The main characteristics of these reforms have been the 
consolidation of the insurance model established before the 
communist period (Bismarck-oriented, 1912), and the transformation 
into a three-pillar scheme. The past legislation (1989-1997) 
established different types of pensions (old-age pension, various 
invalidity pensions, survivors‘ pension and social pension) totally 
based on the principle of solidarity. The first pay-as-you-go pillar was 
the most important, while the second supplementary pension was 
complementary to the first one. In addition, special provisions were 
available for determined professional groups such as farmers, 
lawyers, military personnel and war invalids. This differentiated 
system is, to some extent, still in place.  
In November 1996, a coalition of democratic parties won the 
elections, interrupting the supremacy of the reformed communists. In 
1997, the reform of the pension system was declared a priority and 
the three-pillar scheme was introduced as suggested by the World 
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Bank96. The radical orientation of reforms implemented by the new 
coalition should not come as a surprise because during the period 
1990-1996, the pension system established by Ceausescu remained 
substantially unreformed. The only changes in the legislation (Decree 
60/1990) involved a drastic increase in entitlement criteria, which, in 
the long-run, had the negative effect by making the pension system 
financially unsustainable97 (Consensus II, 1999, Country Report: 
Romania). Despite the new neo-liberal direction, many of the 
peculiarities of the old pension system remain. In particular, these 
involving a universal orientation in pension insurance and the 
existence of special provisions for determined professional groups, 
such as farmers, lawyers, military personnel, or war prisoners.  
 
      2.9 Slovakia 
Slovakia shared the same history of social security with the Czech 
Republic until its independence in 1993. Since the fall of state-
socialism, the predominant model is again Bismarck insurance. The 
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family is now the institution 
responsible in the field of social policy, while the Social Insurance 
Agency collects and administrates the contributions of the employees, 
employers and self-employed98. This is similar to other countries, as 
special provisions apply to different categories of workers, especially 
members of armed forces and police. Social policy in Slovakia 
consists of three different pillars: a) social insurance; b) state social 
support; c) social care, which became social assistance in July 1999. 
This system is not dissimilar to that present in the Czech Republic.  
Slovakia has recently introduced the three-pillar scheme. The first 
pillar (compulsory pension scheme for employees and self-employed) 
is divided in the general pension scheme and in special regulations 
for soldiers and policemen. The financing method in this tier is based 
on contributions and PAYG. The second pillar, supplementary private 
pension, is financed by contributions, but privately funded, while the 
third pillar includes voluntary private pensions. The system is work-
related in scope, but it is still universal in coverage99. Article 39 of the 
Slovak Constitution affirms the right to adequate material provisions 
                                              
96 However, the introduction of the three-pillar scheme in Romania 
has been concluded with the Governance Program 2001-2004 and 
the Plan of Action, approved by the Government Decision no. 
455/2001 (Vilnoiu and Abagiu 2003). Nonetheless, at the moment of 
writing (2003), only the I and III Pillar are functioning. 
97 As a result of these failed reforms, four successive IMF loan 
agreements were signed and then broken.   
98 The state guarantees the solvency of the Social Insurance Agency 
by providing a returnable financial amount of 100 per cent of its 
insolvency. Source: Social Insurance Agency web site, Act no. 
274/1994 Coll. 
99 For further information on pension reform in Slovakia, see Jakoby 
(2004). 
   83
for pensioners establishing a strong linkage with the minimum 
guaranteed income. On the basis of this article, the state shall pay for 
all those citizens who cannot take part in the social insurance (for 
example, unemployed; beneficiaries of social assistance, benefits, 
and so on). The principle of solidarity established by the constitution 
and the persistence of special schemes represent the most important 
communist legacies. These legacies, however, did not block the 
introduction of innovative reforms (three-pillar scheme), implemented 
in a second stage. 
 
      2.10 Slovenia 
Slovenia has a long tradition, as like the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, of Bismarck insurance as part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, with some earlier legislative elements surviving the Soviet 
social policy reorganization. The system is strictly based on the 
concept of state responsibility. Also in this case, particular provisions 
established during the communist period apply to certain categories 
of workers (such as craftsmen). Pensions consist of two different 
pillars: a) compulsory insurance; and b) voluntary insurance. The 
compulsory insurance is a legally prescribed state insurance and is 
related to all professionally active people, while the voluntary 
insurance can be used by the non-insured or by people who want to 
increase their level of benefits. Voluntary insurance is carried out by 
the state through the Institute of Pension and Disability Insurance of 
Slovenia. The main principle of compulsory state insurance is 
solidarity, while in the voluntary insurance the main principle is 
income differentiation. The basic compulsory scheme is universal in 
scope and coverage. The state shall pay for all those citizens who 
cannot take part in the social insurance (for example, unemployed; 
beneficiaries of social assistance benefits, and so on). Despite strong 
political pressures made by the World Bank and the IMF100, the 
mobilising structure of Slovenian trade unions succeeded in 
convincing the government of the financial risks of shifting to 
compulsory funded schemes. The second pillar was first introduced in 
1992, but then blocked until 2000, when the Pension and Disability 
Insurance Act came into force. After an intensive political bargaining, 
the second pillar was not established on a compulsory, but rather on 
a voluntary, basis. The Slovenian pension system has thus become 
an atypical three-pillar scheme: the first-tier is publicly managed and 
based on pay-as-you-go, the second is a voluntary private-tier and 
the third pension pillar consists of voluntary individual savings for old-
age (mostly in the form of life insurance, administered by insurance 
companies) (Stropnik et al. 2003; Kidrič 2004). Universality and 
redistribution still remain the main characteristics. The public pension 
                                              
100 1995 visit of IMF/World Bank team report: “Republic of Slovenia: 
new challenges confronting the social insurance system”; 1996 IMF 
Report: White Paper on Pension reform; 1998 Workshop in Ljubliana 
sponsored by WB for the preparation of the second pillar. 
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scheme (“first pillar”) is a mandatory system for the whole active 
population, but unemployed persons receiving unemployment 
benefits are also included. In addition, pensioners with low incomes 
and an incomplete contribution period can apply for a pension income 
supplement.  
 
     3. Problems regarding the pension sector 
Finally Although the impact of reforms differed significantly from 
country to country, CEECs seem to be characterized by common 
problems. Unquestionably, the principal issue concerns the ageing of 
the population. Despite the fact that Central and Eastern European 
societies can be addressed as still “young”, according to ILO 
estimations, the reliance of pensioners on the work force is constantly 
increasing and will achieve the Western European average no later 
than in 2030  (see Fultz and Ruck 2000, p.22; ILO 2000, pp.58-9). 
Indeed, the Eastern European region shows a significant decrease in 
births followed by an increase in life expectancy (see TransMonee 
Database 2001).  
Unfortunately, the ageing of the population is expected to produce 
more negative consequences in the East than those it might cause in 
West, largely because of the destruction of the unnatural equilibrium 
created by the central planned economy. In East Central Europe, in 
fact, pension entitlements were regulated by the command economy, 
which set retirement rules in accordance not only to the production 
necessities of the countries, but also to the availability of the future 
work force. As a consequence, retirement could easily be anticipated 
for the reason that the existence of numerous “baby pensioners” 
could be tolerated by an economic system, which made continuous 
and extraordinary efforts in finding an artificial balance between the 
number of workers and the number of pensioners. With the 
introduction of market-based mechanisms, pensions lost their 
abnormal linkage to the wider economic system and the equilibrium 
was inevitably broken. The most painful results, however, will only be 
observable in a near future and, precisely, when, as a consequence 
of the economic restructuring, Central and Eastern European young 
workers will be called to pay the costs of the new generation contract 
twice: once, for the older society in which they will live and, a second 
time, for the dissolution of communism.    
A second issue, which has a negative impact on the performance of 
pension systems throughout the CEEC’s, is related to the changes in 
the labour market during the period of transition. Particularly in the 
first years of transition, Eastern Europe dramatically suffered from a 
decrease in economic activity. This has resulted in a reduction of 
funds for the social security budget. At the same time, governments 
embarked in a broad use of early-retirement policies. This strategy 
was particularly common in Poland (Cook and Orenstein 1999), but 
no country was an exception. By so doing, on the one hand, 
politicians succeeded in artificially lowering the pressure on the labour 
market by guaranteeing to the citizens some form of reward for the 
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loss of their jobs, whilst on the other hand, they increased the 
financial constraints for the social security funds. Since the problem 
concerning the decrease in economic activity was, in reality, never 
resolved, but simply amplified, postponed and given to future 
generations to sort out, the newly established pension insurance 
funds, responsible for collecting and distributing the contributions of 
workers, were faced with a disastrous situation. They witnessed a 
constant reduction in their revenues due the diminution in the number 
of contributors, as well as being requested to increase their 
expenditures because of the growing number of applicants.  
Moreover, new market rules required new forms of state control 
and, in this context, the decentralization of tasks was seen as the 
fastest way to increase the autonomy of local authorities, as well as 
enhancing a more rational and more efficient use of pension 
contributions. What was not expected, however, was that excessive 
decentralization, instead of improving the effectiveness of pension 
systems, resulted in an enormous increase in management costs. If, 
a few years ago, one institution with a set number of employees and 
administrative costs was responsible for managing the collection and 
payment of all pension benefits, with the increase in decentralization 
there is now a multitude of institutions responsible managing the 
pension benefits, which subsequently have increased the expenses 
and transaction costs. The main problem was, however, that the 
increase in administrative expenditures has not always been 
associated with an equal increase in administrative efficiency. In the 
case of Hungary, as mentioned, the National Pension Insurance Fund 
was abolished after few years because of the impossibility in reaching 
the standards in force in the period antecedent to the reforms.   
Finally, the adoption of private savings is a political decision with 
still no clear outcomes (Barr 2004). In fact, despite the necessity in 
emphasizing, as Pierson (2001) correctly does, that the demographic 
issue is making the responsibility given to young workers either 
unsustainable or politically unacceptable (under contemporary pay-
as-you-go schemes, current workers pay for current pensioners 
without the certainty of receiving an equal treatment when they reach 
retirement age), the decision to “individualize” old age security 
through an increase in private schemes, as anticipated by the World 
Bank (1994 ) and frequently re-proposed by the OECD (see § OECD 
in this volume), might not lead to the expected results or might even 
cause greater insecurity101 (for an interesting discussion on this issue 
see Ellison 2003; Barr 2004; Oksanen 2004).  
Recent simulations carried out by the ILO have, in fact, shown the 
unpredictability of pensions in mandatory retirement savings schemes 
(ILO 2000). According to ILO specialists (ILO, 2000), even under the 
unrealistic assumption that the authorities have perfect knowledge of 
                                              
101 According to Steinhilber (2004), privatized pension schemes may 
also damage women more than men, because of the gender wage 
gap.   
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the long-term average rates of wage growths and interests over a 
period of 43 working years, the simulated actual balance is quite far 
from 100 per cent of the target (the determined amount of pension as 
stated in advance). The reasons for this failure does not only depend 
on the fact that the authorities cannot know the long-term average 
wage growth and interest rates, but also it depends on the interest 
rates used to convert the final balance into an annuity fluctuate over 
time, sometimes quite sharply (ILO 2000, pp.142-143). In other 
words, in order to let people know in advance what their pension is 
going to be, authorities and pension fund managers should not only 
be able to predict the future (for example, the value of the Euro or of 
the US Dollar ten years after the Enlargement), but they should also 
be capable to adjust interest rates according to the fluctuations of the 
markets, both national and international. 
 
     Conclusion 
The countries discussed here have clearly moved to a corporatist-
style pension insurance system, readjusting pre-existent features into 
a new organism. Wagener (2002) has affirmed that the presence in all 
countries of a strong link to social assistance provisions (old-age 
allowance, the so-called fourth-pillar available for those citizens 
whose pension under the above scheme would not be sufficient) has 
made these pension systems in transition distant from the classical 
World Bank’s three-pillar scheme (see World Bank 1994). What 
Wagener (2002) envisages is a new four-pillar model, which is 
becoming the blueprint for reforms in other European countries (e.g. 
in Germany). Unquestionably, a path-dependent development has 
been the main characteristic in this sector. This evolution has 
included: a) pre-socialist Bismarck-features; b) reinforcement of work-
orientation (Bismarck- and communist background); c) mix of 
universalism and corporatism (communist background) (see Ringold 
1999); d) common attitudes towards solidarity values through the 
maintenance of significant levels of public responsibility102; and e) 
great importance given to constitutional rights established according 
to egalitarian principles. The new Central and Eastern European 
constitutions emerged, indeed, as a mixture of old and new elements, 
in which past actors played a key role in defining the new rules (Elster 
1993, Batt and Wolczuk 1998; von Beyme 2003). It is also noteworthy 
that many pension schemes have retained privileges (such as early-
retirement or better pension formula) for certain professional groups 
established during the communist period or even prior to this period. 
These path-dependent features have not precluded, however, the 
                                              
102 1. Pensions in CEE have a well-developed redistributive 
component; 2. The control of the state over the management of 
pension systems is still high. 3. Employers contributions are usually 
much higher than employees contributions; 4. Existence of a strong 
four pillar covered by the State budget at disposal for all those 
citizens, who otherwise would remain unprotected. 
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introduction of highly innovative reforms, which did not remain 
“locked-in” in the early transitional period, but were possible also in 
later stages of development. The clearest examples are the 
introduction of the three-pillar scheme or the notional defined 
contribution (NDC). 
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Chapter 4 
Health Care Systems 
 
     Introduction 
Until 1989, the dominant health care model in East Central Europe 
was the so-called Semashko system, which was a highly centralized 
scheme, fully part of the central planned economy. The Soviet 
organizational structure implied that decisions concerning health care 
planning were taken at the national level with little or no knowledge of 
local requests. The Semashko model was universal in scope and 
coverage, but high morbidity rates, inefficiency in the delivery of 
health care services and the systematic neglecting of building and 
medical equipment were the norm. Moreover, the number of medical 
personnel and hospital beds did not correspond to real local needs, 
but it was connected to the necessity of the state to allocate the work 
force. Since the scheme was tax-financed, payments for health care 
primarily depended on the budget available. As a consequence, 
health care expenditures were constantly below OECD and Western 
European average. With the collapse of communism, the requests for 
reforming this system increased. There were three main reasons why 
immediate actions were required. Firstly, because citizens were 
unsatisfied with the quality of the services provided. Secondly, 
because health care expenditures as a percentage of GDP needed to 
be drastically increased in order to cope with international standards, 
and finally, because the health care personnel openly showed its 
malcontent for the low salaries. The establishment of health insurance 
was the favourite choice in almost all countries103. The motives for 
this preference are easy to imagine. The first reason largely 
depended on the countries’ historical background. CEECs had 
already established some form of Bismarck insurance during the pre-
Soviet period. The Bismarck model was also not very far from the 
employment orientation of the communist system. The second driving 
force was associated to the belief that the introduction of health 
insurance would have separated the source of funds from the state 
budget without any significant delay. The desired outcome was an 
immediate increase in health care expenditures without worsening the 
financial situation of the state budget. The third motive found its 
origins in the health care personnel, who expected more financial 
benefits from the health insurance rather than from a tax-financed 
system. And, last but not least, health insurance was supposed to 
facilitate the privatization of health care services, and this was, of 
course, the main requests coming from the international 
organizations.  
 
                                              
103 During the first years of reforms, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
preferred a Scandinavian tax-financed system. 
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     1.  Country Overview 
     1.1 Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian legislation on protection against illness dates back to 
1879 and 1903 with the institution of collectively funded health care 
services. During this period, the Bulgarian medical and dental 
associations were set up and the state-funded free hospitals started 
to provide protection for the poor. In 1903, a law on public health care 
was passed, opening the door for the establishment of private health 
facilities. The predominant model was Bismarck social insurance on 
the basis of which all employees in government, private and public 
enterprises and on farms were compulsory insured. The first attempt 
to decentralize the system to local authorities came in 1928, but 
decentralization of tasks was dismissed during the Soviet occupation 
(WHO: Bulgaria 1999). Prior to the most recent reforms, tax financing 
and universality characterized the Bulgarian health care system. The 
definition of  “Public Health Care” was commonly used. This concept 
has been recently replaced by the term “social health protection”, 
which clearly shows its egalitarian origins.  
In 1997, in the middle of an economic crisis, Bulgaria gained large 
international support from the European Union, World Bank, World 
Health Organization and the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID). Although the health care reform was 
conducted on the basis of the requests made by these international 
actors, primarily focusing on financial stability, most of the universal 
principles of the old system were maintained. The Bulgarian health 
insurance is now divided into social health insurance based on 
obligatory contributions and voluntary corporative health insurance. 
The Ministry of Health, through numerous regional offices, is the 
organ responsible for its administration. According to the law, health 
care services are provided to all resident people and the access to 
benefits is granted regardless of financial positions. The Constitution 
of 1991 (article 51 par. 1) remains the most important legislative act, 
defining the basic and irrevocable right to health insurance for all 
citizens and the right to free medical services. This includes full 
coverage in case of sickness. Article 3 (1) of the Health Insurance Act 
(1998) affirms that “the compulsory health insurance is a system for 
social health protection of the population guaranteeing a package of 
health services, which shall be carried out by the National Health 
Insurance Fund (NHIF) and by its territorial divisions - Regional 
Health Insurance Funds (RHIF)”. Article 3 (2) points out that “the 
voluntary health insurance is additional and shall be carried out by 
shareholder companies registered according to the Commercial Law 
and who have obtained license under the conditions and by the order 
of this law”104. Unlike other CEECs, Bulgaria has decided not to 
                                              
104 Health Insurance Act, translation available at URL: 
http://www.nhif.bg/eng/default.phtml. Section: “Legal 
Framework”. Last log-in: November 2003. 
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establish numerous funds, but rather a single health insurance fund. 
The reason for this decision was to provide more financial stability, 
while, at the same time, to ensure solidarity and better regional 
redistribution (Noncheva and Satcheva 2003). To sum up, the 
principles of Bulgarian reforms involved: a) compulsory participation 
in health insurance; b) solidarity of the insured persons in using the 
raised resources; c) equality in using medical care; d) self-
management of NHIF; f) change of property; g) privatization of 
outpatient care; and h) decentralization of tasks.  
 
     1.2 Czech Republic 
The first health policy in Czech Republic dates back to 1918, when 
the Czech Lands declared their independence from the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. During this period, Bismarck social insurance was 
the standard scheme. The first fully functional health insurance 
system was established in 1924 with the adoption of the Health 
Insurance Act, which provided coverage for employees, for 
approximately one-third of the total population. This system lasted 
until 1952, when, following the Soviet occupation, the health care 
services were nationalized and put under state control. The current 
legislation finds its origins in the Law on Health Care for the 
Population of 1966, which introduced egalitarianism and universalism 
as leading principles (WHO: Czech Republic 2000).  
The contemporary Czech health care sector is a compulsory public 
health insurance system based on contributions paid by the 
employees, the employers, the self-employed and the state. Despite 
the corporatist orientation, the system is redistributive in scope and 
the contributions collected are used to provide universal health 
services. In the Czech Republic, the entire population is covered, with 
very few exceptions that must buy individual insurance. In 2003, 
about half of the population was insured by the state, which remains 
the main guarantor of the system, paying almost 20 per cent of total 
health insurance contributions (Tomeš et al. 2003, p.108). The 
collection of premiums is administered by the new established health 
insurance funds (joint-stock companies). These joint-stock companies 
are required by law to provide the same coverage under the same 
conditions and are also not allowed to make profits. Any surplus must 
be transferred to a common reserve. Redistribution remains the main 
rule of the Czech public health insurance system.  
There can be little doubt that the Czech system of protection 
against illness is the result of an ambiguous compromise between 
neo-liberal theorists and more cautious policy-makers. The current 
public health insurance model is clearly based on contributions, but 
the freedom of the health insurance funds to operate in a competitive 
and profit-oriented environment has been strongly limited by the 
necessity of redistribution. 
 The Czech health care sector is thus a hybrid system: it is 
German-style with regard to the social insurance orientation, but 
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universal, redistributive and non-profit-oriented with respect to the 
coverage. 
 
     1.3 Estonia 
By the beginning of the twentieth-century, Estonia had already 
established a functional basic system of health care protection, which 
was highly decentralized with services developed and managed 
locally. This early basic system was replaced, after World War II, by 
the Semashko health care model. Centralization instead of 
decentralization became the leading principle, while universalism 
restored the occupational orientation of the previous scheme (WHO: 
Estonia 2000). In 1991, the Soviet scheme was reformed (central 
management, planning and financed from the state budget). The 
quality of health care facilities inherited was bad and medical 
equipment was poorly developed. During the first period of reforms, 
experts were divided by what to implement: a) the German health 
insurance; b) the system present in the United States; or c) the 
Scandinavian tax financed scheme. The Law on Health Care 
Organization (1995) and Health Insurance Act (2002) expressed a 
compromise among the different political parties by establishing a 
system, which finds its place between an expensive German health 
insurance and a more affordable Scandinavian system. The principle 
of redistribution of resources among different regions was introduced 
and decentralization and privatization began.  
The Ministry of Social Affairs through the Central Sickness Fund 
now administers the health insurance in Estonia105. According to the 
law, health insurance is provided to all resident citizens who have 
paid the social tax. The coverage is broad and the contributions 
collected through the social tax are redistributed to provide universal 
health services. Dependent family members, students, pregnant 
women, persons receiving a state pension are insured according to 
the principle of solidarity. Other groups not covered by compulsory or 
voluntary health insurance must pay their own medical expenses.  
Despite huge efforts, the decentralization of health care has been 
described as one of the less successful aspects of the Estonian 
reforms. This has been attributed to a lack of planning and 
administrative skills at local level, but also to the fact that 
municipalities were too small to be administratively efficient (WHO: 
Estonia 2000). As a result, the collection of social tax payments since 
1999 is no longer decentralized, but given to the Taxation Office, 
which distributes the funds proportionally to the regional offices. A 
form of hidden re-centralization is indeed taking place.  
 
                                              
105 The former Ministry of Health Care was abolished in 1993 in 
order to provide a unitary social policy. 
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     1.4 Hungary 
Hungary has a long tradition of public health services. The first act on 
public health was emanated in 1876 (Act XIV of 1876). According to 
the law, the eligible poor obtained free health care at special 
surgeries. Corporatist social insurance was the foundation of the 
system. Health care was delivered through the private sector and in 
some state hospitals. The 1949 Constitution, established during the 
Soviet occupation, signed a turning point from the Austro-Hungarian 
heritage declaring that the state would be responsible for the health of 
all its population. These universal values were, to a large extent, 
reaffirmed by the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, amended in 
1989, which emphasized the right to a healthy environment and to an 
optimal level of physical and mental health for all citizens106 (WHO: 
Hungary 1999).  
The contemporary Hungarian health insurance is compulsory, 
based on the professional status and financed by contributions. 
Coverage is no more directly linked to citizenship, but since 1992 
health services are provided to all persons in possession of the 
correct insurance card. Despite this corporatist orientation, a very 
small part of the population remains uninsured107. The government is 
responsible for the following: a) regulation of health services; b) 
exercising statutory supervision over the National Health Insurance 
Fund; c) providing capital costs; d) financing and delivering public 
health services; e) providing tertiary care services; and f) covering the 
deficit of the Health Insurance Fund (WHO: Hungary 1999, pp.19-21). 
The Ministry of Social Affairs108 determines the health policy, but 
since 1990 (Local Government Act) local authorities bear the 
responsibility for providing services.  
Medical services are provided directly to patients through the public 
health facilities in contract from the health insurance scheme. Benefits 
include general and specialist care, basic dental care and preventive 
care. As they did during communism, Hungarian patients still pay 
“gratitude money” in exchange for medical treatments109. A recent 
research carried out by the TARKI Social Research Centre in 
Budapest has estimated that the amount of informal payments in 
1999 was equal to 4.6 per cent of total health care expenditures110. It 
is clear that the Hungarian health care sector has been built on 
communist and pre-communist ruins. Numerous elements, however, 
                                              
106 Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Article 70/E 
107 The central and local government have the obligation to cover 
a large part of the population (such as unemployed, people in 
social need, and the pensioners) that otherwise would remain 
uninsured. 
108 The Ministry of Health has been reunified with the Ministry of 
Social and Family Affairs in order to provide a unitary social policy. 
109 Informal payments in Hungary were tolerated throughout the 
communist regime and included in the calculation of salaries. 
110 Bognár et al. (1999) quoted in Gál et al. (eds) (2003, p.77). 
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of Bismarck social insurance have survived even during state-
socialism. These include, for example, the private medical practice 
that was tolerated by the communist regime (though not enhanced), 
and the collection of pay-roll social insurance premiums (WHO: 
Hungary 1999). In contrast, the existence of informal payments is the 
most notable communist legacy.  
 
     1.5 Latvia 
At the beginning of the twentieth-century, Latvia was part of the 
Russian Empire. Private practitioners provided health care, while 
patients paid the cost for services. In 1930, a law on compulsory 
health insurance was adopted, providing coverage for the urban and 
rural population. During this period, there were three sickness funds: 
independent, occupational and territorial. Bismarck social insurance 
was the basis of the Latvian health care. After World War II, this 
model was replaced by the highly centralized Semashko system, 
which lasted until the independence of Latvia from the Soviet Union in 
1991 (WHO: Latvia 2001).  
Health insurance in Latvia is tax-financed and administered by the 
Ministry of Health through the State Compulsory Health Insurance 
Agency (and eight regional sickness funds). In the near future, 
however, more importance will be given to private health insurance. 
Latvia has indeed gained access to a World Bank loan for the health 
care reform111. The project includes support for health care system 
administration, reform of health care financing, strengthening of 
sickness funds, and management of the health information system 
(Bite and Zagorskis 2003).  
The liberalization of the health care system has primarily involved 
the free choice of health care facilities and the decentralization to 
local authorities. The Law on State Compulsory Social Insurance 
(1999), Law “On Local Governments” (1993) and Law “On Medical 
Care” (1997) are the basis of the new system. These acts establish 
the compulsory state social insurance, regulate the organization of 
health care facilities (Law on Local Governments) and reorganize the 
public health system (status, structure, functions and financing of the 
public health network). According to the law, health care services are 
provided to all resident citizens. The coverage is broad and the 
resources available are used to provide universal health services. 
Latvians are, in fact, insured according to the principle of solidarity. 
The organization of medical services is now the task of local 
authorities, but since 1997 financing is no longer decentralized. The 
incapacity of municipalities to collect enough financial resources is the 
main reason for the current attempts to re-centralize the system. 
 
                                              
111 Health Project: US$32 million; Year: 2000-2005.  
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     1.6 Lithuania 
Between the two world wars, Lithuania had established a Bismarck 
model of health insurance, but, following the Soviet occupation, the 
existent health care system was reorganized to be in line with the 
central planned economy. This system mainly survived (although 
some reform took place in 1991) until 1997, when the Law on Health 
Insurance moved the health care sector from a tax-financed to a 
contributory one112 (WHO: Lithuania 2000). The liberalization of 
health care started in the beginning of 1990s, involving the free 
choice of health care facilities and the re-establishment of private 
practice. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (Article 53) 
affirms the right to free health care in public health care facilities. The 
Law on Health Care System of 1994 defines the organizational 
aspects of the national health system, while the Law on Health 
Insurance of 1997 introduces the obligatory health insurance scheme. 
The level of universalism is high. The state covers all those citizens 
who are not able to pay contributions by themselves (such as 
unemployed, pensioners, and so on).  
In Lithuania, health care is predominantly public financed. The main 
sources come from the obligatory Health Insurance Fund and the 
state budget (including both national and municipal budgets). The 
majority of the health care institutions works on a not-for-profit basis 
and are state-owned. Health insurance is administered by the Ministry 
of Health and by the municipalities. The Ministry of Health is 
responsible for the development and the implementation of 
legislation, while the municipalities are responsible for providing 
primary health care to their local population. In addition to the health 
services provided under the supervision of the Ministry of Health, two 
parallel state-run health care schemes exist. The first, run by the 
Ministry of Interior, provides services for the police and prisoners, 
while the second, run by the Ministry of Defence, covers the military 
personnel (Dobravolskas and Buivydas 2003). This differentiated 
system was established during the communist period.  
Despite the new health insurance, some principles of the old 
communist system have been maintained. State responsibility in 
health care protection has often been reconfirmed as the untouchable 
foundation of reforms.  
 
     1.7 Poland 
Poland has a long tradition of Bismarck health insurance, which dates 
back to 1918. This system provided, however, very limited coverage 
with only seven per cent of the population insured. Following the 
Soviet reorganization, after World War II, coverage and protection 
                                              
112 Please note, however, that, for the Lithuanian legislation, 30 
per cent of a persons income tax is considered as health insurance 
contributions. 
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were extended. Some aspects of the old system survived even in the 
Semashko model. Private practice was never formally abolished, 
while private medical cooperatives and dental services remained in 
place even during communism. Decentralization also became an 
exception to the communist monolithic structure. By the beginning of 
1980s, more administrative power in decision-making and 
implementation of policies was in fact given to local authorities 
(voivodships and gmina) (WHO: Poland 1999).  
The reforms in this sector essentially aimed to change the 
understanding of total state responsibility through decentralization, 
social insurance and the increase in individual involvement. The 
Ministry of Health through numerous regional, provincial and local 
offices now administers the health insurance. According to the law, 
health services are provided to all insured persons in the territory of 
Poland. The concept of insured person is broad: it includes workers, 
but also their families and the unemployed. Groups not insured by 
compulsory or voluntary health insurance must pay medical 
expenses. In November 1990, a document on health responsibility 
reduced the competencies of the state by limiting its management 
activities (Consensus II: Poland, 1999, part 3, p. 108), but only with 
“Balczerowicz Plan” of 1991 the Semashko model was drastically 
reformed. As with the pension sector, the health care system was 
characterized by a huge number of proposals preceding the final 
reforms. The concluding step was made after intense negotiations 
with World Bank experts, who were working out a loan for the 
reconstruction of the health care system. The guiding philosophy was 
clear and involved: a) the introduction of health insurance, b) market-
orientation; c) increase in individual responsibility; and d) the 
dissolution of the monolithic Soviet structure through an increase in 
the already existent administrative devolution. Despite numerous 
attempts to carry out the transformation in a fast and drastic way, the 
health care reorganization was stopped for many years due to the 
necessity to find a compromise between the universal right to health 
protection and the newly proposed health insurance model. On 1 
January 1999, the right-wing government finally introduced the new 
health insurance scheme. This was the conclusion of numerous years 
of political discussions and debates among the different social 
partners.  
The contemporary Polish health insurance still aims to provide 
universal coverage, but the excessive devolution of responsibilities 
seems to have left large groups of the population unsatisfied. In 
recent polls, 62 per cent of respondents replied that the new health 
care system performed much worse than the pre-reform system, 
while approximately 72 per cent demanded that the main 
responsibility in this area should have been returned to the state 
(quoted in Golinowksa et al. 2003, pp.116-117). As it might be 
expected, the implementation of neo-liberal reforms had still to face 
the long-lasting effects of Poland’s communist/egalitarian legacies. 
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     1.8 Romania 
Until the end of World War II, the health insurance in Romania was 
based on the Bismarck conception of social solidarity, covering 
workers from industrial enterprises, merchants, employers, and self-
employed. This group of employees represented, however, only 5 per 
cent of the citizens. In 1949, the Law on Health Organization of the 
State introduced the Semashko system, extending coverage and 
protection to almost the entire population. In Romania, the highly 
centralized structure, heritage of the communist system, remained in 
place until 1995, during which the government did not introduce any 
significant changes that might have been in contrast to the right to 
health care expressed by the Article 33 of the Constitution. Only in 
1997, the new regulation on Public Health and on Hospital 
Organization altered the previous system by introducing the legal 
framework for a decentralized pluralistic social health insurance 
(WHO: Romania 2000).  
The Romanian health care sector is now undergoing a process of 
drastic transformation. The departure from tax financing through the 
(re)-establishment of health insurance (Health Insurance Act of 1997) 
has been relatively rapid and facilitated by the persistence of the 
economic crisis, which required immediate financial help from the 
World Bank. The Ministry of Health through numerous regional offices 
now administers the health insurance, while territorial and local 
authorities, on the basis of the payment of health insurance 
contributions, provide health care services. With respect to the 
universal guarantee in health protection established in the past, the 
social health insurance system covers almost the entire population. 
Citizens who cannot pay health insurance contributions are either 
supported from other budgets, or from the social health insurance 
budget according to the solidarity principle (Vilnoiu and Abagiu 2003).  
 
     1.9 Slovakia 
Slovakia shares the same Bismarck tradition of health insurance as 
the Czech Republic, which lasted until the Soviet occupation after 
World War II. During the communist period, the responsibility for 
health care promotion and protection against illness was totally given 
to the state. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reforms of the health 
care system did not aim to destroy this, and most of the egalitarian 
values established by the previous regime were reaffirmed. Some 
change, however, occurred. This has involved a mixture of 
decentralization and centralization, the re-establishment of health 
insurance, and an increase in individual responsibility.  
The Ministry of Health, State Regional Hygienists, and State District 
Hygienists administer the health insurance. According to the law, the 
entire population is covered, even if the insured person is not 
employed and therefore pays no contribution to the fund of the health 
insurance companies. In this case, the state will pay for the budget 
deficit. The idea of state responsibility has been maintained. All 
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citizens have the right to equal access to health services regardless 
of their financial position.  
The Constitution of 1st September 1992 is the most important 
legislative act confirming the right to protection against illness for all 
citizens. The constitutional rights are implemented by the Act no. 
277/1994 on Health Care (with later amendments), which affirms that 
“everybody” (and not only the insured person) has the right to get 
health care including medicaments and that the collected premiums 
will be redistributed according to population needs. In 1998, the 
Government reassured the population that they “will only allow 
privatization of health facilities that will serve as a means of 
improvement in the provision of health care” (Consensus II: Slovakia, 
1999, part 3, p. 102). Since then, this principle has never been 
brought into discussion. 
The delivery and the management of health care facilities are 
decentralized, but the state control is still high. This mixture of 
decentralization and centralization depends on the necessity to 
preserve the constitutional rights, which could not easily be ensured 
by the social insurance model. Health care benefits are very 
comprehensive covering a wide range of services with the exclusion 
of few treatments, such as acupuncture, sterilization, abortion, 
cosmetic surgery, experimental treatment, and psychoanalysis. 
According to Vagac and Haulikova (2003), the wide scope of covered 
benefits is the most notable legacy of the communist regime. 
 
     1.10 Slovenia 
As part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Slovenia had established a 
functional health insurance system based on the Bismarchian model. 
The first act dates back to 1854 introducing compulsory insurance for 
miners and foundry workers. Insurance in case of illness was first 
extended in 1858 to railway workers and then to a larger part of 
employees. This system lasted, though modified several times, until 
the end of World War II. During the communist period, health care 
was based on the principle of universality. In 1954/1955, health 
insurance was separated from social security and different systems 
were established for workers, public employees, craft workers, self-
employed and, later, also for farmers. In 1972, a referendum 
reinforced universal values by amalgamating the differences in 
protection existent between employees and farmers. In 1974, a new 
legislation on health insurance introduced the first steps towards 
decentralization and gave to the “self-managing communities in 
health” the responsibility to be the main source of funding (WHO: 
Slovenia 2002).  
In Slovenia, the Ministry of Health is responsible for the 
implementation of health care policies; the Health Council is 
responsible for monitoring proposals for the development of health 
policy; while the National Health Insurance Institute is responsible for 
the management of health insurance (WHO: Slovenia 2002). 
According to the law, health services are provided to all insured 
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citizens. The entire population is in theory covered, even if the insured 
person is not employed and, therefore, pays no contribution. In this 
case, local authorities will cover the deficit. The Act on Medical 
Activity of 1992 re-introduced private practices abolished during the 
socialist period. The level of contributions are established by the 
assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, based on proposals by the 
Health Insurance Institute. This implies that health insurance is linked 
not only to market (financial stability) factors, but also to social 
priorities. 
 As far as the reform process is concerned, gradual change rather 
than shock therapy was one of the main features of transformation. 
The new legislation reconfirms that health insurance should not 
undermine the right to use health care facilities, which must remain 
predominantly universal in scope and coverage.  
 
     2. Challenges of Transition 
In the early 1990s, Central and Eastern European health care 
systems faced numerous challenges, largely caused by the re-
organization of the old communist structure. These challenges 
included: a) the re-organization of the communist health care 
arrangement into a new market-oriented environment, b) the 
decentralization of the administration in order to ensure that local 
requests were met; c) the improvement of the health care delivery 
system through an increase in GDP expenditures; and d) the 
establishment of an efficient health insurance scheme capable of 
ensuring the financial viability of reforms. Although all countries were 
successful in carrying out the necessary structural changes, several 
problems still wait for an adequate response.  
Undoubtedly, one of the major unresolved issues concerns the 
introduction of the health insurance model that demonstrates its 
weakness in times of raising unemployment. In more than one aspect, 
the establishment of market-based mechanisms is a decision that still 
implies a significant degree of hazard. The decrease in economic 
activity, present in all Eastern societies, makes a direct link between 
the payment of health insurance contributions and the access to 
health care services particularly problematic. The obvious 
consequence is a growing deficit of the health insurance funds 
caused by the impossibility of the unemployed to pay the monthly 
premiums. Moreover, while in the case of pension reforms, numerous 
policy options are available to diminish the budget constraints (for 
example, retirement age can be postponed, the amount of pensions 
can be reduced and so on), these possibilities cannot be applied to 
the reforms of the health care system. As it is well known, the need 
for medical services cannot be simply postponed or the expenditures 
of medicines blocked, but immediate actions are expected. 
Providentially, however, in the situation of financial instability, central 
governments guaranteed the most basic health services by ensuring, 
at their expenses, the solvency of the newly established health funds. 
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A second problem related to the introduction of health insurance 
involves, once again, the excessive decentralization of tasks given to 
local authorities, which has resulted in a disproportionate increase in 
administrative costs at the expense to the efficiency of the overall 
delivery system. This situation has been worsened by the huge 
regional differences that still exist in these countries. The condition of 
Central and Eastern European medical services are, as a general 
rule, much better the closer one is to the capitals, while a lot of work 
still remains to be done in the peripherical zones (WHO HIT Profiles). 
This asymmetrical distribution of resources is the unfortunate 
consequence of forty years of central planned economy, which 
systematically neglected the needs and requests of the peripheries. In 
this context, it comes as no surprise that Eastern policy-makers saw 
the devolution of responsibilities to local authorities as the fastest way 
to find an answer to this old problem. Unluckily, decentralization did 
not automatically imply more efficiency, but rather a constant increase 
in the expenditures of the health insurance funds. 
A third, more debated question, concerns the fast opening of 
Central and Eastern European markets, which has been a reason for 
the closure of many pharmaceutical industries. Unquestionably, 
Eastern medical technology and products were far behind the ones 
available in the West, but they were cheap and, thus, even 
institutions, which suffered from a chronic lack of funds, could buy 
them, ensuring, at least, basic services to their patients. New medical 
products imported from the West, if on the one hand, have enlarged 
the chances of gaining access to the most appropriate medical 
treatment, then on the other, have progressively caused further 
budget constraints for the health insurance funds. This is primarily 
because, being paid in the currency of the country of origin, they are 
much more expensive than they would have been if produced by 
national industries. Of course, the debate on this topic is huge, since 
it includes the dispute on the costs of medical research as discussed 
in chapter two of this volume (see the TRIPS and GATS agreements, 
chapter 2 §1.3.5). Nevertheless, what it seems crucial to mention 
here is that the increasing competition with Western industries under 
current rules did not only produce positive outcomes (such as the 
possibility to buy better equipment or the access to the most recent 
inventions), but had also the undesired effect in reducing the profits of 
national pharmaceutical companies that provided products of great 
use and value to Eastern European citizens. As a consequence, 
instead of improving the efficiency of the health care delivery 
systems, liberalization of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals 
severely impacted on the availability of services for the entire 
population. 
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Finally, the new “risk society113” in which CEE citizens have been 
catapulted into has required an increase in the protection against 
unemployment, poverty and, of course, illness. Unfortunately, 
governments are only partially succeeding in ensuring an adequate 
safety net. There are numerous reasons for this incapacity to ensure 
basic social security, among which it can be mentioned the financial 
restrictions of the social security budgets, the inadequate 
performance of labour market institutions, the impossibility of Central 
and Eastern European markets to be competitive in the new 
globalized environment and so on. The extraordinary efforts, 
however, made to reform a health care system, which was highly 
inefficient and inevitably subject to continuous deterioration, should 
not be forgotten.   
At this stage, an important point still needs to be made. It has to be 
clarified whether Central and Eastern European health care systems 
are moving towards a full corporatist model or whether universal 
aspirations are still the leading principles of reforms. In fact, even 
though it is true that almost all countries have opted for a clear 
Bismarck-oriented model, which grants health care services upon the 
payment of health insurance contributions, state responsibility and 
redistribution of resources remain the main characteristics of reforms. 
As it has been mentioned, the state is responsible not only to ensure 
the solvency of the newly established health insurance funds, but also 
to redistribute the resources collected to regions and individuals more 
in need.  
On the side of the critiques, the recent attempts to re-centralize the 
health care organization of this region have been seen as a possible 
return to the past. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that re-
centralization has been a necessary adaptation to ensure the long-
term sustainability of the new system, which otherwise would have 
fallen under extreme financial pressures caused by the often insolvent 
municipalities. In numerous cases, the introduction of health 
insurance was conducted in an exceptionally fast manner, especially 
if the loss of numerous jobs caused by the transition from the 
command to a market economy is considered. As Stiglitz (2002) has 
correctly emphasized, reforms in East Central Europe have frequently 
been conducted according to a wrong sequence of priorities on the 
basis of which the transition toward a market economic system was 
implemented well before the social and economic conditions made 
this shift possible and sustainable. In the case of health care systems, 
for example, the establishment of market-based services should have 
been introduced only after a “functioning” market economy was in 
place. This would have certainly reduced the imbalance between the 
increase of unemployed and the consequent reduction of 
contributions collected.  
                                              
113 For an interesting debate on the new social risks emerging in 
post-industrial societies see Esping-Andersen (1999), Bonoli 
(2004) and Taylor-Gooby (2004). 
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These mistakes in sequencing the order of reforms inevitably led 
Eastern politicians to a crossroad. The principal question was how to 
ensure continuity of the decisions taken in a reformed system that 
was producing unexpected negative results. The possibilities at 
disposal were, of course, limited. Reforms could have been blocked, 
continued or readjusted to the new evolving needs. The recent 
attempts to re-centralize the health care delivery system or to 
maintain high levels of state responsibility even in presence of 
market-oriented reforms must undoubtedly be understood in this 
context and cannot be separated by an accurate analysis of the new 
emerging problems. 
 
    Conclusion 
The perspective that looks at Eastern societies as a tabula rasa, in 
which institutions can be introduced by design, shows all its 
weakness, when used to explain the transformation of the health care 
sector. Contemporary Eastern European health care systems did not 
only retain many of the characteristics established during their 
Bismarck period of social insurance, but also recombined these 
features with the egalitarian principles introduced by the communist 
regime. The persistence of strong universal aspirations in health 
protection is the most notable indicator that history matters.  
In spite of the enormous budgetary costs caused by raising 
unemployment, governments did not renounce the decisions taken in 
advance and the reform of the old health care organization has been 
carried out as planned. This time, however, new policy priorities came 
to light. If during the first years of transition, privatization of provisions 
was chosen as a necessary step to improve the effectiveness of a 
highly inefficient and under financed health care system, the latest 
policy challenges concern the sustainability of the reforms already 
implemented. This has primarily involved the necessity to ensure the 
availability of sufficient services for the population. Recent studies 
have demonstrated that, despite the introduction of drastic reforms, 
health insurance in Eastern Europe still covers more than 90 per cent 
of the population (Bite and Zagorskis 2003; Dobravolskas and 
Buivydas 2003; Golinowksa et al. 2003; Gál et al. 2003; Leppik and 
Kruuda 2003; Noncheva and Satcheva 2003; Stropnik et al. 2003; 
Tomeš et al. 2003; Vagac and Haulikova 2003; Vilnoiu and Abagiu 
2003). This positive result, however, has not been made possible 
thanks to a natural efficiency of health care systems fully based on 
market resources, which in reality have been demonstrated as being 
extremely vulnerable to economic cycles, but thanks to an active 
involvement of central governments that covered the financial deficits 
of the new health insurance funds. 
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Chapter 5 
Protection against Unemployment114
 
Introduction 
During communism, unemployment was basically non-existent or, at 
least, not officially recognized. As a consequence, no legislation was 
required. Every communist citizen had the right and obligation to work 
for the maintenance of his/her family, as well as for the development 
of the communist ideology. Applied to the state-socialist society, what 
Baldwin (1990) affirmed for the Germany of Bismarck (see chapter 
one), the communist regime made concessions to its industrial 
working class in the coin of full-employment with the aim of avoiding 
the possible spreading of anti-revolutionary forces. As Baldwin (1990) 
would point out: full-employment for empowerment. This is, however, 
only part of the story. During communism, statistics were often 
unreliable and forms of hidden unemployment did exist. The lack of 
jobs did not only involve groups marginalized by the society, such as 
the Roma population, but also social groups better integrated in the 
state-socialist system. Nevertheless, in the beginning of 1970s, the 
existence of unemployed people became so evident in the Yugoslav 
Republic that the government was forced to introduce the first 
unemployment insurance along the same lines as the German 
pattern.  
Not only did hidden unemployment existed during state-socialism, 
but also forms of part-time, or “second jobs”, existed in agriculture. A 
survey led by Ivan Szelényi and D.J. Tremain115 has shown that 18 
per cent of Bulgarians, 19 per cent of Hungarians, 11 per cent of 
Poles (4 per cent in Warsaw) and 45 per cent of Russians116 had 
already worked part-time in agriculture in 1988 (Table 1.1), earning 
extra money to help support themselves or their family. The income 
from this activity was not high (usually less than 10 per cent of family 
income, see Table 1.2), but certainly helped these citizens to face 
times of shortage (see Szelényi 1989) (Table 1.3). Unquestionably, 
                                              
114 I owe much to Fabrizio Caponnetto (Associate Expert on Active 
Labour Market Policies at the ILO Sub-regional Office for Central and 
Eastern Europe in Budapest) for his valuable discussion.   
115 SSEE -Social Stratification in Eastern Europe After 1989 Dataset-.  
This is the international project led by I.Szelényi and D.J. Tremain 
(UCLA). The SSEE general population surveys were conducted in 6 
countries in 1993: Bulgaria (N= 4919), Czech Republic (4737 and 
Prague over sample 884), Hungary (4977), Russia (5002), Slovakia 
(4920), and in 1994 in Poland (Poland 3520, Warsaw sample 1503). 
Question g2a: “Now I'd like to ask you some questions about things 
in addition to your regular job that you have done to earn extra 
money or help feed or support yourself or your family.” 
116 Only 2 per cent of Czechs responded to have worked part-time in 
agriculture prior to 1989. This result can be explained by the highly 
industrialized structure of the Czech society. 
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the emergence of these “atypical” jobs represented the first example 
of breakdown of the Soviet monolithic system of allocation of labour 
(see also Hankiss 1991). 
Abb. 1: Table 1.1: Ever worked part time in agriculture?% 
 
Table 1.1  Ever worked Part Time in Agriculture? % 
 
Ever worked Part Time in Agriculture? % 
 
 Yes No Blank/Refused or Don't Know 
Bulgaria 18,6 78,7 
Czechoslovakia 2,0 98,0 
Hungary 19,7 80,3 
Poland 11,5 88,2 
Russia 45,3 54,2 
2,7 
0,0 
0,0 
0,3 
0,5 
Source: SSEE-Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 Dataset 
 
Abb. 2: Table 1.2: Fraction of income from agriculture?% 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2   Fraction of Income from agriculture? % 
 
Fraction of Income from agriculture? 
 
10% or 
less 
10% to 
half 
about a 
half 
more 
than a 
half 
almost 
all Skipped 
Blank/Refused 
or Don't Know 
Bulgaria 12,9 3,3 0,9 0,3 0,1 78,3 4,2 
Czechoslovakia 1,0 0,4 0,1 N.A. 0,0 98,0 0,5 
Hungary 6,4 2,2 0,9 0,2 0,1 88,2 2 
Poland 8,2 3,4 1,2 0,4 0,2 80,1 6,5 
Russia 24,7 7,1 3,2 1,1 0,6 54,7 8,6 
Source: SSEE-Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 Dataset 
 
Abb. 3: Table 1.3: Fraction of food from agriculture? % 
 
Table 1.3    Fraction of food from agriculture? % 
 
Fraction of food from agriculture? 
 
10% or 
less 
10% to 
half 
about a 
half 
more than 
a half 
almost 
all Skipped 
Blank/Refused 
or Don't Know 
Bulgaria 8,1 8,3 3,1 2,2 0,4 77,0 0,9 
Czechoslovakia 0,9 0,5 0,2 0,1 0,1 98,0 0,2 
Hungary 4,5 4,2 5,2 3,4 2,1 79,9 0,7 
Poland 3,5 2,2 1,9 1,6 2,2 88,2 0,4 
Russia 9,9 12,0 10,9 6,6 4,4 54,7 1,5 
Source: SSEE-Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 Dataset  
 
1. The Performance of Labour Markets in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
The fall of Berlin Wall brought a free market economy, but also 
unemployment. This was not only the result of the necessary change 
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of economic alignment from the Soviet Union to Western Europe and 
consequent diminution in trading power, but also the outcome of 
years of industrial mismanagement. Central and Eastern European 
countries inherited an obsolete industrial structure, where workers 
were often trained accordingly (Interview no. 9). The extraction 
industry and the defense industry were the engine of the command 
economy, while the service sector was largely underdeveloped. 
Agriculture was managed by big state-owned enterprises and, only in 
Poland was agriculture based on small family farms. The private 
sector was only symbolic and almost limited to Hungary and Bulgaria 
(Nesporova 1999) only. According to the European Commission, 
employment in Central and Eastern Europe is still largely over-
represented in agriculture and industry, to the detriment of the service 
sector (DG Employment and Social Affairs 2002). 
Competitions with Western European industries became a major 
problem immediately after the first years of transition. Unfair trade 
agreements117 accompanied by the necessary macroeconomic 
stabilization policies led to a cut in the domestic demand, in the end 
resulting in the bankruptcy of many Eastern companies. As a first 
response, numerous state-owned enterprises tried to reduce 
production costs, in many cases, by firing employees. At the political 
and managerial levels, it was hoped that most of these workers would 
be absorbed into the private sector (Nesporova 1999). Unfortunately, 
this did not happen. Data regarding employees insured by the Social 
Insurance Agency in Poland (ZUS), for example, show that during the 
period 1991-1998 approximately 1.3 million employees lost their jobs 
in the process of re-allocation from the public to the private sector118.  
In practice, although the real GDP growth significantly improved 
after the first shock of transition, economic recovery was not followed 
by a proportional job creation (see Table 1.4 and Table 1.5). 
Identifying the reason for this imbalance in the labour market is 
extremely difficult, especially due to the fact that there are many 
possible responses to such a big issue. Perhaps, the most convincing 
explanation is provided by Nesporova (1999, 2002a, 2002b), who 
identifies as the main reason the necessity of enterprises to be 
competitive by reducing labour costs and redundant labour while 
                                              
117 The EU Member States agreed to push for trade liberalization of 
CEE markets, while protecting those sectors in which competition 
from accession countries might have threatened their economies. 
The so-called “Strategy of Asymmetry” expressed by the Europe 
Agreements. See Stiglitz (2002). 
118 The number of people insured in the public sector diminished 
from 12 397 thousand in 1991 to 5624 thousand in 1998 (-6773), 
while the insured in private sector increased from 1727 thousand in 
1991 to 7112 thousand in 1998 (+5385) Source: ZUS web site: 
http://www.zus.pl/english/chapter4.htm. Last log-in: November 
2003. 
   105
simultaneously increasing production. This obviously involved a 
decrease in real wages and consequently poverty for workers. 
Abb. 4: Table 1.4: Real GDP  
 Table 1.4 Real GDP
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bulgaria - -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.9 -9.4 -5.4 3.9 2.3 5.4 4.1 4.8 4.5 5.0
Czech -11.6 -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.3 -0.8 -1 0.5 3.3 3.1 2.0 2.8 3.9
Estonia - - - -2.0 4.3 3.9 9.8 4.6 -0.6 7.1 5.0 5.8 4.9 5.1
Hungary -11.9 -2.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.3 3.7 4.1
Latvia -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 -0.6 -1.6 3.7 8.4 4.8 2.8 6.8 7.9 6.1 5.5 6.0
Lithuania -5.7 -21.3 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7.3 5.1 -3.9 3.8 5.9 5.9 4.5 5.0
Poland -7.0 2.5 3.7 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.0 1.3 2.5 3.7
Romania -13,1 -8.7 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.1 -4.8 -1.2 2.1 5.7 4.9 4.9 5.0
Slovakia - - 6.2 5.2 6.5 5.8 5.6 4.0 1.3 2.2 3.3 4.4 3.7 4.5
Slovenia -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.8 5.2 4.6 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.7
Source: DG Employment and Social Affairs 2003, pp.206-208
 
Abb. 5: Table 1.5: Occupied population 
 Table 1.5 Occupied Population
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bulgaria -13.0 -8.1 -1.6 0.6 1.3 0.1 -3.9 -0.2 -2.1 -3.5 -0.4 1.5 1.5 2.0
Czech
Rep.
- - -0.2 1.1 0.7 0.2 -0.7 -1.4 -2.1 -0.7 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.9
Estonia -2.7 -5.9 -8.1 -3.3 -6.2 -2.4 0.1 -2.0 -4.3 -1.3 0.8 1.3 0.5 0.5
Hungary - - -6.3 -2.0 -3.4 -0.5 0.1 1.8 3.2 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3
Latvia -0.8 -7.3 -6.9 -10.1 -3.5 -2.7 1.9 0.6 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 2.7 2.0 1.5
Lithuania 2.4 -2.2 -4.2 -5.8 -1.9 0.9 0.6 -0.8 -0.5 -3.7 -4.0 0.0 0.5 0.7
Poland - - -2.4 1.0 1.8 1.9 2.8 2.3 -2.7 -2.3 -0.6 -2.9 -0.5 1.3
Romania -0.5 -3.0 -3.8 -0.5 -5.2 -1.2 -3.8 -2.3 -4.5 2.5 -0.8 -8.7 -0.2 0.0
Slovakia - - - - 2.1 3.3 -1.1 1.5 -3.2 -2.5 1.0 0.2 0.5 1.0
Slovenia 0.6 0.5 -0.2 2.4 3.7 2.1 -2.5 2.8 2.1 -0.4 -1.0 0.2 1.5 1.8
Source: DG Employment and Social Affairs 2003, pp.206-208
 
 
Raising unemployment did not only imply a constant decrease in 
household income, but it also meant changing values established for 
more than 40 years. If during communism men and women had equal 
access to full-employment (the system was based on a dual-
breadwinner model), in the new post-communist order, gender roles 
became more differentiated. Here, points of view on the weakness of 
gender-related labour market situation in Eastern Europe substantially 
differ (see Table 1.6). The European Commission, by affirming that 
unemployment hit men harder than women (DG Employment and 
Social Affairs 2002), has indirectly supported the hypothesis proposed 
by Fodor (1997) that women are seen as “revalued resources119”. By 
contrast, Nesporova (1999, 2002a, 2002b) has demonstrated that 
female participation rates fell more rapidly than male rates, showing a 
weaker position of women in the labour market. In addition, women in 
East Central Europe are now openly facing new forms of “ethical 
                                              
119 Eva Fodor (1997) argues that women will have a significant 
advantage over men in the labour market as a result of their better 
training and educational skills acquired during communism.  
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discrimination”, which result in an increase of the gender wage gap120. 
In other words, since women are often considered less reliable and 
less productive than men only because of their sex, they are more 
likely to be discriminated against in recruitment, promotion and pay 
(Interview no. 1; Interview no. 12; Nesporova 1999, 2002a, 2002b; 
Cazes and Nesporova 2003; UNECE 2003).  
Abb. 6: Table 1.6: Unemployment rate (% Labour Force 15+) by 
sex 
 Table 1.6 Unemployment Rate (% Labour Force 15+) by Sex 
 2000 2001 2002 
 Tot Male Fem Tot Male Fem Tot Male Fem 
Bulgaria 16.4 16.7 16.2 19.2 20.0 18.4 18.1 18.7 17.4 
Czech Rep. 8.7 7.3 10.3 8.0 6.7 9.7 7.3 5.9 9.0 
Estonia 12.5 13.4 11.5 11.8 11.5 12.0 9.1 9.8 8.4 
Hungary 6.3 6.8 5.6 5.6 6.1 4.9 5.6 6.0 5.1 
Latvia 13.7 14.4 12.9 12.8 14.1 11.6 12.8 13.7 11.8 
Lithuania 15.7 17.9 13.4 16.1 18.4 13.8 13.1 13.3 13.0 
Poland 16.4 14.6 18.6 18.5 17.1 20.2 19.9 19.1 20.9 
Romania 6.8 7.2 6.3 6.6 6.9 6.2 7.0 7.3 6.6 
Slovakia 18.7 18.9 18.5 19.4 19.8 18.9 18.6 18.4 18.8 
Slovenia 6.6 6.4 6.8 5.8 5.5 6.2 6.0 5.7 6.4 
Source: DG Employment and Social Affairs 2003, pp.227-237 
  
 
As far as the structural change in occupations is concerned, 
transition meant a drastic transformation of the labour structure for 
these countries. In the process of reallocating the work force to the 
new sectors, the industrial workers have undoubtedly paid the highest 
social costs. This result, however, is hardly surprising, since the 
communist industries were in particular urgent need of modernization 
and thus subject to a painful restructuring.  
In order to have a clearer picture, Figure 1.1 reorders data 
regarding employment by occupation provided by the ILO (ILO: 
Laborsta 2002) into four major groups. “Major Group 1” involves 
legislators, senior officials and managers (ISCO-88 Group 1), 
professionals (ISCO-88 Group 2), technicians and associate 
professionals (ISCO-88 Group 3). “Major Group 2” includes clerks 
(ISCO-88 Group 4), service workers and shop and market sales 
workers (ISCO-88 Group 5). “Major Group 3” includes skilled 
agricultural and fishery workers (ISCO-88 Group 6), craft and related 
trade workers (ISCO-88 Group 7), plant and machine operators and 
assemblers (ISCO-88 Group 8), while “Major Group 4” involves 
                                              
120 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe has 
estimated that the gender wage gap in Central and Eastern Europe 
in 2001 was between 18 and 25 per cent, that is, women earned, for 
the same job position, between 18 and 25 per cent less than men 
(UNECE 2003). 
   107
Elementary occupations121 (ISCO-88 Group 9). Although it is still not 
possible to know in detail what has happened to the old communist 
worker (in order to do this, data is needed that clearly show that a 
worker moved from one group to another), Figure 1.1 demonstrates 
that the new Central and Eastern European labour market structure is 
characterized by a clear increase in Major Group 1 (ISCO-88 Group 
1, 2, 3) and Major Group 2 (ISCO-88 Group 4, 5) workers, that is, an 
increase in middle and upper-classes, at the expenses of lower 
occupations, such as Major Group 3 (ISCO-88 Group 6, 7, 8) and 
Major Group 4 (ISCO-88 Group 9). The latter are more directly 
associated to the ex-socialist working class. This, however, by no 
means implies that the old socialist worker successfully climbed the 
social class, moving from lower to higher positions, but rather that the 
new social scale is characterized by a different class composition in 
which a larger availability of jobs in the highest positions will 
necessarily require different skills from those necessary during 
communism. Needless to say, low-skilled workers are inexorably 
going to suffer more for the consequences of this transformation. 
Abb. 7: Fig. 1.1: Employment by occupation & (ISCO-88 regro 
 
Fig.1.1 Employment by Occupation % (ISCO-88  regrouped)
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Also from the analysis of Figure 1.2, it becomes evident that lower 
social classes (workers in Major Group 3 and Major Group 4) have 
suffered more job losses than other groups, confirming the hypothesis 
                                              
121 ISCO Group 0 “Armed Forces” and Additional Group X are 
excluded from the count. 
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that unemployment has hit workers in the lower occupations harder 
than in the higher. This result is particularly clear for Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia in Major Group 3, while in Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia the extent of the loss has primarily 
included Major Group 4 workers, that is, those people employed in 
the elementary occupations that required no advanced skill.  
Abb. 8: Fig. 1.2 Employment by occupation: change 1995-2000 
within group (ISCO-88 regrouped) 
 
Fig. 1.2 (ISCO-88 regrouped) Employm ent by Occupation: change 1995-2000 within 
group
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During communism, flexibility was an unknown concept. 
Employment was provided life-long in a single firm, responsible to 
take care of the citizen/worker. A research conducted by the ILO 
Subregional Office for Central and Eastern Europe in Budapest has 
shown that countries in transition are now moving towards an 
increase in labour flexibility, especially driven by the EU accession 
(Cazes and Nesporova 2001, 2003; Cazes 2002). Unfortunately, this 
has also been coupled to a growth in the number of informal workers 
(Musiolek 2002). This is not to say that the informal economy was not 
existent during communism. It did exist, especially in the form of 
undeclared labour such as in construction and maintenance of family 
houses, production and sale of agricultural products (see Szelényi 
1988) and illegal activities (ILO 2002). Nonetheless, the number of 
informal workers and the impact of informal activities for the overall 
production of GDP did not reach contemporary levels. Possible 
reasons for the increase in the informal sector have been identified in 
the economic transformation (privatization, dismissal of workers from 
the state-owned enterprises, deterioration of economic situation, and 
so on) as well as in the increase in income inequality.  
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Trying to discover the real volume of these workers is not easy, 
above all due to the implicit illegal nature of some of these 
occupations. Applying “official” estimations reported by the ILO 
(2002), approximately 46 per cent of the unemployed persons 
surveyed in Romania engaged in some form of informal activity in 
2000, of whom 28 per cent had more than two occupations in the 
“unofficial sector”. In Poland and in the Russian Federation, on the 
other hand, “official surveys” show that only about 5 per cent of the 
total of those employed worked informally (quoted in ILO 2002, p.19). 
More recent estimations (Schneider 2002), however, have suggested 
that the size of shadow labour force in East Central Europe should 
be, in reality, much higher than expected and equal to approximately 
one-fourth or one-third of total labour force. Without going into details 
on the analysis of repercussions of an informal economy on the 
economic and social issues, it is vital to remember that being an 
informal worker means for the person involved “being unprotected, 
unrecognized and unorganized and, therefore, being highly 
vulnerable and insecure” (ILO 2002, Powerpoint Presentation, Slide 
n. 5). These are all challenges that Central and Eastern European 
systems of protection against unemployment still need to deal with. 
 
2. Country Overview 
2.1 Bulgaria 
Until 1989, there was no official unemployment in Bulgaria and, 
therefore, no legislation was required. The first legislation was 
emanated immediately in 1989, when the government admitted, for 
the first time, the necessity to guarantee protection for all those 
people who involuntarily had lost their job. State responsibility through 
the administration of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy was the 
main characteristic of reforms. Although many efforts have been 
made, Bulgaria has still one of the highest unemployment rates in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The main causes for this result can be 
attributed to its economic structure, which remained, until very 
recently, highly dependent on the Soviet bloc and agriculture. At the 
beginning of 1989, Bulgaria was one of the poorest countries in East 
Central Europe. This situation has not changed yet. 
The Constitution of 1991 is the basis for the Bulgarian sector of 
protection against unemployment. It defines basic citizens‘ rights, but 
also the obligation of the state to provide all necessary assistance in 
case of job loss. The first legislation started with the Ordinance no. 57 
of the Council of Ministers for Redirection and Effective Use of the 
Labour Force Dismissed (1989). The current system, however, is 
based on the Unemployment Protection and Promotion of 
Employment Act of 1997 (entered into force in 1998), the Compulsory 
Public Insurance Code of 1999 and the Employment Promotion Act of 
2002, which regulate the new unemployment insurance, as well as 
passive and active measures. These acts envisage two types of 
insurance: compulsory and voluntary. The principle of the voluntary 
unemployment insurance is the same of the voluntary health 
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insurance. Citizens may freely decide to sign contracts with joint stock 
companies in order to improve their income in case of job loss. 
Protection against unemployment concerns: a) unemployment 
benefits; b) unemployment allowances (when participating in forms of 
vocational training); c) allowances for long-term-unemployed; d) 
social unemployment pension; e) and various active measures (such 
as employment trainings and stipends; employment subsidies, public 
works, etc.). Entitlement conditions are quite strict and not all those 
registered unemployed receive benefits (Noncheva and Satcheva, 
2003). Job seekers must have worked for a period of nine months 
during the last 15 months before having access to benefits, which 
cannot be granted for more than 4-12 months depending on age and 
period of service. The amount cannot be higher than 60 per cent of 
previous wage.  
 
2.2 Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic has a comprehensive system of re-allocation of 
labour. Every employer is forced by law to give notice of possible 
vacancies to the employment offices within 5 days. It is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, through 77 
District Labour Offices, to administrate and supervise the employment 
related policies. In theory, unemployment benefits are provided to all 
economic active persons who are involuntarily unable to find a job. 
The amount of unemployment benefits is determined by the average 
monthly earnings and is therefore based on the occupational status of 
the person seeking the benefit. The state is not only responsible to 
ensure functioning labour market policies, but also to provide a 
minimum subsistence level to all those unemployed who have expired 
the access to benefits.  
Act No.1/1991 Coll. defines the citizens‘ right to employment, 
regulates the conditions for placement services, re-qualification, 
unemployment benefits and recruitment of workers by the employers. 
Employment promotion in the Czech Republic involves: a) socially 
useful works (Act. No. 1 /1991 Coll.); b) subsidies to employers 
offering vocational experience to jobseekers (Act. 324/1992 Coll.); c) 
creation of jobs for disables persons (Ministry Decree 232/1997); d) 
passive policies (social benefits); e) active policies (job creation); f) 
health insurance of the unemployed; and g) public employment 
offices administrative costs. Job seekers have access to benefits after 
one week since registering at the employment offices. The 
unemployed applying for unemployment compensation must have 
worked for a period of twelve months in the previous three years and 
benefits cannot exceed six months (depending on the period of 
service). The amount is equal to 50 per cent of previous earnings for 
the first three months, and 40 per cent during the remaining period. If 
the unemployed takes part in retraining measures, however, he or 
she will receive 60 per cent of previous earnings. The insufficient 
duration of unemployment benefits (only up to six months) is 
complemented by unemployment assistance under the general 
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minimum subsistence level. The law establishes indeed that every 
household is entitled to this subsistence level corresponding to the 
sum of all amounts necessary for food and other essential needs (see 
§ Social Assistance: Czech Republic).  
 
2.3 Estonia 
Until January 2002, there was no unemployment insurance in 
Estonia. Protection against unemployment was financed through the 
state budget and was more close to social assistance rather than to 
unemployment insurance. Benefits were flat-rate and equal to 400 
EEK for registered unemployed. Only a few people, however, were 
allowed to register as unemployed, even if they were actively seeking 
a job. The recent legislation has changed the old structure, with 
unemployment insurance now including: a) earnings-related 
unemployment insurance benefits financed from statutory 
unemployment insurance contributions; and b) flat-rate state 
unemployment allowances financed from the state budget (Leppik 
and Kruuda, 2003).  
The Decree of the Government in 1991 defined for the first time the 
concept of ‘unemployed person’, until that moment unrecognized in 
Estonian society.  The Social Protection of the Unemployed Act of 
1994 was the practical implementation of the Decree of Government 
1991, defining the terms for payment of the benefits. Unemployment 
insurance as defined by the Social Protection of the Unemployment 
Act of 2000 and Unemployment Insurance Act of 2001 now concerns: 
a) unemployment insurance benefits; b) unemployment allowance; c) 
labour market services (e.g. employment trainings and stipends; 
employment subsidies and community placement); and d) means-
tested social assistance. Job seekers have access to benefits after 
eight days after registering at the employment offices, under the 
condition that they have worked for a period of twelve months in the 
previous two years. Benefits can last up to six to twelve months 
depending on the period of service. The amount is equal to 50 per 
cent of the average remuneration of the insured person for the first 
100 days, and 40 per cent for the remaining period.  
 
2.4 Hungary 
In Hungary three stages of employment policies can be identified. 
During the first years of reforms (1990-1998), unemployment 
insurance was particularly generous. The unemployed were well 
protected, with easy access to benefits or early retirement policies 
being the favourite tool of politicians to repay the ex-state socialist 
workers for the dissolution of the communist social contract. In the 
second period, following the election of the Orbán government (1998-
2002), there has been a shift to active measures and a systematically 
reduction of entitlement criteria. This change towards more neo-liberal 
policy-making has not produced the expected results and 
subsequently the Orbán administration has not been re-elected in 
   112
2002. A new government led by the ex-communists has set the 
reintroduction of more comprehensive unemployment insurance as a 
policy priority. 
The Hungarian unemployment insurance is contributory and 
earnings-related. The National Labour Centre, through 180 Local 
County Employment Offices independent from the local authorities, is 
responsible for the payment of benefits. The implementation of labour 
market policies remains under the supervision of the Minister of 
Social and Family Affairs, which operates together with the Minister of 
Economic and the Minister of Education. The Act IV of 1991 (still in 
force) regulated for the fist time the measures against unemployment 
in Hungary. These measures can be summarized as being passive 
(unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance, early retirement) 
and active (support of intensive job searching, of the unemployed 
persons to become entrepreneur, of creating new jobs, of preserving 
workplaces, public works, training activities). In brief, unemployment 
insurance in Hungary is based on a three-tier system, which consists 
of: a) unemployment benefit; b) unemployment allowance; and c) 
means-tested social assistance (Gál et al. 2003). The system covers 
all wage earners with the exclusion of the self-employed who are 
insured under the Civil Code Contract. Before having access to 
benefits, job seekers must have worked for at least for 12 months 
within the previous two years and benefits cannot be granted for more 
than nine months (depending on the period of service). The amount is 
equal to 65 per cent of previous earnings.  
 
2.5 Latvia 
Latvia has a comprehensive social security system, which is divided 
into five main areas: 1) state pension insurance; 2) unemployment 
insurance; 3) occupational accidents and diseases insurance; 4) 
disability insurance; 5) maternity and sickness insurance. The 
payments of these five main areas, since 1998, are divided according 
to four special budgets: a) pension budget; b) employment budget; c) 
occupational accident budget; and d) disability, maternity and illness 
budget. The State Social Insurance Agency is the organ responsible 
for regulating the unemployment insurance.  Until 1996, 
unemployment benefits were equal for all citizens, regardless of the 
contributions paid. Since 1997, however, unemployment benefits 
depend on the amount of contributions paid and the length of 
insurance record. The flat-rate orientation was a clear expression of 
the politicians‘ will to maintain old principles of universality and 
egalitarianism as long as possible. Nonetheless, the increasing 
pressure created by raising unemployment forced the government to 
accept less egalitarian policies by introducing a differentiated 
compensation of risks.  
The Law on Employment (1991), Law on Compulsory 
Unemployment Insurance (1995), Law on State Social Insurance 
(1997) and Law Insurance against Unemployed (1999) can be seen 
as the basis of the current system. These acts defined the state 
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employment policy and the terms of payment with regards to the 
unemployment benefits (unemployment benefits and unemployment 
allowance). Protection against unemployment now concerns: a) 
unemployment benefits; b) unemployment allowance; and c) labour 
market services (e.g. employment trainings and stipends; 
employment subsidies, public works); and d) means-tested social 
assistance. In order to have access to benefits, job seekers must 
have worked one year and nine months over the last 12 months. The 
amount of benefits is equal to 50-65 per cent of gross wage 
depending on the length of service and cannot exceed nine months of 
duration.  
 
2.6 Lithuania 
As with other countries, the first years of transition in Lithuania were 
also characterized by a massive increase in unemployment. In this 
economic chaos, also worsened by the dependence of the country on 
the Russian economy, protection of the unemployed was 
unfortunately understood in a residual way. Entitlement criteria for 
access to unemployment benefits were strict and with little or no real 
benefits.  
The most important legislative act is the Law on the Support of 
Unemployed of 1996. This legislation regulates the new 
unemployment insurance, as well as passive and active measures. 
This act envisages one type of unemployment benefit (excluding the 
access to social assistance benefits) and numerous “active 
measures”, which remain, however, under-developed. Active 
measures in Lithuania take the form of placement services, vocational 
training and retraining, public works, promotion of self-employment 
(start-up loans) and organization of supported jobs (subsidized 
employment). The registered unemployed must be fit for work, 
actively cooperate with the employment offices, and agree to take 
part in public works. Taking part in public works is an essential 
precondition, if the unemployed does not meet the requirement 
criteria for access to unemployment benefits. Before receiving 
unemployment compensation, job seekers must have worked 24 
months in the last three years. Benefits can be granted for no longer 
than six months in every twelve months depending on the period of 
service and their amount depends on the Minimum Subsistence Level 
(MSL).  
 
2.7 Poland 
In Poland, one might distinguish two stages of unemployment 
policies. The first stage (1989-1993) regards the establishment of 
social safety nets in order to cope with the new emergent problem of 
unemployment. During this period, passive policies were the main 
tool. The second stage (1994 onwards) concerns the establishment of 
unemployment insurance and the first attempts to increase the role of 
active labour market policies. During the first stage of reforms, 
benefits were provided quite easily, but at a very low level. In addition, 
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persons who had never worked before could be registered as 
unemployed. Since 1994 things are changing in the opposite direction 
with the restriction of eligibility criteria and reduction of expenditures 
are the clearest outcomes (Consensus II, 1999, Poland).  
The Law of 14 December 1994 on Employment and Counteracting 
Unemployment can be seen as the core of the new Polish 
employment strategy. This act establishes a new definition for 
unemployed persons, their rights and obligations. In addition, the new 
act announced a turning point towards an increase in active labour 
market policies and a drastic decrease in eligibility criteria. Retraining 
schemes, public works, and extended periods of unemployment 
benefits in underdeveloped regions are all main characteristics of the 
new employment policy.  Job seekers must have worked at least 365 
days within the previous 18 months. Benefits can be received up to 
18 months in regions where unemployment is below the national 
average. In regions where unemployment is above the national 
average, unemployed persons can receive benefits for no longer than 
six months. The amount of benefits ranges from 80 to 120 per cent of 
basic amount according to the period of service.  
 
2.8 Romania 
Until 1989 unemployment was not recognized in Romania and, 
therefore, no legislation was in place. The first law was established in 
1991, when the government admitted for the first time the necessity to 
guarantee protection for all those people who involuntarily had lost 
their job. State responsibility and administration via the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Protection was the main characteristic of reforms. 
Although many efforts have been made, Romania has still among the 
highest unemployment rate in Central and Eastern Europe. The main 
cause can be attributed to the persistent economic crisis.  
The Constitution of 1991 (article 43) is the basis for the Romanian 
system of protection against unemployment. It defines basic citizens‘ 
rights for access to unemployment benefits and other forms of social 
assistance. The first legislative act started very recently in Romania 
with the Law 1/1991 on social protection and vocational integration of 
unemployed (with many later amendments). The current legislation 
regulates the new unemployment insurance as well as passive and 
active measures. This act envisages numerous types of benefits: a) 
unemployment benefits; b) support allowance for unemployed with 
insufficient income); c) compensation payments for unemployed 
resulting from lay-off; and d) then, social assistance. Before receiving 
benefits, job seekers must have worked for a minimum of six months 
out of the last twelve. Benefits can be received up to 12 months, 
depending on the period of service, and is equal to 50-55 per cent of 
net average basic salary, according to the period of service.  
 
2.9 Slovakia 
The Slovak Republic has established an insurance system of 
protection against unemployment. In comparison to the reforms made 
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in the Czech Republic, Slovakia has opted for a more determined way 
to change the system towards an increase in individual involvement. 
The state, however, has still the main responsibility in regulating and 
allocating the work force in the labour market, while decentralization 
has only been partially implemented. A form of hidden centralization 
is, in fact, one of the main characteristics of the Slovak reform. The 
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (MISAF), the National 
Labour Office and the Districts and Local Labour Offices are officially 
the authorities implementing the labour market policies. Their main 
responsibilities regard the implementation of the directives of the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In reality, however, the MISAF 
has major control over all employment policies.  
In Slovakia, two stages of employment policies can be 
distinguished. In the first period, protection against unemployment 
and promotion were financed through the state budget (1989 until the 
end of 1993), while in the second stage of reforms (1994122 onwards) 
were financed from non-state source. The establishment of the 
Employment Fund (Employment Fund Act of 1993) was probably the 
biggest step towards decentralization. In this case, however, a high 
level of hidden centralization has been maintained. The employment 
fund has received very limited competencies, which have remained in 
the hands of the state. The Act on Employment (latest amendment 
2004)123 defines the new employment objectives, which primarily aim 
to establish and to maintain the balance between the demand and 
supply of labour and to ensure an adequate subsistence level of 
citizens who have blamelessly lost their jobs. 
Before receiving benefits, job seekers must have worked for at 
least 24 months over the last three years. Benefits can be received 
for 6-9 months depending on the period of service and their amount is 
equal to 40-50 per cent of the determined base of unemployment 
benefits according to the period of service. The unemployed will also 
qualify for unemployment benefits if he/she has taken “care for a child 
up to five years of age in cases when the person executing such care 
has been paying unemployment insurance contributions for at least 
24 months over the last three years before commencement of such 
care”124. The registered unemployed receiving sickness insurance 
benefits, parental allowance or financial assistance in maternity is not 
entitled to unemployment benefits. The unemployment insurance can 
be also supplemented by an additional  “voluntary unemployment 
insurance”, which aims to increase the level of benefits available. The 
Act on Employment also establishes the Guarantee Fund, which is 
                                              
122 Until 1993, however, the employment legislation was a copy of 
that present in the Czech Republic. 
123 The Employment Act has been amended more than ten times in 
less than 8 years. 
124 Employment Act 2002, §47(g). Translation available at URL: 
http://www.employment.gov.sk/en/index.php. Section: 
Employment. Last log-in: November 2003. 
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designed to cover the possible insolvency of employers. One of the 
most important peculiarities of the new employment strategy is its 
strong link with the social assistance sector. In January 2001, social 
assistance benefits were paid to 308 800 beneficiaries, of whom 283 
000 (91.6 per cent) were registered as unemployed125.  
 
2.10 Slovenia 
Slovenia has established an insurance system of protection against 
unemployment, which includes three levels:  a) unemployment 
insurance; b) unemployment assistance; and c) non-contributory 
social assistance. These three levels are closely linked together. 
There are two main qualifying conditions for gaining access to the 
unemployment benefits; the period of insurance and the positive 
behaviour of the unemployed in actively seeking a job. The authorities 
implementing the labour market policies are the Ministry of Labour, 
Social and Family Affairs, the National Employment Office and the 
Regional (10) and Local Labour Offices (59). Their main 
responsibilities regard the implementation of the directives from the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
The first legislation regarding unemployment insurance in Slovenia 
was in 1974, and copied the German pattern of social insurance. A 
decent level of social protection was one of the main characteristics of 
the old system. The Act on Employment and Unemployment 
Insurance (1991, amended 1998) introduces the new insurance 
model (adjustment of the legislation in force since 1974) and 
regulates: a) unemployment benefits; b) unemployment assistance; c) 
the link to social assistance and the entitlement conditions to access 
to welfare benefits; and d) the introduction of active labour market 
policies. Unemployment benefits are contributory and earnings-
related, while unemployment assistance is non-contributory and flat-
rate. Before receiving benefits, job seekers must have worked for at 
least 12 months in the last 18 months. Benefits can be received for 3-
24 months, depending on the period of service. The amount received 
is equal to 70 per cent of gross wage for the first three-months, and 
thereafter is reduced to 60 per cent, according to the period of 
service.  
 
3. The Systems of Protection against Unemployment in 
Comparison 
The systems of protection against unemployment in East Central 
Europe are not homogeneous since they differ according to 
entitlement criteria, duration and level of benefits. As illustrated, 
minimum requirements for access to unemployment benefits (2003) 
                                              
125 Source: Joint Assessment of Employment Priorities in the Slovak 
Republic 2002. Document available at the web site of the Ministry of 
Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic:             
http://www.employment.gov.sk/en/international_relations/joint_ass
essment.html. Last log-in: November 2003. 
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range from 200 days of employment in the previous 4 years in 
Hungary to 24 months over the last three years in Lithuania and the 
Slovak Republic. The duration of benefits also greatly differ from 
country to country. In Czech Republic, it cannot be longer than 6 
months, while in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia 
unemployment benefits can last up to a maximum of nine or twelve 
months. In Poland, the duration also depends on the level of regional 
development. In underdeveloped regions, it can be up to 18 months, 
while in districts with unemployment rates below the national average 
it is granted for no longer than 6 months. As far as the amount of 
benefits is concerned, the criteria for the calculation are usually 
earnings-related in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Romania and Slovenia, while a strong flat-rate component still exists 
in Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia.  
This diversity of arrangements seems to be the result of three main 
factors. The first is linked to the differences in economic development 
and in unemployment rates126 among Central and Eastern European 
countries, which required a different intensity of efforts. As outlined by 
Meglena Kuneva (2002), not all CEECs started the transition under 
the same economic conditions, and, thus, have not had the same 
policy success, or orientation as expected for less fortunate 
applicants127. For example, in the cases of Bulgaria and Hungary, 
there can be little doubt that state intervention was required more in 
Bulgaria, where the financial situation was less favourable, than in 
Hungary, where labour market institutions could more easily be 
deregulated due to a better economic performance. In fact, although 
the rule of one-size-fits-all has too often been prescribed (see, for 
instance, the OECD Employment Strategy discussed in chapter 2. 
§1.3.4 of this volume, which basically applies to all countries in the 
world), the implementation of reforms has fortunately taken very 
diverse directions. In more than one case, countries have reacted in 
different ways to the existent pressures in the labour market 
recombining the suggestions received from the international 
institutions to the needs originating from specific national 
circumstances. This has consequently resulted in a multitude of 
actions and of provisions. 
                                              
126 In 2002, for instance, unemployment rates ranged from almost 
20 per cent in Poland to less than 6 per cent in Hungary. More 
precisely, it was less than ten per cent in Hungary (5.6 per cent), 
Slovenia (6.0 per cent), Romania (7.0 per cent), Czech Republic (7.3 
per cent) and Estonia (9.1 per cent), while it was well above in 
Latvia (12.8 per cent), Lithuania (13.1 per cent), Bulgaria (18.1 per 
cent), Slovakia (18.6 per cent) and Poland (19.9 per cent) (Source: 
DG Employment and Social Affairs 2003, pp.227-237). 
127 Kuneva, Meglena, Bulgarian Minister of European Affairs, 
'Bulgaria on the road to Copenhagen and beyond'. Conference at 
delegation of the EU Commission in Berlin (14.11.2002). 
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A second, but not less important, factor is the variety of privatization 
strategies implemented (see Stark 1992; Stark and Bruszt 1998), 
which led to different outcomes in terms of job losses and actions 
required. Privatization followed, for instance, the German model in 
Estonia, where a “privatization agency” gained large responsibilities in 
the decisions regarding what kind of state assets could be sold, to 
whom and under what circumstances. In the Czech Republic, 
privatization was above all conducted through the use of vouchers, 
which were coupons given to ordinary citizens to purchase shares of 
state property (Beyer and Wielgohs 2001). Unexpectedly, however, 
approximately 70 per cent of vouchers in the Czech Republic did not 
end up in the hands of citizens, but rather in those of large investment 
funds, the majority of which were still run by major state-owned banks 
(European Forum 1998). Despite the negative results of such dubious 
privatization programmes, citizens and employees of ex-state-owned 
enterprises in East Central Europe were to some extent repaid for the 
expropriation of property by the communists. As Beyer and Wielgohs 
(2001) have outlined, this has taken the form of a transfer of state 
property for special prices or free of charge (as in Poland); of special 
public loans or leasing opportunities in Hungary; of discounts on 
share prices of enterprises in Bulgaria and Romania; of acquisition of 
shares free of charge in Slovenia; of public bonds (used to buy not 
only state properties but also medical insurance and pension plans) in 
Slovakia; and of “citizens grants” in Lithuania. This variety of 
approaches resulted in different effects in the labour market and, 
consequently, in a multiplicity of schemes of protection against 
unemployment.   
Finally, it is worth mentioning the diversity of attitudes towards the 
measures necessary to combat unemployment. Especially during the 
first years of transition, neo-liberal supporters in the Czech Republic, 
for instance, even claimed that “healthy” unemployment would have 
been useful for a faster economic development of countries in 
transition, fostering competition and helping to reassess the normality 
of the market for so many years artificially falsified by the central 
planned economy (Consensus II, 1999, Czech Republic, part 4, p. 
150). Consequently, the use of active labour market policies was 
often limited and not coupled with a coherent strategy of employment 
promotion. Other countries, by contrast, have demonstrated to be less 
enthusiastic with using these very dubious economic theories and 
have developed more highly efficient provisions. Hungary has been, 
perhaps, one of the best examples of successful policy-making. The 
reasons for this success seem to be the broad use of active labour 
market policies (Interview no. 4), coupled with significant levels of 
state protection. Hungary has, indeed, one of the most 
comprehensive and generous systems of protection against 
unemployment in East Central Europe, which includes not only active 
measures, but also well-developed unemployment compensation 
benefits. 
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Conclusion 
Labour markets in Eastern Europe faced numerous, serious 
challenges. Dissolution of the pre-existent economic structure, 
establishment of a new market mechanism and dismissal of millions 
of workers are only few examples of the most pressing issues that 
needed an immediate response. Unquestionably, a variety of policy 
options characterized this sector of social security. The multiplicity of 
privatization strategies, already emphasized by Stark and Bruszt 
(1998), has resulted in a multitude of systems for protection against 
unemployment, which differ in terms of entitlement criteria, duration 
and amount of benefits. Moreover, countries in transition did not only 
implement different measures to fight the new plague of 
unemployment, but also reacted in different manners to the requests 
coming from the international organizations. The fundamentalist 
approach proposed by many financial institutions (such as the 
OECD), according to which the market should be left alone to resolve 
the asymmetries between the offer and demand of labour, has only 
rarely been applied. This refusal provides further support for the 
thesis that any new institutional arrangement cannot so easily be 
implemented by dictation, but needs to find a mediation in the socio-
political arena. 
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Chapter 6 
Social Assistance 
 
Introduction 
Since the command economy regulated all prices (of foods, of 
housing, of clothing, of heating, and so on) in order to provide a 
minimum subsistence level to its citizens, state-socialist policy-
makers did not give social assistance provisions the importance 
they deserved (Milanovic 1995). This does not mean that social 
assistance schemes were not necessary during communism. They 
were necessary, especially for the less integrated groups of the 
society, such as the Roma, or for all those people who were for 
some reason unable to work (for example, pensioners, people 
affected by disability or by chronic illnesses). As Milanovic (1995) 
has emphasized, the extreme importance that the state-socialist 
society gave to work-performance as a mean of freedom from the 
capitalist oppression resulted in an implicit social stigma for all 
those citizens that in some way did not or could not conform to the 
idea of the perfect communist worker. Subsequently, merits 
acquired through a workaholic attitude had to be distinguished from 
the implicit reactionary threat of non-workers. The “good communist 
workers” often received medals as a symbol of their excellent work-
performance, while the “bad communist workers” were usually the 
ones who lived at the expense of society and, probably, were 
moved by fascist intentions. It goes unsaid that providing a 
comprehensive system of social assistance provisions to this kind 
of people was something that contradicted the communist political 
aims (Milanovic 1995).  
In more practical terms, social assistance during communism 
consisted of a series of social services provided by local offices to 
people without stable jobs, vagabonds and the handicapped. These 
services could take the form of in-kind benefits (such as food, 
housing and so on) and/or income supplement in order to achieve a 
minimum level of consumption. Unfortunately, since economic 
planners set these minima on the basis of a supposedly perfect 
system, the benefits received only rarely corresponded to real 
needs and poverty continued to exist in state-socialist societies 
(Milanovic 1995). 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the command 
economy, new instruments to combat poverty were necessary. 
Regulation of prices could no longer be used to maintain the 
artificially low costs of foods. Ex state-owned enterprises now 
needed to cope with the concurrence of Western industries and 
could no longer be the source of social security. In brief, 
rationalization of production rather than full-employment were the 
new economic keywords. 
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1. Contemporary Social Assistance Schemes 
After the shock of the first period of transition, most Central and 
Eastern European governments introduced generous social 
assistance schemes in order to cope with raising unemployment 
and inflation. Particularly during the first period of reforms, access 
to these benefits was relatively easy and used more as a means of 
compensation for the loss of job, brought about by the involuntary 
dissolution of the communist social contract. Strict means-testing 
was rarely applied, primarily because of feasibility problems.  
Current social assistance schemes are usually funded through 
the state budget, while local authorities have often the duty to 
administer the payments and to decide which applicants are 
eligible. In some cases, such as in Poland, local authorities may 
also bear the responsibility for the collection of funds. However, due 
to the existence of huge regional differences, this strategy does not 
seem to be particularly efficient, because it causes serious 
problems for the redistribution of resources to municipalities that 
are more in need. In theory, the access to social assistance 
benefits is provided to all resident citizens who are involuntary 
unable earn sufficient income and are registered at the employment 
office. The right to a guaranteed minimum subsistence is defined by 
the Constitutions or by consequent laws of the respective countries. 
In some cases, however, the real access to benefits can be 
determined by less rational reasons, such as in the case of Poland, 
where payments are granted upon discretion of social assistance 
workers.  
One of the key features of Central and Eastern European social 
assistance schemes is the establishment of a Minimum Income 
Level (also called Guaranteed Income Level) as a poverty 
threshold. All households and citizens that find themselves below 
the poverty line established by law have the right to social 
assistance benefits. These provisions can take the form of cash, in-
kind benefits or services. The amount is calculated as the 
difference between the official subsistence level and the family or 
individual disposable income128. Interestingly, this was not a new 
introduction. As mentioned, most communist regimes 
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Soviet Union) had already 
established “socially desirable” levels of consumption for their 
citizens (Milanovic 1995) well before the concept of  “social minima” 
was introduced in France in 1988 (in numerous other European 
countries it is still absent, as for example in Spain and in Italy).  
 
                                              
128 In the case of Slovenia, the amount depends on the Minimum 
Guaranteed Wage, which is the lowest possible salary for a full-
time job. In Latvia, the law sets no guaranteed income threshold 
and the access to welfare benefits depends on strict means-
testing. In Hungary, social assistance provisions have both a 
means-tested and a non-means-tested component. 
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2. Country Overview  
2.1 Bulgaria 
Social assistance benefits in Bulgaria are provided to all resident 
citizens (in need) who are registered at the employment office and 
who do not refuse a suitable job. The Constitution of the Republic 
of Bulgaria 1991 (article 51) guarantees the citizens’ right to social 
assistance and, consequently, obligates the state to provide a 
minimum subsistence level. All social assistance benefits are 
financed through the state budget. The Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy redistributes the resources accumulated in the “Social 
Assistance Fund” among the local municipalities, while the local 
governments administer the payment of benefits. The Guaranteed 
Minimum Income dictates the access to benefits. The subsistence 
benefit is based on the income of the individual, or the family 
composition, and is calculated as the difference between the 
“Differentiated Minimum Income” and the income of the individual, 
or the family, from the previous month. Without going into a detailed 
explanation of all coefficients used in the calculation, poverty is 
determined on an individual, and not on a national, basis. As a 
general rule, however, larger families are entitled to a higher 
income from benefits. Means-testing is also very strict. A 
beneficiary can only have an apartment with a determined number 
of rooms or limited bank deposits. The Social Assistance Act (1998) 
establishes and regulates monthly, earmarked and one-off 
payments. In addition to the cash granted to reach a differentiated 
minimum subsistence level, social assistance provisions may also 
include services, such as counselling, home services and so on. 
 
2.2 Czech Republic 
In the Czech Republic, social assistance benefits are provided to all 
resident citizens with an income below the minimum standard of 
living and who have no possibility to increase their revenue. The 
general Minimum Subsistence Level regulates the access to social 
assistance benefits, which are financed through the state budget. 
The structure of the Czech social assistance sector cannot be 
fully understood without a brief description of the general social 
policy organization, which is very comprehensive and strongly 
interconnected. This includes: 1) social insurance which involves 
old-age, invalidity, unemployment, death of breadwinner, sickness 
insurance (providing cash) and health insurance (providing health 
services). This level is financed through contributions; 2) state 
social subsidy which involves income tested benefits (child 
allowance; social allowance; housing allowance; and transportation 
allowance) and non-tested benefits (such as parental allowance; 
maintenance allowance, foster care allowance and grants; 
maternity grants; death grants). This level is financed through the 
state budget; and 3) social assistance which involves allowances 
for citizens under the minimum subsistence level (allowance for 
child subsistence and for taking care of relatives or other persons in 
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need). This level is also financed through the state budget. The Act 
No. 463/1991 determines the minimum subsistence level available 
to all citizens. This is the sum of all necessary expenditures for food 
and other essential needs. The Minimum Subsistence Level 
depends on the household structure and income, so it increases 
according to the number of family members or the age of 
dependent children under the age of 25. The government has the 
obligation to adjust the level of benefits to the increase of the cost 
of living. 
 
2.3 Estonia 
Also in Estonia, the Minimum Subsistence Level dictates the 
access to social assistance benefits, which are financed through 
state budget. The Ministry of Social Affairs divides the financial 
resources among the local municipalities through the county 
councils, while local governments administer the payment of 
benefits. The minimum income is available to all resident citizens 
registered as unemployed at the employment offices and is 
calculated as the difference between the subsistence level and the 
family disposable income. Social assistance provisions consist of: 
a)  social need benefits (supplementary income to reach the 
minimum subsistence level); b) supplementary social benefits 
(protection of people with specific social needs, also elderly, 
children and so on); c) counselling; d) provision of prosthetic, 
orthopaedic and other appliances; e) home services; f) housing 
services; g) foster care; and h) care and rehabilitation in social care 
institutions. In addition, there is also the possibility of emergency 
social assistance, which comprises all measures with the aim to 
guarantee, in a very short period, at least food, clothes, and other 
essential needs.  
 
2.4 Hungary 
During the last years, continuous adjustments of the legislations 
have characterized the social assistance scheme of Hungary. The 
most famous action was the Bokros-package in 1995, which was a 
set of austerity measures named after Finance Minister Lajos 
Bokros’ dismissal. The family allowance was no longer universal 
and automatic. Most of flat-rate benefits became means-tested. 
Childcare assistance was reduced. In addition, employers rather 
than the social security organizations had to fund sick pay for the 
first 20 days. Tuition fees were also introduced for universities. The 
central budget contributions to local authorities, as well as 
Government employment, were strongly reduced. Despite the 
attempt to establish these painful measures, which led to a violent 
political debate and the subsequent dismissal of Bokros and the 
freezing of his reforms, the role of the state regarding social 
responsibility has only been temporarily diminished. In particular, 
the political agenda of the new government led by the ex-
communists (elections April 2002) has been based on the re-
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introduction of pre-existing benefits (for instance, school- and 
university aid).  
In Hungary, there is no statutory Guaranteed Minimum Income 
available as such, but numerous similar provisions exist for certain 
groups. These benefits include: a) benefits for the elderly in order to 
reach the income limit (80 per cent of minimum old-age pension); b) 
income-supplement for the unemployed (ISU) which is a transfer for 
long-term unemployed who have expired the entitlement of 
unemployment benefit (an income supplement to reach 70 per cent 
of minimum old age pension); c) regular social assistance for 
disabled people (an income supplement to reach 80 per cent of 
minimum old age pension); d) housing assistance; e) a “fee for 
care” which is a benefit for those who help persons requiring long-
term care; f) transitory assistance which is provided to people who 
have transitory financial problems (this benefit is usually provided in 
the form of loan without interest or at very low rate); and g) funeral 
grant which involves a subsidy between 10 and 100 per cent of the 
cost of the funeral.  
 
2.5 Latvia 
Social assistance provisions in Latvia include three main areas: 1) 
material help (social benefits: payments in cash or in kind); 2) social 
care (care services for persons in need); and 3) social rehabilitation 
(numerous activities in order to improve person‘s integration in the 
society). The access to these schemes is dictated by the Act on 
Social Assistance of 1995 (see also Law on Social Services and 
Social Assistance of 2002) and the associated provisions are 
intended to act as a social safety net through a  Guaranteed 
Minimum Income. Social assistance provisions and family benefits 
are complementary. The Act on Social Assistance also regulates 
family support policies, which are financed through the state and 
local authorities budget. The level of decentralization is high. This 
organization often causes serious problems when local authorities 
do not have sufficient resources to cover all persons in need. Social 
assistance provisions are means-tested, but family benefits are 
universal and characterized by a pro-natalist orientation. Social 
assistance benefits and services include: a) state social security 
benefit; b) allowance for the compensation of transportation 
expenses for disabled with mobility problems; c) funeral benefit, d) 
social assistance benefit to needy families; e) housing benefits; and 
f) care benefit. In order to have access to social assistance 
provisions, the person must be over 15 years of age, be registered 
as unemployed, and accept a suitable job or a retraining measure. 
The claimant of benefits must also fulfil other less common “social 
duties”, which may indirectly lead to social stigma, such as 
acceptance of medical examination, or participation in medical and 
social rehabilitation. 
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2.6 Lithuania 
Lithuania has a broad, close universal scheme of social assistance 
provisions. Social assistance benefits are paid to Lithuanian 
citizens and all other permanent residents who are without work 
and are registered at the employment office and do not refuse a job 
offer or a retraining measure. The access to social assistance 
benefits is dictated by a set of laws129. Benefits are mostly means-
tested, although a set of non-contributory and non means-tested 
benefits do exist. Means-tested benefits are related to the Minimum 
Subsistence Level and include: a) social pension; b) families 
allowance; c) reimbursement for cost of house heating and of hot 
water; d) public transport subsidies; e) numerous benefits in kind 
(elderly or disabled people care houses, free of charge meals, 
lodging-for-the-night houses, services for the disabled and elderly 
and at home); and f) social benefits for families in need. 
Municipalities are responsible for financing these benefits. 
 The legislation130 guarantees the citizens‘ right to social 
assistance provisions. These laws also oblige the local authorities 
to provide help for those citizens who involuntarily do not have 
sufficient income. The amount of social aid depends on the 
difference between the stated supported income and the income 
level of the family, or single person. All social assistance benefits 
are financed through the local budget, but since these benefits are 
strongly linked with the Minimum Subsistence Level, and the latter 
suffers from a low indexation, the impact of these benefits in the 
overall poverty reduction strategy has been relatively low131.  
 
2.7 Poland 
Poland has a discretionary social assistance scheme. Almost all 
provisions and allowances can be granted on discretion of the 
social assistance workers of the local offices. All social assistance 
benefits are financed from the government or local resources, but 
the main decisions regarding the concession of benefits are taken 
at the local level (gmina). High decentralization remains one of the 
main peculiarities of Polish reforms.  
                                              
129 Law on Incomes Guaranties of Inhabitants 1990;  State Social 
Insurance Law 1991; Law of the Social Integration of the Disabled 
1991; Law of Social pension 1994; Law on Health Insurance 1996; 
Decree of Government “On Approval of Regulation of 
Compensation for Heating and Hot Water Costs for Low Income 
Families” 1997; Law on Cash Social Assistance to Law Income 
Families of 2003. 
130 Act on Income Guarantee of 1990; Act on Reimbursement for 
Cost of House, Heating and Hot and Cold Water for Low Income 
Families of 1999; and Act on Social Pensions of 1994. 
131 Please note that social assistance beneficiaries in Lithuania are 
entitled to health care with no payment of the health social 
security contribution. 
   126
According to the current legislation, social assistance benefits 
should be granted to people in difficult situations trying to overcome 
unfavourable circumstances, under the condition that they are 
registered as unemployed and do not refuse any suitable job offer 
or retraining measure. Entitlement criteria, for access to benefis, 
regards people with insufficient income and people affected by  
“social dysfunctions”, such as orphanood, homelessness, 
unemployed, disability, long-term illness, problems with 
motherhood, alcoholism, drug abuse and prisoners. 
The Social Assistance Act of 1990 (see also Social Assistance 
Act of 2004) determines the minimum subsistence level necessary 
for all citizens resident in the territory of Poland. The grant of 
subsistence benefit is calculated as the difference between the 
subsistence level and the family or individual disposable income. 
Social assistance benefits are not easy to distinguish from other 
provisions, but, used with due caution, the legislation mentioned 
above establishes and regulates: a) temporary allowance (a benefit 
for single persons or families, who do not reach the minimum 
income threshold. This benefit is discretionary); b) special 
temporary allowance (granted to unemployed single parents, who 
lost the entitlement to unemployment benefits because of ending of 
duration; this benefit is not discretionary, but obligatory); c) various 
benefits for handicapped persons (such as social pension, housing, 
home care and payment of social insurance premiums. These 
benefits are generally non-discretionary and non-means tested); d) 
social welfare homes for people in need of permanent care; and e) 
social work for various groups of population. All these provisions 
are financed from the state or local budget. 
  
2.8 Romania 
Romania has a broad scheme of social assistance provisions. This 
also includes family benefits (please note that while social 
assistance benefits are non-contributory, family benefits are both 
contributory (e.g. maternal leave) and non-contributory). The 
access to social assistance benefits is dictated by the Act on Social 
Aid (Law 67/1995). This law obliges the state or local authorities to 
provide help for those citizens who have no possibility to increase 
their income if they are registered at the employment offices and do 
not refuse a job offer or a retraining measure. The reforms in this 
sector are based on three main principles: a) universality; b) public 
social integration; and c) means-testing. All social assistance 
benefits are financed through the state or local budget and the 
amount is subject to periodic indexation, depending on the price 
increase. The social assistance beneficiaries are entitled to health 
care with no payment of the health social security contribution. 
Social assistance benefits and services concern: social aid in 
cash or in-kind; counselling; home services; earmarked 
supplementary cash benefits (such as cash for paying rent, heating, 
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travel and transport for disabled persons); social pension (for 
elderly above 70 years old); social unemployment benefits; 
payment of health insurance; and non-contributory family benefits. 
A new Law on Minimum Guaranteed Income (Act no. 416/2001) 
has set the monthly amounts for the minimum guaranteed in 
accordance with the family structure, exceeding by far the present 
income levels. The social aid size now depends on the income level 
of the family, or single person, and is based on the difference 
between the minimum granted income (established by law) and the 
monthly net income of the family, or the single person. 
 
2.9 Slovakia 
Social assistance in Slovakia is very similar to the scheme present 
in the Czech Republic. This can also be seen by the differentiation 
of the overall social security system, which is divided, such as in 
the Czech case, into: a) social insurance; b) state social support; 
and c) social care. The Ministry, regional and district state offices 
and the centre for international-right protection of children and 
youth take the main decisions regarding the implementation of 
social assistance policies, while the responsibility of financing the 
benefits is given to the National Budget, the budget of 
municipalities and of non-governmental subjects. Social assistance 
benefits are provided to all employed, retired or unemployed 
citizens resident in the territory of Slovakia, who are involuntarily 
unable to have sufficient income and are registered at the 
employment office (this gives access to benefits for “objective 
reasons”). According to the current legislation, social assistance 
involves: 1) social prevention; 2) resolution of material and social 
needs (in order to help people to obtain minimum living conditions); 
and 3) resolution of social needs caused by disability. This takes 
the form of: a) social counselling; b) protection of social rights, c) 
social services; d) social assistance benefits; and e) social services 
and cash support for disabled persons. Entitlement criteria basically 
regard all citizens with insufficient income or affected by disability. 
In addition to cash benefits, social assistance provisions may 
include: f) home care services; g) organization of public 
nourishment; h) transportation services; i) residential care of social 
services; l) and social loans. The level of benefits depends on the 
Minimum Living Standard and the amount changes if the material 
need is due to subjective or objective causes. The minimum living 
standard (Act on Minimum Living Standard no.125/1998; with later 
amendments) is calculated on a household basis and is equal to 
the difference between the net income of the household, from all 
other sources, and a “subsistence minimum level” that varies with 
the size and composition of the household.  If the material need can 
be attributed to subjective reasons, social assistance benefits help 
to reach 50 per cent of the minimum living standard. In presence of 
objective causes and the beneficiary does not have any income 
from a job, social assistance benefits are set to reach the level of 
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100 per cent of minimum living standard. If the citizens find 
themselves in a difficult situation due to objective causes, but do 
have an employment income, social assistance benefits could 
reach 120 per cent of minimum living standard (this last provision, 
however, has been removed with effect from January 2001). From 
January 2003, however, a new amendment to the Act on Social 
Assistance (1998) has slightly lowered the amount of these 
benefits. Citizens applying for benefits for subjective reasons are 
now entitled to supplement their monthly income up to a fixed sum 
of SKK 1,450, while those who apply for objective reasons may 
supplement their income up to SKK 2,900 (the maximum social 
assistance benefit for a family is of SKK 10,500) (Vagac and 
Haulikova, 2003, p.37).  
 
2.10 Slovenia 
In Slovenia, social assistance benefits are provided to persons who 
are permanently incapable to work, over 60 years of age, or those 
who are temporarily unable to earn sufficient income but are 
actively seeking a job (for instance, they are taking part in active 
employment programmes or have signed a contract with the Centre 
for Social Work). Thus, the entitlement criteria basically regard all 
citizens with insufficient income, elderly or affected by disability. 
Benefits can be granted for a limited period, usually not more than 
12 months, although there is the possibility of prolonged support for 
those who cannot permanently work (Stropnik et al. 2003). The Act 
on Social Assistance of 1992 (last amendments 2002) is the basis 
of the Slovenian social assistance sector. It defines the guaranteed 
minimum income necessary for all resident citizens, establishes 
relative provisions and financial means to reach this level and 
regulates the links to other sectors (such as family benefits, health, 
unemployment or pension insurance). The level of benefits 
depends on the guaranteed minimum income for a family, which is 
obtained by multiplying the basic amount by the weighted number 
of family members. This amount is adjusted once a year to allow for 
any increases in prices. In principle, the family, and not the 
individual, is the main beneficiary of social assistance provisions. 
According to the current legislation, social assistance involves cash 
benefits, in-kind benefits and social services. A mix of 
decentralization and centralization remains one of the main 
peculiarities in this sector. The National Budget and the budget of 
municipalities bear the responsibility of financing the social 
assistance provisions, while the Ministry and district offices are 
responsible for the implementation of policies.  
 
3. Problems regarding the social assistance sector 
The transition from a central planned economy to a market 
economy has put Eastern European social assistance schemes 
under great financial pressure. Although, during communism, 
means-testing was rarely implemented, primarily because the 
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communist regime indirectly subsidized poor families through its 
total control over market mechanisms, with the introduction of 
market-oriented reforms and the consequent increase in the 
number of poor people, the wide scope of social assistance 
benefits required better targeting in order to ensure basic help to 
those citizens who really need benefits. Milanovic (1998, p.118) has 
estimated, for instance, that in order to guarantee a minimum 
income level to these populations, it would be necessary to spend, 
on average, from 9 to 10 percent of GDP each year. Evidently, 
these are exceptionally high amounts that no country could afford.  
In order to find an immediate response to this issue, numerous 
influential international institutions (in particular the World Bank, 
OECD and IMF) saw an increase in means-tested provisions as a 
necessary step for improving the effectiveness of this sector 
(Milanovic 1995, 1998; Standing 1996; Capucha 1999). There were 
three main expected positive consequences of better targeting: 
first, it was supposed to limit the drastic increase in expenditures 
which were slowly becoming unaffordable; second, it should have 
helped to target “real” poor citizens, avoiding any waste of money; 
third, it should have finally introduced the concept of individual 
responsibility, limiting the dependence from the state (a notion, 
which, for too many years, had been sponsored by the central 
planned economy).    
Needless to say, these expectations have only, to a certain 
extent, been satisfied. The first thing to note here is that the 
introduction of severe austerity measures in the economy, as 
strongly requested by the IMF, World Bank and OECD, has 
resulted in an exponential growth in social assistance applicants. 
As a consequence of this, a decrease in expenditures has rarely 
taken place, because social assistance provisions have been called 
to limit the negative effects of reforms carried out in other sectors. 
This situation has been aggravated by the decentralization of tasks, 
another priority of many international institutions, which has 
resulted in a drastic increase in administrative costs and in 
difficulties in coordination between the different levels and local 
offices (Capucha 1999). Another point that needs to be elucidated 
involves the introduction of means-testing: a political decision which 
has not automatically produced the expected consequence of 
targeting “real poor people”. In reality, this has simply meant the 
exclusion of numerous underprivileged citizens, who have seen 
their entitlement criteria being drastically reduced by the new rules. 
Finally, it has been demonstrated that the market alone is hardly 
able to cope with the more onerous costs of the economic 
transition, and so the concept of individual responsibility has only, 
in some measure, been launched (or, at least, in its positive 
connotations). In this context, the idea of a residual safety net, in 
which social assistance provisions should come into play only when 
the market has completely exhausted its capability of ensuring 
minimum living standard, has clearly resulted in a simplistic and 
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impracticable way of devolving those tasks, which were once the 
responsibility of the State. 
Nevertheless, as chapter 9 shows, social assistance provisions 
have continued to play an enormous role in reducing the extreme 
negative consequences of the economic transition, helping to 
diminish the number of poor people. They have been crucial in not 
only facilitating the acceptance of market-oriented reforms, but 
have also helped to weaken the perception among Eastern citizens 
that the democratization process are too cumbersome and 
expensive in terms of social costs. Recent results of the EU 
sponsored public opinion survey “Eurobarometer” clearly show that 
while the number of Central and Eastern European citizens, who 
feel unsatisfied with the way in which democracy works in their 
country, remains, in all social groups, much higher than those who 
are satisfied (especially if compared with the results of Western 
Europeans), this percentage becomes even higher among the 
retired, the unemployed, and people with limited education 
(European Commission 2003a, p.20). These unequivocally 
represent the groups that have less benefited from the economic 
transition of their countries. From this perspective, it is also hardly 
surprising to note how the “fight against unemployment” and 
“poverty” are the first two priorities among Eastern citizens, while 
the “principles of democracy” score only seventh in the scale of key 
issues (European Commission 2003b, p.5). 
 
Conclusion 
Central and Eastern European social assistance schemes became 
key players in the process of transformation from a central planned 
economy to a market economy, recombining the principles based 
on solidarity in place during the communist period with the new 
emergent needs caused by the deterioration of the economic 
situation. If during communism, state responsibility was the leading 
moral principle put in place in order to ensure a basic subsistence 
level to all communist citizens, as well as promoting the leading 
communist ideology, then this conception has been re-implemented 
in the new post-communist environment. The existence of social 
assistance provisions established during the first years of transition 
has, in fact, played a dual role. On the one hand, it has fostered 
political support for economic reforms (Kramer 1997); whilst on the 
other, it has facilitated the stabilization of transition and the 
consolidation of democratic institutions. 
Interestingly, social assistance provisions are not a new 
introduction of reforms, but are part of the communist heritage. 
Social minimum lines already existed in the central planned 
economy as “socially desirable” levels of consumption. These 
minima now represent the most notable legacy of the past, but are 
also important elements of innovation and modernization in the 
present.  
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The effect of the West on these schemes has been manifold, but 
primarily expressed by an increase in income-testing, which, 
however, has not produced the expected positive consequences. 
According to Milanovic (1998) and Capucha (1999), however, 
targeting has only rarely been implemented. Although international 
institutions tried to propose a residual welfare state, in which social 
assistance provisions could play the role of a residual safety net, 
the extreme social pressures caused by the economic transition 
has required that the scope of social assistance provisions remain 
necessarily extensive. The leading principle remained, as during 
communism, based on the necessity to guarantee a minimum 
subsistence level to all citizens. Unfortunately, social assistance 
provisions alone could hardly cope with the negative economic 
conditions caused by the transition to the new market economy. 
The negative economic performance has severely reduced the 
effectiveness of these provisions, which, as mentioned, have been 
called to cover the negative effects of reforms implemented in other 
sectors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   132
Chapter 7 
Family Benefits 
 
1. Family Policies  
In attempting to define the main functions of welfare institutions, Esping-
Andersen (1990) correctly outlined that the welfare state was a crucial 
institution in the reproduction of power relations. Nonetheless, the 
author has often been accused of paying little attention to the political 
role played by family policies as important elements in the 
transformation modern societies. For numerous observers, an essential 
feature of different welfare states has been precisely the variety of 
attitudes towards the preservation of traditional family patterns 
(Kamerman and Kahn 1978; Lewis 1992; Kaufmann 1993, 2002; 
Sainsbury 1994; Hantrais 1995; Lewis and Ostner 1995; Gauthier 1996; 
Orloff 1993, 2002). According to Kaufmann (1993, 2002; see also 
Lüscher, 1985, 1989) the “family rhetoric” that characterizes different 
welfare state models is distinct to each country and influenced by 
cultural traditions and existing institutional arrangements (Kaufamm 
2002; see also Hantrais 1995; Gauthier 1996). By pursuing different 
political, economic and social objectives, family policies also acted as 
important systems of social stratifications. During their history, they 
aimed, for example, to increase birth rates (pro-natalist approach), to 
ensure social stability by preventing poverty (social reproduction), to 
promote gender equality, and to enhance human capital by supporting 
the healthy development of the child (Kaufmann 2002). The attitudes 
towards a determined family logic, obviously, depended on the 
functional necessities of the state to build a peculiar typology of society.  
As a result, the most common classifications identify four, more or 
less, distinct welfare family regimes: a) the Corporatist model which 
reproduces labour relations according to the traditional ideal of family 
(as in the case of the German speaking countries); b) the Anglo-Saxon 
model which emphasizes the role of the market in social protection, 
thus, neglecting the family; c) the Scandinavian model which is 
supposed to promote gender equality through comprehensive family 
policies (Kamerman and Kahn 1978; Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1994; 
Gauthier 1996); and d) the Southern European model in which the 
family plays a vital role to replace the deficit of state protection (Leibfried 
1992; Ferrera 1996; Flaquer 2000). Needless to say, the classifications 
mentioned above do not consider the Central and Eastern European 
family regime. For Kaufmann (2002, p.439) “the experience with 
socialist family and population policies is now only of historical interest, 
and the actual process of transformation does not yet allow to draw 
conclusions about what finally their family policies will be”. In response 
to this rather provocative statement, which presupposes the Western 
family model(s) as the only one possible, there are now enough 
empirical evidences to trace some common characteristics in Eastern 
Central Europe. 
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2. Family Policies during Communism 
Family policies are not a monopoly of Western countries. After a short 
period during which communist regimes strongly advocated the 
necessity to free the citizens from the reactionary influences of the 
family, family policies became a priority for ensuring social stability, but 
also to enhance the development of the socialist society. In almost all 
countries the first legislation started at the beginning of 1950s, but only 
in the 1970s was the family was openly seen as being functional to the 
development of state-socialism. Ferge (1978, p. 87) shows that in 1975, 
the Hungarian Ministry of Labour published its Directives for Family 
Policy Work, stating that  
 “by family policy we understand all the planned, intended effects 
which aim in a complex way at influencing the life conditions and 
attitudes of families, in order to assure that the functioning of the 
family will be in harmony with the requirements of socialist 
development. Family policy expresses, then, a system of interests 
relating the socialist state and its institutions to the functioning of 
the family”.  
Also Sokolowska (1978, p. 241) has shown that in the same year, 
the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party emphasized that  
”the family fulfils and will fulfil the irreplaceable function in the 
formation of the character of man. There is no socialist society 
without a stable, strong and spiritually healthy family”.  
Thus, the family was no more a reactionary force of capitalism, but 
could become a valuable source of innovation and modernization. But 
what kind of family was promoted and on what principles was it based? 
Of course, the communist support for the family was different to that of 
Western societies, which primarily promoted the idea of women as 
housewives. The conception of family advanced by communist regimes 
had to be based on egalitarian values in which men and women had the 
same rights. Furthermore, if there was a thing that family policies should 
not pursue it was precisely the reproduction of status differentials in 
labour force participation. The state-socialist system did not see women 
simply as housewives, but rather as wives-mothers-workers132. 
                                              
132 Nonetheless, Paci (2002) has emphasized that labour segregation 
persisted during communism, though in much lower percentages than 
in Western Europe. Women were much more concentrated in 
occupations such as teaching or medicine. The patriarchal role of the 
family was also never fully abolished and women were supposed to do 
both jobs: factory workers, and also mothers. During this period, 
however, the family benefit system was designed to compensate 
women for their activities as wives-mothers-workers (see also Pascall 
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Universal birth grants, extensive maternity leaves and generous child-
care were the new political science tools used to continue the Cultural 
Revolution initiated by the Bolsheviks. In public speeches, party 
members started to kiss children more frequently, while the absence of 
pregnant women from the factory was tolerated and no more addressed 
as capitalist sabotage. In brief, the new communist society was building 
itself on the family and not out it. 
 
3. The Adaptation of the State Socialist Family Model 
After the end of the Cold War, family policies shifted the responsibilities 
of the state not to the development of the socialist society, but rather to 
the creation of the post-communist citizen. The dissolution of 
communism meant something more than simply the collapse of a 
political or economic order; it also meant the redefinition of values in 
force for many decades. The communist nomenklatura was the source 
of economic subsistence, but also of moral and familistic values. The 
state was the father, the mother, the brother and the sister of the 
communist worker. In brief, a negative form of state-paternalism 
characterized the socialist societies.  
With the collapse of the communist order, new values had to be 
introduced. The state was no longer the only one responsible for the 
destiny of its citizens, and so new forms of protection were required. At 
the top of the political agenda was the issue of how to conduct the 
switch from public to private responsibility in a manner that did not 
catapult the citizens into the new risk society without substantial social 
protection. In other words, a way had to be found that made the 
communist citizens independent from the state and, finally, able to 
manage new risks without the help of a visible hand. As in the case of 
children who leave their parents’ home to start a new life with their 
partner, the family was seen as the natural target for redistribution and 
the best way to increase individual responsibility. As a ministry official 
pointed out during an interview, for this publication, in Budapest:  
“during socialism, the state was responsible even if you had 
headache. What we’re trying to do now is to create a system - for 
example, like the Italian one, where the family will be able to 
increase the welfare of its members […]. In our case, however, 
we’re trying to maintain a sufficient level of state protection” 
(Interview no. 2). 
4. Country Overview 
The expected change in “family rhetoric”, which was path-dependent but 
also innovative, cannot be evaluated without some comparison involving 
family policies. An important part of how one country feels about the 
                                                                                                      
and Manning 2000; Fodor et al. 2002; Balcerzak-Paradowska et al. 
2003; Fodor 2003; Fultz and Steinhilber 2003; Kotýnková et al. 2003; 
Lukács and Frey 2003; Manning 2004). 
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task of the family concerns depends on the different understandings of 
gender roles, as well as the level of protection attributed to the 
household. Looking more specifically at the organization of family 
policies, it is important to focus not only on the ideals stated in public 
speeches or declared by the constitutions, but also on the policies 
implemented.  
All Central and Eastern European countries have a well-developed 
family and maternity benefit system, which includes birth grants, child 
benefits, school and educational scholarships. These benefits are 
mostly financed through the state budget. In addition, there are short-
term benefits under the sickness insurance, covering the traditional 
costs of sickness, maternity leave and work-accidents or occupational 
diseases. By contrast, these benefits are employment-related and, 
therefore, mostly financed by contributions133. Family policies consist of 
three main provisions: 1) birth grants paid by the state to refund mothers 
for the expenses that they incur in the first months of child birth; 2) 
maternal/parental leave which provides the possibility for parents to stay 
away from work for a determined period134; and 3) child benefit (also 
called “child care” or “family allowance”) which consists of a sum of 
money paid by the state each month to families who raise children. This 
sum increases with the number of children and is usually available until 
the completion of the secondary or university education. 
 
4.1 Bulgaria  
Until the new legislation of 2002, family policies in Bulgaria were 
determined by the Decree for Encouragement of Child Birth of 1968, 
which provided allowances to families with children regardless of their 
income status. With the emanation of the new Family Child Benefit Act 
of 2002, income-testing was introduced as a basic principle for the 
access to these benefits. The reform had two main related objectives. 
The first one was to reduce the number of high-income beneficiaries, 
while the second one was to increase the amount of benefits available 
for poor families. Family policies in Bulgaria now consist of: 1) birth 
grant, which is a universal, lump-sum benefit; 2) maternity leave, 
granted for 135 days, whose amount is equal to 90 per cent of former 
                                              
133 The access to child benefit does not depend on family’s previous 
income in Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Romania, while it is income-tested in Bulgaria, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. Parental allowance is essentially linked to previous 
occupational status in Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia, while it is also necessary to carry out a 
screening of family’s income in Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia. 
134 Maternity leave is granted only to women for a maximum of 3-6 
months, but parental  leave (also parental allowance) may be up to 
3/4 years and may involve both parents. During this time, the parent 
who decides to stay at home to take care of the child receives 
payments from the state and when he or she returns to the “normal” 
working life the previous job is guaranteed. These provisions, 
however, usually involve women rather than men.   
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income; 3) income-tested parental leave, which is granted until the child 
reaches its second birthday and is equal to the minimum wage; 4) 
income-tested child allowance, which can be received until the age of 
18 if the child attends secondary school; 5) child allowance for disabled 
children; and 6) school grants.  
 
4.2 Czech Republic 
In Czech Republic, family benefits depend on the Minimum Subsistence 
Level and their access can be subjected to income and non-income 
testing. Non means-tested benefits are: 1) birth grant; 2) maternity 
leave, which is earnings-related and granted for 180 days; 3) parental 
allowance, which is a flat rate benefit granted to all working parents 
(non-working parents have access to social allowance) until the child 
reaches the age of 4; 4) maintenance benefits for families of soldiers; 
and 5) foster care allowance for children in institutions. Means-tested 
benefits are granted to low-income families and embrace: 6) social 
allowance, to help to raise the child until the age of 4; 7) child 
allowance, to cover the child raising expenditures until the end of 
compulsory education (usually 15 years or 26 if the child is enrolled in 
higher education); 8) housing benefits; and 9) transportation to school 
benefit. 
 
4.3 Estonia 
Family policies in Estonia are earnings-related but have also a strong 
flat rate component, which involves, with some exceptions (such as 
maternity leave and parental allowance), almost all provisions. Family 
benefits at disposal to Estonian citizens comprise of: 1) birth grant; 2) 
maternity leave, which is granted for 140 days and amounts to 100 per 
cent of previous earnings; 3) child care fee (parental allowance), paid to 
parents on parental leave until the child reaches the age of 3 (earnings-
related); 4) child allowance, paid from the birth until the age of 16 (or 19 
in case of enrolment in basic, secondary or vocational school); 5) single 
parent’s allowance, paid until 16 years of age (19 in case of studies); 6) 
conscript’s child allowance, for the children of conscripts in the Defence 
Force; 7) school grant; 8) foster care allowance, paid until the age of 16 
(or 19 in case of studies) for children in foster care; and 9) start-in-
independent life allowance, which is a one-off payment for children 
leaving parents’ home.  
 
4.4 Hungary 
Hungary has an extensive family support system, which consists of: 1) 
birth grant; 2) maternity allowance (maternity leave), granted for 170 
days and equal to 70 per cent of the daily average earnings of the 
previous year; 3) child care fee (GYED) (ceased in 1995, but recently 
reintroduced), which provides a continuation of the maternity allowance 
to parents taking care of a child until the age of 2; 4) child care 
allowance (GYES) (parental allowance), a flat rate benefit paid to 
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parents who have exhausted their entitlement to child care fee135; 5) 
child raising support allowance (GYET), an income-test benefit paid to 
mother with three or more children136; and 6) family allowance (családi 
pótlék), paid to Hungarian citizens and permanent residents taking care 
of children below the age of 16 (or 20 in the case of students). In 
addition to these provisions, there are numerous other in-kind benefits 
(such as state care for orphans, homes for handicapped children) and 
short-term benefits (such as sick-leave, sickness cash benefit, sickness 
cash benefit on child nursing, pregnancy and confinement benefit, 
maternity subsidy and funeral aid), which enlarge the scope and 
coverage of Hungary family support policies. 
 
4.5 Latvia 
Immediately after its independence from the Soviet Union, Latvia has 
established a broad, non-income tested, family benefit system, which, 
as in other CEE countries, is formed by: 1) birth grant; 2) maternity 
leave, paid for 112 days and equal to 100 per cent average insurance 
contributions wage; 3) parental allowance, granted until the child 
reaches the age of 3; 4) child care benefit available until the age of 15-
20 years if the child is enrolled in secondary school; 5) compensation to 
the guardian for taking care of a child; and 6) remuneration for fulfilling 
the function of a foster family. In addition to these provisions, other local 
government benefits are at disposal for needy families. These include 
social assistance benefits, housing benefits and care benefits. 
 
4.6 Lithuania 
Lithuania has an extensive system of family benefits, which, with the 
exclusion of maternity leave and parental allowance, depends on the 
Minimum Subsistence Level. Family benefits include: 1) birth grant 
(lump-sum); 2) maternity leave paid for 196 days and equal to 100 per 
cent of the average compensatory wage of the beneficiary; 3) 
maternity/paternity benefit (parental allowance), calculated as 70 
percent of the average compensatory wage of the beneficiary and 
granted until the child reaches the age of 1 (or, according to the criteria 
in force for the family benefit, until the age of 3); 4) maternity benefit for 
female students; 5) family benefit, granted until the child reaches the 
age of 3 to families that are not entitled to the social sickness or 
maternity insurance benefit; 6) benefit to families with three or more 
children, paid until the age of 16); 7) child care benefit paid to persons 
                                              
135 GYES could be continued until the child reaches 3 years of age (or 
10 in the case of disabled children) under the condition that the 
beneficiary (usually the mother) stays out of the labour market for at 
least for 1 and half year after the birth of the child. Until 1995, this 
benefit was based on citizenship, but now it is income-tested and 
financed by the central budget. 
136 GYET is flat rate at the level of the minimum old-age pension, 
administered by the local government, but fully financed from the 
central budget. 
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or non-state care institutions that bring up children left without the care 
of their parents; 8) benefit to the families of military conscripts; 9) 
orphans’ grant for orphans enrolled in higher, tertiary or vocational 
schools; and 10) settlement grant paid to orphans up to 18 years old.  
 
4.7 Poland 
Poland has recently introduced an income-tested, earnings-related 
system of family benefits, which has slowly replaced the more 
egalitarian scheme in force during communism. Family benefits now 
comprise: 1) birth grant (recently abolished); 2) maternity leave which is 
paid for 112 days for the first child and is equal to 100 per cent of 
previous wage; 3) parental leave paid for a fixed period of 24 months, 
which can be extended to 36 calendar months in case of more than one 
child or single parents; 4) family allowance paid from the birth until the 
age of 16 (or until 20 years in case of enrolment in higher education. 
The access to family allowance depends on the level of the family 
income, which should not be higher than 50 per cent of the average 
monthly wage); 5) nursing allowance paid to children under the age of 
16, who need continuous care for handicapped (non income-tested); 6) 
alimony for abandoned children, in order that they have a means of 
becoming independent; and 7) grant-for-starting-an-independent life.  
 
4.8 Romania 
Romania has a universal, non income-tested system of family benefits, 
which include: 1) birth grant (lump-sum); 2) maternity leave, paid up to 
126 days and equal to 85 per cent of the calculation basis established 
for other social insurance rights; 3) state allowances for children up to 
the age of 16 (or 26 in case of higher education); 4) supplementary 
allowance, for families with many children; 5) social aid for wives, whose 
husbands are called for military service; 6) allowances for family 
placement; and 7) scholarships (educational grant) for pupils. 
Interestingly, there is no special scheme for parental leave in Romania, 
but the right to financial help for raising their children is granted through 
the access to state and family allowances.   
 
4.9 Slovakia 
Family policies in Slovakia have a strong means-tested component and 
the amount of benefits is based on the guaranteed minimum income, 
established as poverty threshold. Family benefits consist of: 1) birth 
grant; 2) maternity leave, paid up to 196 days (260 in case of 
unemployed) and equal to 90 per cent of the net daily income; 3) 
parental allowance (income-tested), for parents taking care of a child 
under 3 years of age if the parent’s income is below 50 per cent of 
minimum wage; 4) child allowance, payable until 15 years of age (or 25 
if the child is in full-time education) depending on guaranteed minimum 
income; 5) allowances for families of persons on military service; 6) 
foster care allowances; 7) benefits in support of care for a family 
member (part of the sickness insurance system); 8) one off grants to 
cover special life circumstances (such as the birth of 3 or more 
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children); 9) social fellowship for university students to cover 
accommodation and meals for university students (means-tested 
benefit); 10) loans for young couples under 30 years in their first 
marriage.  
 
4.10 Slovenia 
In Slovenia, the access to family benefits can be subjected to income 
and non-income testing. Non income-tested benefits are: 1) birth grant; 
2) maternity leave which amounts to 100 per cent of the average 
monthly gross wage up to 105 days; and 3) parental leave granted for 
260 days (520 days if combined with a part-time work) which remains 
earnings-related (a flat rate parental allowance is granted, however, for 
365 days to those parents who do not qualify for parental leave); and 4) 
childcare benefit for severely ill child or physically or mentally 
handicapped. By contrast, means-tested benefits are formed by: 5) child 
benefit, which can be granted up to 26 years of age if the child is 
enrolled in higher education (income-tested); 6) child care benefit for 
large families; 7) scholarships grant for secondary education; and 8) 
numerous other educational benefits (cash and in-kind, such as school 
meals; free transfer to school etc.). 
 
5. Problems regarding the family benefit sector  
For the most part, the effectiveness of family policies depends on the 
amount of benefits granted. The economic performance of countries in 
transition is usually a good indicator of the efficiency in this sector. In 
Bulgaria and Romania, for instance, the dramatic economic crisis has 
negatively influenced the level of benefits at disposal for the population, 
which remains usually very low and does not permit sufficient 
protection. In Hungary, on the other hand, the situation seems to be 
slightly different with families having access to an extensive and 
relatively effective family benefit system.  
Economic performance is the major indicator in predicting the 
effectiveness of family policies, but not the only one. Another potentially 
important element, in the understanding the family rhetoric proposed by 
a country, is the will of state to establish comprehensive and extensive 
benefits. In fact, if researchers simply analyse the impact of family 
policies in Eastern Europe without considering the dramatic economic 
crisis, which has resulted in an erosion of social benefits, they would 
probably conclude that family support in these countries is minimal. By 
contrast, the paragraphs above show the numerous provisions available 
for Central and Eastern European citizens, which often cover children if 
not “from the cradle to the grave”, then at least to the completion of 
secondary school or university137.  
                                              
137 Please note that, in the second half of 1990s, a shift towards 
means-testing in almost all countries can be observed. This decision is 
undoubtedly controversial. Fultz and Steinhilber (2003, pp. 25-26) 
affirm, for example, that an increase in means-testing in relation to 
the access to family benefits has the undesired effect “to reduce the 
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Of course, there are intra-region differences. Fodor et al. (2002), for 
example, emphasize, that despite the persistence of national similarities 
due to the communist heritage, Hungary, Poland and Romania show 
differences in terms of the ways how they handle parenthood and, thus, 
shape gender relations. In their three-cases study, Fodor et al. (2002, p. 
477) affirm: 
 “Specifically, we find that the Polish welfare state is notable for 
restricting eligibility to family and maternity benefits. Doing so, the 
state forces women out of the labor force and encourages their 
dependence on their spouses for their well-being. The Hungarian 
state, on the other hand, is more accommodating to women 
seeking a balance between paid work and family. Policies 
encourage paid work for middle class, white women, creating 
important distinctions among women, not just between men and 
women. The Romanian model is different from the Polish one in 
that it allows more freedom for women to pursue work outside the 
home, yet it does not provide enough sustenance so women can 
establish independent households”. 
Fodor et al. (2002) envisage, in conclusion, three different family 
regimes: one for each case study. In reality, the situation is more 
complex than this and cannot be explained by a method, which 
excessively emphasizes the technical differences in the nature of family 
provisions (such as entitlement criteria). In fact, if the number of 
countries used in the sample would have been twenty, the resulting 
family regimes would have probably been twenty138. By contrast, if it is 
possible to confirm that different family policies in the post-socialist 
period have led to different “gendered” effects, then it can be shown that 
these policies have not been systematically linked to a “breadwinner” 
                                                                                                      
incentives for women to engage in economic activity, especially 
women with low skills […] This change has shifted the nature of the 
support from wage replacement to poverty alleviation; and it has 
shifted the status of beneficiaries, mostly women, from holders of 
personal rights to petitioners of the state.” (See also Balcerzak-
Paradowska et al. 2003; Kotýnková et al. 2003; Lukács and Frey, 
2003). In some countries, such as Hungary, however, this kind of 
reform has been blocked and universal family benefits have been 
reintroduced. 
138 Gough (2001) and Gough et al. (1997) have carried out a similar 
analysis on social assistance regimes using cluster analysis (indicators 
used in cluster analysis: Total SA Expenditures/GDP; SA 
Recipients/Total Population; Exclusion Index; Standardized Benefit 
Levels after housing costs; Relative Benefit Levels after Housing 
Costs). The results show the emergence of 8 (Gough et al. 1997) or 7 
(Gough 2001) clusters comprising 20 Western European and non-
European social assistance regimes. The main reason was due to the 
existence of numerous sub-regime differences. 
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ideology (see also Gal and Kligman 2000). It seems more plausible that 
different policy outcomes have been the result of the countries’ different 
economic performance, than the consequence of voluntary gender-
segregating policy-making. What is certain, however, is that the (family) 
logic behind the post-communist policy-making is not dissimilar in 
Eastern Europe. In this region, the governments have clearly aimed to 
target the family in order to amortize the costs of transition, giving to this 
institution the important role of main engine of innovation.  
 
Conclusion 
Family policies mediated the way in which individuals conceive the 
environment. The analysis carried out in this chapter has provided 
ample evidence that family support in East Central Europe is still driven 
by the socio-political communist heritage, but that, again, the legacies of 
the past have not precluded factors of innovation. The family rhetoric 
proposed by communist regimes and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, by 
post-communist regimes has moved the tasks attributed to the family 
from an individual to a country logic. If during communism, family 
policies were functional to the development of the state-socialist 
societies, after the end of the Cold War, family support became crucial 
for the consolidation of transition. In order to amortize its dramatic costs, 
governments have given the family the role of main social safety net139, 
often understood as complementary to social assistance provisions140. 
As a consequence, family policies have been useful both to the 
consolidation of the new political order, but also to the creation of the 
new “post-communist citizen”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
139 See also Fultz et al. (2003); Lukács and Frey (2003); Fultz and 
Steinhilber (2003).  
140 Of particular relevance is that family benefits and social assistance 
provisions in East Central Europe are frequently seen as 
complementary. This is particularly true for Latvia, where there is no 
single legislation on family benefits. No country, however, is an 
exception. The complementary orientation of family and social 
assistance provisions is not a surprise. As mentioned before, since the 
1970s the family became the centre of a “second” society” (see 
Hankiss 1991), forming an additional scheme of protection within the 
communist system. As a consequence, in politicians’ mind these two 
provisions were not easily distinguishable.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF PART TWO 
Eastern European welfare states developed in a specific industrialized context 
adapting to the characteristics of the environment in which they were growing. 
The character acquired by these early systems of social protection predisposed 
them to future developments, involving almost all welfare state sectors. Pension, 
health care, protection against unemployment, social assistance and family 
policies grew not only in the ruins of the past, but also became key institutions in 
the establishment of a new social order in the future, encouraging certain values 
instead of others. They promoted Bismarckian societies based on differentiation 
of provisions according to the professional activity, but also the communist 
egalitarianism through the introduction of universal benefits. Hence, welfare 
state sectors acted both as policy-takers, and also as policy-makers.  
An important point that still needs to be elucidated is which pattern of 
transformation are Central and Eastern European welfare states really following. 
Are they silently acquiring the characteristics in force in the West? Or, are they 
successfully adapting and recombining characters valid during communism with 
the new emergent requirements of post-communist societies?        
The palaeontologist Fleagle (1999, pp. 1, 571) provides a definition of 
“adaptive radiation” as “a group of closely related organisms that have evolved 
morphological and behavioural features enabling them to exploit different 
ecological niches141”. For the author, adaptation to a new environment is not 
only a fundamental pre-requisite for success and survival of the individuals, but 
it also implies a metamorphosis, a morphological change, which results in the 
emergence of a new characteristic, and, over time, possibly a new species. 
The analysis of five welfare state sectors (pension, health care, protection 
against unemployment, social assistance and family support) has demonstrated 
that governments implemented the welfare system already in place during the 
pre-Soviet period (Bismarck social insurance), tried to maintain most of the 
values in force during communism (universalism, corporatism and 
egalitarianism) and re-adjusted it to the new post-communist consensus 
(market-based schemes). 
Contrary to the classical assumption of path dependency theory, however, it 
has been proven that Central and Eastern European welfare states remained by 
no means locked-in in their path of extrication from state-socialism, but were 
capable of highly innovative reforms, which took place also in later stages of 
development. 
As a consequence of an evolutionary process, pension, health care, 
protection against unemployment, social assistance and family benefit systems 
have been subjected to pressures, that have caused mutations, which have 
drastically altered the characteristics introduced during the first stages of 
reforms, where a social policy vacuum required immediate actions. Although 
market fundamentalism was chosen as the leading principle of the Washington 
Consensus, this policy orientation has not been implemented as planned. As 
mentioned, the three-pillar scheme of pension insurance has turned into a four-
pillar model, where a strong link to social assistance provisions ensures 
                                              
141 For an early version of a theoretical approach based on evolutionary 
theories see Poznanski (1993). For path dependency see Götting (1994) and 
Pierson (1993, 2000b). 
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coverage for those citizens whose income under the above scheme would not 
be sufficient (see Wagener 2002; conclusion chapter 3). Market-based health 
insurance, characterized by a strong link between contributions paid and 
services received, has been introduced, but coupled, in all countries, with the 
universal principles guaranteed by the state, which is still responsible to cover 
numerous uninsured citizens  (see conclusion chapter 4). Finally, 
unemployment, social assistance and family benefits, introduced with the aim to 
reduce temporary poverty, have changed their nature and scope from residual 
safety nets into active democratization forces. A mix of market-orientation, 
targeting and universality has then become the new distinctive attribute of these 
areas. If analysed in their global context, the abovementioned characteristics 
are evidence for a significant degree of cohesion among these welfare states in 
transition and presuppose the emergence of a new and unique model of 
solidarity. 
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Chapter 8 
Quantifying the Support for a Socially Responsible Welfare State 
 
1.1 The Cultural-Civilization Approach  
It has already been pointed out in previous chapters, that the dissolution 
of communism did not automatically coincide with the termination of 
forty years of state-socialist rules and attitudes, but most of the 
principles established during this period survived to the drastic 
transformation. Sztompka (1995) provides, perhaps, the most 
interesting insight into the role played by cultural heritage in the 
formation of the post-communist citizen and society. The cultural-
civilization approach proposed by Sztompka (1995) explicitly recalls the 
sociological school of a) Tocqueville (1945) where the “soft intangibles 
factors of habits, mentalities, symbols, frameworks, rituals and routines” 
represent the true character of a nation and, consequently, of the citizen 
itself (see also Simmel 1971142); b) of Durkheim (1964, 1966) where the 
importance of collective representations as socially shared universe of 
objects, beliefs, norms, values and institutions mediate the 
understanding of the society in which we live143; c) of Elias (1978) and 
his notion of “civilising process” as a culture- and society-generating 
phenomenon which cannot be isolated from its natural, historical flow; 
and f) of Bourdieu (1990) and “his central idea of “habitus” as the semi-
automated and unconscious mode of acting and thinking, which 
influences our everyday conduct144” (Sztompka 1995, pp. 237-241). 
What Sztompka (1995) emphasizes is, in brief, the necessity not to look 
at the developments of Eastern European societies as the mere 
creation of institutions and logics by design, but rather as the 
consequence of historical, cultural and civilising adjustments, which end 
up in the construction of a new organism. For Sztompka (1995, p. 238): 
 “what we are witnessing in the countries of Eastern-Central 
Europe in the aftermath of the collapse of communism is not 
merely the second birth of capitalist economy; nor is it merely the 
                                              
142 For Simmel (1971), people live in the society and are forged by its 
rules, but people are also active actors in determining its evolution.
143 According to the French sociologist, Durkheim (1964), an 
individuals’ mind is formed by two consciences: an individual 
conscience, which reflects the individuals’ personality, and a “collective 
conscience”, which is the total of norms, cultural beliefs and social 
expectations. The “collective conscience” is crucial not only in the 
development of the individual’s personality, but also because it is the 
main source of the state’s authority (Durkheim 1964).  The 
“conscience collective” is a social product, which finds its origin in what 
the author calls “social facts” (Durkheim 1966), that is every way of 
acting, thinking and feeling imposed by the society on the individual by 
means of written and unwritten social norms. 
144 See also Weber’s classification of traditional action (Weber [1922] 
1968). 
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reconstruction of democratic polity; nor is it merely the restitution 
of some earlier social order – a “return” to Europe, to the West, to 
normality, or whatever. Rather, it is the construction of a new 
social order out of a curious mixture of components of various 
historical origins. It involves the transformation of the most 
fundamental, deepest cultural-civilization fabric. This major 
cultural and civilization breakthrough is the core of post-
communist transition”  
In this context, it might be argued that the cultural-civilization fabric in 
force during communism has resulted in common attitudes towards the 
support for a socially responsible welfare state. Ash (1990) was, in fact, 
the first to note that, as a result of the communist habit, in most Eastern 
European countries there is still a widespread support for a strong 
welfare state and for highly redistributive policies (see also Slomczynski 
and Shabad 1997). More recently, Suhrcke (2001) and Redmond et al. 
(2002) have looked at the communist legacies as determinants for the 
orientation toward social inequality, re-affirming the persistence of clear 
preferences within Eastern Europe for more redistributive policy-making, 
as well as, also outlining that these orientations are likely to have 
significant repercussions for future welfare state reforms. In spite of the 
fact that these authors have carried out their research on the same 
ISSP dataset used here, their methods has left most of the questions 
concerning the connections among work-status, economic condition and 
political orientations unexplored145. This chapter has the scope to 
provide a better picture of these relations. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
The following section analyses the dataset Social Inequality III (1999) 
made available by the collaboration of the principal national research 
institutes of 26 nation members of the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP)146. For the purpose of this research, nine available 
Western European147 and seven Central and Eastern European 
countries148 have been included in the analysis149. The surveys were 
                                              
145 While the investigation of Suhrcke (2001) was carried out primarily 
through multivariate analysis, Redmond et al.(2002) have preferred to 
test the factors determining social inequality through cluster analysis. 
In both cases, however, figures, presented as aggregates, do not allow 
an indepth examination of results within social groups. 
146 Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Rep, 
France, Germany East, Germany West, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, 
Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, North Ireland, Norway, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United 
States. 
147 Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Great Britain, North Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 
148 Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Hungary, Latvia, Poland,  Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
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carried out in 1999 through face-to-face interviews. The sample size of 
the database involves: 1016 respondent’s for Austria; 1102 for Bulgaria, 
1834 for the Czech Republic, 1889 for France, 1432 for Germany150, 
804 for Great Britain, 1208 for Hungary, 1100 for Latvia, 2200 for 
Northern Ireland, 1321 for Norway, 1135 for Poland, 1144 for Portugal, 
1082 for Slovakia, 1006 for Slovenia, 1211 for Spain, and 1150 for 
Sweden. In order to correct for possible sample mistakes, all 
calculations have been made using the weight provided by the ISSP 
project. The analysis has primarily involved the variables V.11, V. 35, V. 
36, V.39, V.40, which correspond to the following questions:  
“To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements: 
• large differences in income are necessary for [country’s] prosperity 
(V.11); 
• government should reduce the differences in income (V.35); 
• people with high incomes should pay a large, the same or a smaller 
share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes (V.36); 
• it is just or unjust [right or wrong] that people with higher incomes 
can buy better health care than people with lower incomes (V.39); 
• it is just or unjust [right or wrong] that people with higher incomes 
can buy better education for their children than people with lower 
incomes (V40)” 
The responses, based on a five point scale ranging from “strongly 
agree” to “strongly disagree”, were tested according to different 
independent variables such as income, work status and voting 
behaviour. In order to have a better picture of income clusters, the 
original 10 income deciles calculated according to the ISSP 
classification have been regrouped into three main deciles. The “First 
Decile” includes respondents belonging to the lowest income groups 
(deciles 1, 2 and 3). The “Second Decile” includes respondents 
belonging to the middle-income groups (deciles 4, 5, 6, and 7), while the 
“Third Decile” includes high-income respondents (deciles 8, 9 and 10). 
This partition is based upon the suggestions on data presentation 
provided by the Canberra Group (2001). In order to facilitate the 
presentation of the data, the ISCO-88 classification has been regrouped 
into four major groups as seen in chapter five (§1, p.153) of this work. 
These new major groups should provide a clearer representation of low 
and higher social classes.   
 
2. The Data 
2.1. Country focus 
It is common wisdom among neo-liberal supporters to assume that 
differences in income are necessary for economic prosperity. One of the 
                                                                                                      
149 Since East and West Germany display substantial internal 
differences, their analysis has been conducted separately. 
150 In order to provide a better representation of East German 
attitudes, the ISSP research institution in charge of the survey has 
deliberately over-sampled the five eastern Federal states. 
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major complaints during communism was that the equalization of wages 
was not motivating the workers to produce beyond their possibilities. 
Thus, following the collapse of the communist order, it would not be 
surprising if Central and Eastern European respondents (CEE Rs) 
would choose the cause of wage differentiation as essential 
precondition for country’s prosperity. By contrast, Table 2.1 (V.11) 
reveals that CEE Rs tended to disagree more, than Western Europeans 
respondents (WE Rs), that differences in income are necessary. About 
three tenths of CEE Rs “strongly disagree” to this statement (29 per 
cent), where as only less than two-tenths of their Western neighbours 
(17 per cent) “strongly disagree”. However, differences among countries 
sampled do exist. Within Eastern Europe, for instance, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia more strongly disagreed, while East Germany and Poland 
show lower results. Noteworthy is also that Austria, France and Portugal 
tend to score similarly to their Eastern colleagues. 
Do these attitudes change according to the individuals’ income? The 
refusal that large differences in income are necessary for country’s 
prosperity does not change in Eastern Europe if the economic position 
of the interviewees is considered (see Table 2.2, V.11). About three-
tenths of Eastern respondents in all income deciles “strongly disagree” 
with this statement, while a similar result is reached in the West only in 
the highest-income decile. This last result is hard to explain. It should be 
expected that high-income earners would support more differentiation of 
income, since they might benefit more from such policy-making. In 
contrast, almost one in three high-income earners in Western Europe 
strongly disagree to the assertion that differences in income are 
necessary. The raise in post-materialist values might be a possible 
explanation. As Inglehart (1977) would put it, once people have fulfilled 
their more basic material needs, they can get involved in the defence of 
higher social values, such as the support for feminist or green-oriented 
policies, but also for a more equal society (Eatwell 2000, p. 415). 
Given the widespread inference that the communist governments had 
on the economic structure, it might also be expected, that as a reaction 
CEE Rs would be more likely to refuse an active role of the government 
in reducing differences in income. The assumption would be that if an 
active state did not succeed in ensuring economic prosperity and 
equality during communism, there is no reason why this conception 
should work ten years later. Contrary to this assumption, the attitude 
towards the role of the government in reducing differences in income is 
evidence for a more substantially polarized Central and Eastern Europe 
towards a more active involvement of the state. In fact, four-tenths (40 
per cent) of respondents, the average, “strongly agree” that the 
government should play an active role in East Europe, while it is less 
than three-tenths in the West (28 per cent). It is also important to note 
that the Western European average is particularly influenced by the 
responses of Portugal, which scores for more than 68 per cent 
(“strongly agree”), because without Portugal the average would be 
equal to only 23 per cent (see Table 2.1, V.35).  
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This trend is, to some extent, confirmed if the analysis is based on the 
respondents’ income. With the exception of the highest income deciles, 
citizens in Eastern Europe ask more, than their Western European 
neighbours, for an active involvement of the state (see Table 2.2, V.35). 
It should not be forgotten, however, that CEE Rs in the highest-income 
decile are more sceptical about this statement. Undoubtedly, those 
people in this category are the ones who have benefited more from the 
liberalization of the markets and from the deregulation of the state asset 
and, as a consequence, every state involvement would directly affect 
their final revenue. 
How do Central and Eastern Europeans perform when it comes to 
paying taxes? Do they support redistributive policies or do individualistic 
values become predominant? As can be seen in Table 2.1 (V.36), the 
responses concerning the amount of taxes that rich and poor people 
should pay substantially differ between East and West Europe. In 
Central and Eastern Europe about one-third (34 per cent) of 
respondents affirm that rich people should pay a “much larger share” of 
taxes than poor people, while in Western Europe only about one-fifth 
(24 per cent) of interviewees agrees with this statement. Again, Portugal 
shows more redistributive attitudes than its Western neighbours.  
Does this orientation change according to the economic position? 
Here, a proportional decrease of support from the bottom to the top of 
income deciles should be expected. The logic behind this is simple and 
guided by the principle that not only the more money one person earns, 
the more taxes he or she has to pays, but also that this share 
disproportionately increases with the increase in income. Thus, one 
would expect that rich people would agree less than poor people 
because by stating that they are ready to pay a much larger share of 
taxes would automatically mean taking a part of the responsibility for 
low-income citizens. Needless to say, this statement based on inter-
class solidarity might end up being particularly painful for the revenues 
of healthy people.  
Although this “rational choice” hypothesis is confirmed by the data  
(the percentage of those who agree that rich people should pay a much 
larger share of taxes proportionally diminishes with the increase in 
individuals’ income, see Table 2.2, V.36), people in the lowest and 
middle income deciles in Eastern Europe tend more to agree, than their 
Western neighbours, that the tax burden should primarily rely on rich 
people. The difference between the two regions becomes closer only in 
the highest income deciles. Understandably, high-income earners in 
both regions would indeed prefer that their wage is not lowered by 
additional taxes (CEE average: 19 per cent; WE average: 19 per cent).  
Despite clear differences regarding the attitude towards egalitarian 
values and the role of the state in social protection, both Eastern and 
Western European citizens show similar negative opinions about the 
possibility that rich people can buy better health care services and/or 
have access to better education. In both regions, the large majority of 
citizens find it “very unjust” that high-income earners can have access to 
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some form of differentiated treatment151 (see Table 2.1, V.39 and V.40). 
However, in the case of the health care sector, the Western European 
average seems to be artificially increased by the responses of France 
and the Mediterranean countries, which are close to a universal health 
care system. This might represent an important indicator of the 
existence of stronger differences in the West rather than in the East.  
 
Abb. 9: Table 2.1: ISSP among countries 
% of respondents Table 2.1 ISSP among countries 
 
V11 
(strongly disagree) 
V35 
(strongly 
agree) 
V36 
(much larger 
share) 
V39 
(very 
unjust) 
V40 
(very 
unjust) 
Bulgaria 51 56 60 49 49 
Czech Rep. 28 43 27 33 41 
Germany East 16 26 28 48 47 
Hungary 31 47 30 62 62 
Latvia 25 33 22 29 36 
Poland 11 33 36 22 24 
Slovakia 51 41 34 31 40 
Slovenia 21 40 32 46 53 
CEE average 29 40 34 40 44 
Austria 26 28 28 45 41 
France 26 36 25 61 53 
Germany West 10 12 21 29 28 
Great Britain 9 18 21 20 21 
North Ireland 10 17 23 19 20 
Norway 11 18 20 34 37 
Portugal 35 68 42 49 30 
Spain 13 31 24 46 47 
WE average 17 28 24 39 36 
Source:  ISSP 1999. Author’s calculation. 
 
 
 
  
 
As it might be expected, similarities between these two regions also 
exist with respect to income distribution (see Table 2.2, V.39 and V.40). 
In this case, people in the lowest income deciles tend to find inequality 
in treatments “more” unjust than high-income earners. Interestingly, 
one-third (32 per cent) of high-income individuals in Western Europe 
find it very unjust that rich people can buy better health care, while less 
than one-fifth (19 per cent) of their Eastern European counterparts 
express the same opinion. This result might be explained by the 
negative performance of equalized welfare provisions in force during 
communism, which did not produce an efficient welfare state. Thus, it 
                                              
151 In Great Britain and Northern Ireland, however, respondents show 
a greater justification for differentiation of provisions. 
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might be comprehensible that people in the highest-income decile in 
Eastern Europe are more sceptical about the effectiveness of a single 
unified system, since they might be able to afford the access to the 
second “best” one.  
Abb. 10: Table 2.2: ISSP among decile groups 
% of respondents TABLE 2.2  ISSP among decile groups 
Eastern Europe 
V11  
(strongly 
disagree) 
V35  
(strongly 
agree) 
V36  
(much larger 
share) 
V39  
(very 
unjust) 
V40  
(very 
unjust) 
Decile 1-3 32 47 38 46 50 
Decile 4-7 31 37 30 33 39 
Decile 8-10 34 23 19 19 24 
Western Europe      
Decile 1-3 20 35 26 48 44 
Decile 4-7 18 28 24 38 34 
Decile 8-10 29 26 19 32 29 
Source:  ISSP 1999. Author’s calculation. 
  
 
2.2 Vote Last Election 
In order to see whether the orientation towards a more active 
involvement of the state, in promoting social solidarity, depends on 
political affiliation, the attitudes of respondents according to their vote in 
the last election are tested. The main assumption is that there should be 
a clear differentiation towards values based on solidarity among the 
various political orientations. People who voted for a conservative or 
right-wing party should be more prone to support the ideas proposed by 
Thatcher and Reagan. For this group of voters, politicians should leave 
the market to work free and the negative influences of the welfare state 
should be drastically limited. By contrast, citizens who voted for a left-
wing party should be more willing to support redistributive policies and 
values based on social solidarity (Taylor-Gooby 1993).  
What do European voters really think about differences in income as 
a necessity for economic prosperity? If the voting behaviour 
corresponds to the classical economic orientations, as stated above, 
people on the right of the political spectrum (the bourgeoisie) should 
agree that differences in income are essential to boost country’s 
economy, while people on the left (the working class) should be less 
tolerant of this statement. If, however, the voting behaviour in the post-
industrial societies does not follow this pattern anymore, then the 
responses might be less clear-cut. Needless to say, the latter seems to 
be the most appropriate explanatory model. It is possible to confirm that 
far left voters in Western Europe tend to support more strongly values 
based on social solidarity (approximately 24 per cent of far left voters 
strongly disagree that differences in income are necessary for economic 
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prosperity152), whilst a similar result (23 per cent) can be found among 
far right voters in Eastern Europe (see Table 2.3, V.11). This value is 
undoubtedly of interest because it might explain the support for right-
wing parties in this region. Basically right-wing parties have gained 
support as a result of the new social cleavages, caused by the transition 
(see Minkenberg (2000) for Eastern Europe; Ignazi (1992) and Betz 
(1994) for Western Europe).    
Returning to the theme of government intervention in the reduction of 
income difference, it should be expected that different political factions 
correspond to different interests and, thus, the promotion of different 
degrees of “statism”. Left-wing voters should strongly call for state 
intervention, while centre, liberal and conservative voters should be less 
enthusiastic about this orientation. Once again, CEE Rs show a clearer 
preference for public responsibility regardless of political affiliation. In 
fact, CEE Rs tend more strongly to agree that the government should 
reduce differences in income, while Western European 
right/conservative voters seem to support more the classical neo-liberal 
idea that the state should avoid any type of interference. Approximately 
one-fifth (25 per cent) of right/conservative respondents in the West 
Europe “strongly” agreed with an active role of the state in reducing 
differences in income. In East Europe, the ratio is almost double (45 per 
cent, see Table 2.3, V.35). This result is certainly intriguing. On the one 
hand, it confirms the hypothesis that right-wing or conservative Western 
Europeans are still affected by “Thatcherism” preferring lasses-faire to 
state intervention; on the other hand, it does not confirm the successful 
introduction of a similar ideology in Eastern Europe. Here, four decades 
of communist civilization has proven to be the most efficient vaccine. 
It is common wisdom to assume that people on the left are also more 
likely to support the statement that rich people should pay a larger share 
of taxes, while people on the right should be less prone to agree to this 
possibility. It might be argued, for instance, that left-minded individuals 
tend to be more inclined for redistribution of welfare, because this kind 
of policy direction would diminish differences in income between the rich 
and the poor. By contrast, right-oriented people should focus more on 
individual achievements and, thus, any disproportionate redistribution of 
merits would alter fair competition. Although this pattern seems to apply 
to Western Europe, CEE Rs tend to support more strong values based 
on social solidarity. More than one-fourth (27 per cent) of centre and 
liberal voters seem to have formed a consensus on a system where 
high income earners pay a “much larger share” of taxes, while only less 
than one-fifth (19 per cent) of their Western counterparts seems to 
share the same point of view (see Table 2.3, V.36). This trend becomes 
clearer if right voters are considered. In this case, the percentage 
increases up to 38 per cent (35 per cent far right) in East Europe, 
against less than 20 per cent in West Europe (see Table 2.3, V. 36). 
                                              
152 Please note that the ISSP dataset does not provide any result for 
far left supporters in Eastern Europe. 
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In theory, we might expect even clearer results where opinions on the 
access to welfare provisions are concerned. In this case, left- and right-
wing individuals should be clearly divided. The majority of left-wing 
voters should find the existence of differentiated welfare provisions “very 
unjust”, while the majority of right-wing supporters should be more 
tolerant on this issue. Unexpectedly, the result disconfirms this 
hypothesis. Although it is possible to state that CEE Rs find “very 
unjust” that rich people can buy or have access to better health care 
services or education, it is not the majority of respondents who show 
strong egalitarian feelings, but rather a minority (in the best case no 
higher than 12 per cent). This result becomes a bit clearer, if 
conservative, right or far right voters are compared. The ratio of 
respondents who found a differentiated access to health care “very 
unjust” is 6 per cent and 12 per cent for right and far right voters in 
Eastern Europe against only 3 per cent for the same groups in Western 
Europe. With respect to a differentiated access to education, the 
percentage is approximately 5 per cent for right and far right voters in 
the East against 2 per cent for right-wing voters in the West.  
Abb. 11: Table 2.3: ISSP among voters 
% of respondents TABLE 2.3 ISSP among voters 
Eastern Europe 
V11  
(strongly 
disagree) 
V35  
(strongly 
agree) 
V36  
(much larger 
share) 
V39  
(very 
unjust) 
V40  
(very 
unjust) 
Left, centre left 14 40 39 8 10 
Centre, liberal 19 31 27 3 2 
Right, conservative 16 45 38 6 5 
Far right, etc. 23 41 35 12 6 
Western Europe      
Far left 24 43 25 - - 
Left, centre 16 32 30 2 2 
Centre, liberal 13 43 19 - - 
Right, conservative 9 25 19 3 2 
Source:  ISSP 1999. Author’s calculation. 
  
 
2.3. Opinions according to the professional activity 
Another important aspect for the personal inclination for public 
responsibility is often belonging to a determined professional group. As 
it has been broadly described elsewhere, different groups of workers 
tend to have different interests and, therefore, are likely to support 
different values according to their current needs and future expectations 
(Giddens 1973; Evans 1993). In examining the effect of class 
membership on the psychological orientation and function toward 
systemic change in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, Slomczynski 
and Shabad (1997) have confirmed this hypothesis, demonstrating that 
individuals’ preferences for continuity versus change in pro-welfarist 
policies in Eastern Europe are starting to differ according to the 
professional group. Farmers and factory workers are the strongest 
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advocates for continuity, while managers, employers and experts, the 
professional groups who benefited more from the privatization of state 
assets, exhibit the most support for change in the direction of a reduced 
role of the state (Slomczynski and Shabad 1997).  
To what extent does an individuals’ class position affect their attitudes 
towards income differentiation? In other words, do people in the best-
paid professional groups still support equalization of wages or do they 
tend to promote those values which best maximize their future 
remuneration? Here, the main question is whether individualistic 
principles have successfully been introduced by design, or whether 
attitudes towards social justice are characterized by path dependency. 
As it might be expected, Table 2.4 (V.11) reveals that in Central and 
Eastern Europe all four Major Groups more intensively tend to disagree 
with the statement that income differences are necessary for country’s 
economic prosperity. The percentage of CEE Rs who “strongly 
disagree” is about three-times higher of their Western colleagues for 
Major Group 1 (35 per cent of CEE R’s vs. 10 per cent of WE R’s) and 
Major Group 4 (38 per cent vs. 13 per cent), and more than double for 
Major Group 2 (31 per cent vs. 14 per cent) and Major Group 3 (32 per 
cent vs. 12 per cent). Not surprisingly, this result is a further indicator of 
the importance of the communist legacies, which influence individuals’ 
orientations even though the person involved has completely changed 
his or her work status. Stated another way, the professional activity may 
have changed as a result of the reorganization of state-socialist class 
structure, but the attitudes connected to the new work status still 
predominantly depend on the orientations acquired in the previous 
communist orientated work place. 
It is now tempting to state that no clear distinction among professional 
groups exists in Eastern Europe. This statement, however, would be 
extremely misleading. If it is possible to affirm that similar patterns can 
be witnessed with respect to the question of whether the government 
should reduce differences in income  (all Major Groups in Eastern 
Europe tend, again, to support an active involvement of the state more 
strongly than their counterparts in Western Europe, see Table 2.4, V.35, 
“strongly agree”), then WE and CEE Rs should show an increase in 
egalitarian values particularly when descending the social class. In 
Western Europe, 14 per cent of Major Group 1 members “strongly 
agree” that the government must reduce differences in income. This 
value raises up to 22 per cent for Major Group members 2, up to 26 per 
cent for Major Group 3 members and, finally, up to 31 per cent for Major 
Group 4 members. In Eastern Europe, this trend is similar, but the score 
within professional groups is more than double (35 per cent) for Major 
Group 1, almost double for Major Group 2 (42 per cent), and about 
three-fourths higher for Major Group 3 (46 per cent) and Major Group 4 
(53 per cent). In brief, this result shows that belonging to a determined 
professional group is not irrelevant to the attitudes towards the role of 
the government. It also demonstrates that the inter-class orientations in 
Central and Eastern Europe still emphasize state responsibility as the 
leading principle.    
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At this stage, what people in different professional groups think about 
the division of tax burdens should be examined. Do communist legacies 
influence an individuals’ orientation, even though these have a negative 
impact on respondents’ pockets? Also with regard to the issue 
concerning who should pay more taxes, all Major Groups in Central and 
Eastern Europe demonstrate more support for solidaristic values than 
Western European counterparts (Table 2.4, V.36). In Major Group 1, the 
number of respondents who affirm that rich people should pay a “much 
larger share” of taxes than poor people is three-fourths more than in 
Western Europe (27 per cent vs. 15 per cent); while for Major Group 2, 
Major Group 3 and Major Group 4, this percentage is about one-third 
more than Western European colleagues (Major Group 2: 32 per cent 
from CEE R’s vs. 22 per cent from We R’s; Major Group 3: 37 per cent 
vs. 23 per cent; Major Group 4: 45 per cent vs. 29 per cent). However, 
this is not to say that differences among professional groups do not 
exist in Central and Eastern Europe. CEE Rs do support solidarity, but 
this moral value tends to loose some of its intensity when translated into 
tax payments. In this context, there is a clear increasing trend for 
redistributive policies from the top to the bottom of the Major Groups. In 
Major Group 1 about 27 per cent of CEE Rs agree that rich people 
should pay a “much larger share” of taxes. This percentage increases 
up to 32 per cent in Major Group 2, up to 37 per cent in Major Group 3, 
and, finally, up to 45 per cent for Major Group 4 (representative of those 
workers involved in elementary occupations who should benefit more 
from such a tax system).  
As expected, in all professional groups in Eastern Europe, 
respondents also tend to refute, more strongly, the fact that rich people 
can buy better health care or education. This is also particularly clear 
when the Major Group 3 and Major Group 4 are analysed. In this case, 
the gap between Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe 
becomes bigger. In fact, about 42 per cent of Major Group 3 
respondents in Central and Eastern Europe find a differentiated access 
to health care services “very unjust”, while the percentage of Western 
Europeans who share a similar belief is about 34 per cent. This 
difference increases for those respondents involved in elementary 
occupations (Major Group 4). In Central and Eastern Europe about a 
half of interviewees in this group (51 per cent) find it very unjust, while in 
Western Europe only about one-third (37 per cent) strongly disagree to 
differentiated health care provisions (Table 2.4, V.39). The same pattern 
applies with regard to the access to better education (Table 2.4, V.40). 
In this case, 46 per cent of Central and Eastern Europeans belonging to 
Major Group 3 find it very unjust, versus 35 per cent of their Western 
colleagues; and 53 per cent of CEE workers in elementary occupations 
(Major Group 4) find it “very unjust”, versus 37 per cent of Western 
Europeans. Noteworthy is, however, that the support for redistributive 
policies in Eastern Europe increases with the diminution of the 
professional status, in almost all variables taken into account so far (see 
V35, V36, V39, V40, Table 2.4). 
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Abb. 12: Table 2.4: ISSP within professional activity 
 % of respondents TABLE 2.4 ISSP within professional activity
Eastern Europe
V11 
(strongly
disagree)
V35 
(strongly
agree)
V36 
(much larger 
share)
V39 
(very
unjust)
V40 
(very
unjust)
Major Group 1 (ISCO-88 1-2-3) 35 35 27 32 38
Major Group 2 (ISCO-88 4-5) 31 42 32 39 45
Major Group 3 (ISCO-88 6-7-8) 32 46 37 42 46
Major Group 4 (ISCO-88 9) 38 53 45 51 53
Western Europe
Major Group 1 (ISCO-88 1-2-3) 10 14 15 30 32
Major Group 2 (ISCO-88 4-5) 14 22 22 37 37
Major Group 3 (ISCO-88 6-7-8) 12 26 23 34 35
Major Group 4 (ISCO-88 9) 13 31 29 37 37
Source:  ISSP 1999. Author’s calculation.
 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis carried out in this chapter has confirmed the main 
hypothesis, that economic condition, work status and political orientation 
in Central Eastern Europe does not drastically alter the support for a 
socially responsible welfare state. However, it would be wrong to 
conclude that this support does not change according to socio-
economic variables. It does change, but the extent of the change still 
shows a clearer inclination for a stronger welfare state.  
It has been demonstrated that although Eastern Europeans support 
more the idea that differences in income are not an essential 
prerequisite for country’s prosperity, actual differences within the region 
do exist. These differences, however, have not modified the general 
result. In all income deciles, and in all professional groups, Eastern 
Europeans are more strongly inclined to agree on such issues than their 
Western counterparts. Interestingly, it has been found that Central and 
Eastern European far right voters “strongly disagree” that differences in 
income are necessary for economic prosperity, providing empirical 
evidence concerning the support for right-extreme parties as a result of 
the economic deterioration that is occurring in these countries.  
Eastern Europeans have also expressed greater support for an active 
involvement of the government in reducing differences in income. With 
the exception of the highest income decile, CEE Rs have asked more 
for government intervention, than their Western European neighbours. 
This result has been achieved, to some extent, regardless of political 
affiliation. In all Major Groups, Eastern European workers have more 
strongly supported an active involvement of the state, than their 
respondents in Western Europe. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning 
that WE Rs and CEE Rs, the lower the social class, have shown an 
increase in egalitarian values. 
Although the percentage of those who agree that rich people should 
pay a much larger share of taxes proportionally diminishes with the 
increase in an individuals’ income, people in the lowest- and middle-
income deciles in Eastern Europe have tended more strongly to agree 
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on this issue than, their Western European neighbours. Again, despite 
the fact that the preference for redistributive policies in Central and 
Eastern Europe has not been irrelevant to political affiliation, there is still 
a wider consensus among political factions that the rich should pay a 
much larger share of taxes. Interestingly, right-wing voters have seem to 
be more in favour of a system where high-income earners pay a “much 
larger share” of taxes, while their Western counterparts do not appear to 
agree on this issue with the same intensity. All Major Groups in Eastern 
Europe also show a clear support for solidaristic values, than Western 
European colleagues. In both regions, however, this support diminishes 
with the increase of the professional status.  
Eastern and Western European citizens have also shown similar 
negative opinions about the possibility that rich people can buy better 
health care services or access to better education. As a rule, people in 
the lowest income deciles have usually tended to find inequality in 
treatments “more” unjust than high-income earners. As far as political 
affiliation is concerned CEE Rs are more inclined to find it “very unjust” 
that rich people can buy, or have access to, better health care services 
and/or education. A stronger support for a socially responsible welfare 
state is also observable in all professional groups in Eastern Europe. 
This orientation becomes particularly evident when the members of 
Major Group 3 and Major Group 4 are taken into account. 
The conclusion for policy-makers and politicians is that, despite intra-
country and intra-group differences, the support for a redistributive 
welfare state is much higher in Eastern Europe, than in West Europe 
(see also Ash 1990; Slomczynski and Shabad 1997; Suhrcke 2001; 
Redmond et al. 2002). Also politicians in the Central and Eastern 
European region have the possibility to emanate socially oriented 
reforms without the risk of loosing important segments of the electorate.  
This chapter has also provided further empirical evidence for the 
hypothesis that a common cultural-civilization fabric, produced by forty 
years of communism, still plays the major role in rejecting ideas 
introduced by design. 
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Chapter 9 
The Impact of Social Transfers 
 
Introduction153
It has long been assumed that after a short, but painful economic transition, 
Central and Eastern European societies would share the same well-being and 
economic prosperity of the western world. More than a decade after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, scholars and politicians are now forced to admit that something 
went wrong or, at least, not as planned. Raising unemployment, income 
inequality and poverty not only have implied insecurity and unsatisfied needs for 
the persons involved (Ferge and Tausz 2002), but have also meant a 
redefinition of democratic institutions. How will Central and Eastern European 
governments ensure democratic stability if the number of poor people is 
increasing under the new economic order? Despite the importance of this 
question, however, the relationship of economic development, democratization 
and social stability will not be discussed here because there is already an 
extensive academic debate on this topic (see § Introduction). Instead, the 
intention of this chapter is to provide an overview of the change in social 
inequality in Central and Eastern Europe and to quantify the impact of social 
transfers in reducing poverty. This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 
1 is intended to describe the Luxembourg Income Study micro data and the 
method used, whilst Section 2 summarizes the main findings of previous 
research. Finally, Section three illustrates the data, while Section 4 will discuss 
the main results. 
 
1. Method 
This chapter involves the analysis of 16 datasets provided by the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS). The LIS dataset is a collection of household income 
surveys, which provide demographic, income and expenditure information on 
three different levels: household, person and child. The 16 datasets involved in 
this study concern seven Central and Eastern European countries during the 
period 1986-2000 (Czech Republic 1992, 1996; Estonia 2000; Hungary 1991, 
1994, 1999; Poland 1986, 1992, 1995, 1999; Romania 1995, 1997, Slovakia 
1992, 1996; Slovenia 1997, 1999. see Table A 1.). For the purpose of this 
investigation, the analysis has been carried out on the household level. In other 
words, the overall household income, not the single income, has been taken into 
account. The assumption is that dependent spouses might share an important 
amount of their partner’s revenue and, thus, they should not be considered as 
poor solely on the basis that they do not have regular earnings (The Canberra 
Group 2001). Following the same logic, in the course of this chapter, welfare 
benefits recipients will be considered as not only those who materially receive 
the benefits, but also those members of the households who share the 
recipients’ income. One problem using income surveys is that households may 
vary in size and this influences the purchase power of single members. In order 
                                              
153 This chapter is based on Cerami, A. (2003), ‘The Impact of Social 
Transfers in Central and Eastern Europe’, LIS Working Paper no. 356, 
Luxembourg: Luxembourg Income Study. 
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to cope with these distortions, all calculations have been made according to the 
suggestions provided by the Luxembourg Income Study. This involves the use 
of an equivalence scale calculated as the square root of the number of persons 
in the household (Atkinson et al. 1995) and, as a general rule, a weight 
calculated by multiplying the household weight (HWEIGHT) by the number of 
units involved in the analysis154. Although the use of an equivalence scale can 
reduce the distortion caused by the comparison of different disposable incomes 
in different countries, it has been necessary to limit the effect of extreme values 
at the bottom or at the top of the distribution. The results presented in the 
following tables are bottom-coded at 1 per cent of equivalized mean income and 
top-coded at 10 times the median of non-equivalized income. All records with 
zero disposable income or not applicable values have also been excluded from 
the count (see also LIS Methods; Atkinson et al. 1995; Förster et al. 2002; 
Smeeding 2002;). 
The core of the analysis concerns the Net Disposable Income (DPI) 
available for single households. Here, the definition of disposable income 
provided by The Canberra Group of Income Statistics (2001, p.15) is used, and 
is defined as: 
“…the maximum amount that a household or other unit can 
afford to spend on consumption of goods or services during the 
accounting period without having to finance its expenditure by 
reducing its cash, by disposing of other financial or non-financial 
assets or by increasing its liabilities”. 
In more concrete terms, the variable DPI can be displayed as the sum of the 
income either generated by employment, or pensions and social transfers minus 
taxes and mandatory contributions155. 
                                              
154 This weighting procedure is consistent to the recommendations provided 
by Atkinson (2002) and Eurostat Task Force (1998). 
155 The following variables are not present in the LIS datasets: a) 
Unemployment Compensation in Poland 1986; b) Means-tested benefits in 
Poland 1986, 1992 and in Romania 1995 and 1997; c) Family Benefits: 
Alimony and Child Support in Czech Republic 1992, Poland 1986, Poland 
1992, Slovakia 1992, Slovakia 1996, Romania 1995 and Romania 1997. 
Maternity Pay in Estonia 2000. In the LIS summary, “Alimony or Child 
Support” is not included in the variable Social Transfers (Soctrans). In the 
course of this paper, however, “Social Transfers” refer to all social benefits 
with the exclusion of private and public sector pensions. In the LIS 
summary, “Alimony or Child Support” is not included in the variable Social 
Transfers (Soctrans). In the course of this paper, however, “Social 
Transfers” refer to all social benefits with the exclusion of private and public 
sector pensions. 
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Table 3.1  LIS Summary of Income Variables
+ Gross wages and salaries
+ Farm self-employment income
+ Non-farm self- employment income
= Total Earnings
+ Cash property income
= Factor Income
+ Private pensions
+ Public sector pensions
= Market Income
+ Social Retirement benefits
+ Child or family allowances
+ Unemployment compensation
+ Sickpay
+ Accident pay
+ Disability pay
+ Maternity pay
+ Military/vet/war benefits
+ Other social insurance
+ Means-tested cash benefits
+ Near-cash benefits
+ Alimony or Child Support
+ Other regular private income
+ Other cash income
=Total Gross Income
- Mandatory contributions for self-employed
- Mandatory employee contribution
- Income tax
= Net Disposable Income DPI
Source: LIS, Summary Income Variables
Social Transfers
 
Abb. 13: Table 3.1: LIS summary of income variable 
The first stage of analysis involves examining the data for changes in social 
inequality among the population. In order to do this the percentage of net 
disposable income according to ten income deciles  (1st decile=bottom, 
10thdecile=top) was computed. To facilitate the data presentation, these deciles 
were then regrouped into three groups (see The Canberra Group 2001, section 
Data Presentation). This should provide a clearer idea of low, middle and high-
income earners. As alternative measures of income inequality, the percentiles 
and the Gini coefficient are also given. The latter calculated on net disposable 
income and on net disposable income minus social transfers. The purpose of 
this first part is to see to what extent the absence of social transfers would affect 
social inequality. 
The second stage examines the impact of welfare provisions in reducing 
poverty among the population and among targeted groups. The main issue here 
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is concerned with how resources (inputs) are turned into results (outputs) and 
whether reforms have had a positive impact on the population and on the 
beneficiaries. In order to have a clearer picture, the poverty rates among the 
population before and after the disbursement of social transfers were calculated. 
In addition, an indepth analysis on unemployment compensation, means-tested 
and family benefits recipients, subtracting from their net disposable income the 
amount coming from these provisions, was carried out. The main question of 
this second part is what would have happened if a determined benefit would not 
be in place. Would, in this case, poverty rates become higher? By what 
percentage would they increase or diminish? The following table shows the 
main components of the welfare benefits mentioned above: 
Abb. 14: Table 3.2: LIS summary of benefits 
Table 3.2 LIS Summary of Benefits 
Unemployment Compensation 
 
- Unemployment insurance  
- Training or retraining allowance  
- Placement/Resettlement Benefits  
- Other Unemployment Benefits  
 
Total Means-tested benefits  
 
- Means-Tested Cash-benefits  
 
o Social assistance  
o Old age assistance  
o Unemployment assistance  
o Unmarried mother’s allowance  
o Other means-tested allowance  
 
- Means-Tested Near-cash benefits  
(near cash food benefits; near cash housing 
benefits; near cash medical benefits; near cash heating 
benefits; near cash education benefits; near cash child 
care benefits;  other near cash means-tested benefits) 
 
Family oriented policy  
 
- Child or Family Allowances  
- Maternity pay  
- Alimony or Child Support  
  
 
Before going into a detailed analysis of poverty rates in Eastern Europe, it is 
necessary to define what kind of poverty we want to measure. The literature on 
this topic is broad and a brief overview is available in almost all manuals of 
sociology. In brief, poverty can be described according to the axis of relative 
versus absolute poverty (Smeeding 2002). Relative poverty is understood in 
terms of the lack of material resources and usually calculated as 40 per cent, 50 
per cent or 60 per cent of average income/expenditure of the population. By 
contrast, the term absolute poverty is more ambiguous. Carmel (1999) defines it 
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as a  “chimera”, since its measurement strongly depends on the definition of 
basic needs that we give, so that it may exist when or where a person is unable 
to buy enough food, water, or clothing, but it may also exist in absence of these 
extreme situations. In the course of this chapter, the analysis will primarily 
concern all those people who find themselves below 60 per cent of the 
median156. This is the official poverty line proposed by the European Union for 
comparisons among member states (Eurostat 2000). Nonetheless, the reader 
can also find calculations at 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the median in the 
appendix.  
 
2. Previous Research and Possible Methodological Problems 
Over the past decade, the study of income inequality has experienced 
numerous stages of evolution. Beginning with the description of how this 
phenomenon developed across countries and over time, researchers are now 
able to investigate and to quantify the determinant factors of poverty and social 
inequality. By exploring trends in income inequality in fifteen European countries 
(plus the United States), Atkinson et al. (1995) demonstrated that the majority of 
these nations showed a rise in inequality, but this was by no means universal 
and the extent of the increase differed significantly. Very frequently, it was found 
that the United States had an exceptionally large gap between the rich and the 
poor, while, in comparison, the Scandinavian countries were less unequal 
societies (Smeeding 2002). The reasons for the good performance of the 
Scandinavian countries have often been attributed to the effectiveness of 
welfare provisions (Esping-Andersen 1990), which have made these societies 
capable of responding to the rise in market income differences (Ritakallio 2001). 
In other words, it was demonstrated that although the position in the labour 
market is a determinant factor for enhancing differences between the rich and 
the poor, welfare regimes could still play an important role to reduce these 
differences (Tsakloglou and Papadopoulos 2002). Recent studies, on Central 
and Eastern Europe and other countries, have demonstrated that children 
(Förster and Tóth 2001), women157 (Fultz and Steinhilber 2003; Balcerzak-
Paradowska et al. 2003; Kotýnková et al. 2003; Lukács and Frey 2003), 
unemployed (Ferge et al. 2002; Stanovnik and Stropnik 2002), persons who live 
far from major urban areas (Förster and Smeeding 2002), persons who live in 
households with more than three children, persons who are single parents 
(Chambaz 2001), persons who are members of the Roma community (Emigh et 
al. 1999; Barany 2000; World Bank 2001; Szelényi 2002; Zhelyazkova et al. 
2002; Orenstein et al. 2003) and, in general, ex-state sector employees (World 
Bank 2002) remain the most vulnerable groups158. Needless to say, without 
                                              
156 The median is usually preferred to the arithmetic mean since it is not 
affected by extreme values in the tails of the distribution (for further 
information see The Canberra Group 2001; Atkinson et al. 2002). 
157 The issue on feminization of poverty is, however, still controversial. For 
more information on this topic see AA.VV. (2002); Szelényi (2002) and 
Schnepf (2004).  
158 For a comprehensive study on the developments of income inequality in 
Central and Eastern Europe during the transition from planned economy to 
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efficient welfare institutions and, of course, the political will to improve such 
institutions (Ferge and Tausz 2002), their situation would dramatically worsen. 
In order to measure the impact of welfare provisions and, thus, to have a 
better idea of what can be done to prevent poverty, particular attention has 
recently been given to the effectiveness of means-tested benefits across the 
European region (Behrendt 1999; Sainsbury and Morissens 2002). The 
investigation by Behrendt (1999) involved Germany, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom and has demonstrated that although the receipt of means-tested 
benefits is no guarantee for leaving poverty, the incidence of these benefits on 
poverty alleviation considerably varies across nations and across poverty 
brackets. In Great Britain, for instance, means-tested provisions are very 
successful in reducing “strong” or “extreme” poverty (calculated as less than 60 
per cent of the median), but less effective if poverty was calculated at 60 per 
cent of the median. Sainsbury and Morissens (2002) conducted a similar 
analysis, on previous datasets of the Luxembourg Income Study, involving 
almost all European countries available at that date (this survey included, 
however, only three Central and Eastern European countries from older 
datasets). The two authors calculated poverty rates for the entire population and 
vulnerable groups, such as the unemployed, solo mothers, large families, and 
the elderly. This approach was concerned more with the impact of means-tested 
benefits on people “at risk of poverty”, that is “potential recipients”, rather than 
on the real beneficiaries. Their results, however, reconfirmed the diversity in 
basic safety nets across the European Union and their importance to alleviate 
poverty. 
The choice of a determined method in comparative research is always 
painful and never free of procedural mistakes. This is particularly true with 
respect to household income surveys. The necessities of researchers rarely 
correspond to the possibilities given by the data and the distortion of results is 
not rare. Although the method used here matches the requests of the European 
Commission concerning the necessity of producing indicators of poverty before 
and after transfers (Social Protection Committee 2001), this procedure has also 
its negative sides. Atkinson et al. (2002) argue, for instance, that simply 
subtracting transfers from disposable income is something that should be 
considered very carefully, if not directly avoided. According to Atkinson et al. 
(2002, p.109), “if benefits did not exist, then people would change their 
decisions. For example, unemployed young people would live with their 
parents”. Following this logic, however, the unpredictability of human actions 
would block further research and the impact of welfare provisions would remain 
unexplored.  
As mentioned, the method used in this paper has its weaknesses, as 
described above, but also its strengths. The strength of this method concerns 
the possibility to explore the impact of a determined welfare provision, not on 
“potential beneficiaries” (such as the “unemployed”), but on “real beneficiaries” 
(all those who receive the benefit). In fact, it should be made clear that NOT all 
the unemployed receive unemployment compensation, NOT all potential means-
tested beneficiaries receive some form of assistance, and NOT all families with 
                                                                                                      
market economy see also Milanovic (1998) and UNDPAD’s World Economic 
and Social Survey (2003).  
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children receive family support. Thus, the impact of a welfare provision does not 
only depend on the amount of benefits, but also on the entitlement criteria. If, on 
the one hand, the analysis carried out here neglects all those potential 
beneficiaries who have not received the benefit, it allows a closer investigation 
of the real performance of welfare benefits, limiting possible distortions. In 
addition, not only means-tested benefits are taken into account, but also other 
fundamental provisions such as unemployment compensation and family 
support policies.  
 
3. Monitoring the Impact of Social Transfers  
3.1 Monitoring the Change in Social Inequality in Central and Eastern 
Europe  
Figure 2.1 and Table A 2.1 show the share equivalent disposable income 
within decile groups in seven Central and Eastern European countries. Decile 
shares are commonly used not only to demonstrate how unequal income 
distribution can be in one country or among many countries, but also used to 
display where changes occur. Lower-income groups are the three bottom 
deciles, middle-income groups are the four middle deciles, while high-income 
groups are the top three deciles (The Canberra Group 2001). Taking as 
example the Czech Republic in 1992, Figure 2.1 can be read as follows: a) the 
lowest income individuals (Decile 1-3) received 19 per cent of total net 
disposable income; b) the middle-income individuals (Decile 4-7) received 
approximately 37 per cent, c) while the highest income individuals received 
about 44 per cent. From a brief comparison, we can conclude that inequality in 
income distribution drastically increased in all countries since the first years of 
transition. The percentage of total net disposable income also moved from the 
bottom to the top of income deciles. This means that the proportion of total 
disposable income decreased for lower income individuals, while high-income 
earners had access to a bigger fraction. In 1999, however, the net disposable 
income in the lowest income deciles slowly increased in Hungary and Poland, 
showing a slow reduction of income inequality (in Hungary from 13.7 per cent in 
1994 to 15.1 per cent in 1999, while in Poland from 11.9 per cent in 1995 to 14.7 
per cent in 1999). 
In many respects, the reproduction of economic mechanisms in place in 
Western Europe meant also for those societies in transition a shift to a capitalist-
based social structure. The distance among income groups was accentuated 
and, accordingly, the differences among individuals became more evident. 
Moreover, the fact that the diminution in income at disposal for households 
particularly affected lower income groups indicates that the costs of transition 
were not uniformly distributed. If all citizens would have equally paid the price 
necessary to transform their economies, then the analysis of decile shares 
should have shown an equal distribution of income across time. By contrast, as 
it has been argued elsewhere (see, World Bank 2002), there have been clear 
winners and losers from the period of transition. Unfortunately, the majority of 
losers were those citizens who found themselves in the lowest income groups, 
paying the highest social costs, while the winners were those citizens who, for 
some reason, succeeded in earning profits from the economic transformation 
(mostly those oligarchs and insiders who had substantial control rights over 
state assets; see Eyal et al. 1997, 1998; World Bank 2002). 
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  Abb. 15: Fig. 2.1: Share of total disposable income within decile 
groups 
 
Fig.2.1 Share of total disposable income within decile groups
Source: Author´s calculations using LIS.
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(see also Table A 2.1 in the Appendix) 
 
Another way to display income inequality is through the use of percentiles of 
the distribution as percentages of the median. The 10th percentile (P10) 
represents, for example, a household in the bottom decile, while the 90th 
percentile (P90) represents a household in the highest income decile.  The 
difference between the 10th and the 90th percentile corresponds to the distance 
between lowest and highest income groups, while the ratio between the 
incomes of those at the 90th and 10th percentiles (the so-called “Decile Ratio”; 
P90/10) quantifies the gap between the richest and the poorest. The percentiles 
can be, therefore, seen as a measure of social distance (for a detailed 
explanation see Atkinson et al. 1995; Smeeding 2002). To clarify, taking as 
example the Czech Republic in 1992 (see Figure 2.2 and Table A 2.2), it might 
be affirmed that a low-income citizen (P10) had an income equal to 65 per cent 
of the median, while a high-income citizen (P90) had an income equal to 155 
per cent of the median. In other words, high-income individuals had 2.4 times 
(P90/10=Decile Ratio) the income of low-income individuals.  
As mentioned, Figure 2.2 shows the distance between low- and high-income 
individuals (for detailed statistics see Table A 2.2). The gap is bigger in Estonia 
(2000), in Hungary (1994, 1999), in Poland (1995,1999) and in Romania (1995, 
1997). In 2000, the Estonian lowest-income individuals had only 46 per cent of 
the median net disposable income, while the richest Estonians had 230 per cent 
of the median (five times more). In Hungary (1994), this proportion was equal to 
50 per cent of the median for low-income individuals and approximately 210 per 
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cent for high-income citizens (four times more). The decile ratio decreased, 
however, to 3.5 times in 1999, showing a reduction in income inequality. In 
Poland (1999), the share was 52 per cent of median for low-income and 187 per 
cent for high-income individuals (3.6 times more). Compared to the previous 
survey, however, income inequality in Poland slightly decreased (1995: 4 times). 
In Romania, low-income individuals had access to 50 per cent of the median 
(1995, 1997), while high-income individuals to approximately 180 per cent 
(about 3.3 times more). The lowest social distance can be found in the Czech 
Republic (1992,1996), Slovakia (1992, 1996) and Slovenia (1997,1999) with 
high-income individuals having access between 2 and 3 times more disposable 
income than low-income citizens.  
Unsurprisingly, the use of percentiles has reconfirmed the results obtained 
through the analysis of deciles shares. However, Figure 2.2 highlights clearly 
not only the social distance that separates one country from the other, but also 
its eventual reduction across time. In a virtual classification, the greater social 
distance has been found in Estonia, followed by Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, it is worth noting that a 
drastic increase took place in all countries in the first half of the 1990s, and, as a 
result, the position of the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia (nations for 
which no recent data is available) might drastically be changed in the last years. 
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Fig.2.2 Distance between 10th and 90th percentile
(adjusted disposable income)
Source: Author´s calculations using LIS.
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(see also Table A 2.2 in the Appendix) 
Abb. 16: Fig. 2.2: Distance between 10th and 90th percentile (adjusted disposable income) 
How would social inequality change in Central and Eastern Europe if social 
transfers would not be in place? In other words, what kind of scenario would 
prevail if less fortunate citizens would not have access to some form of income 
replacement? In order to achieve this aim, the redistribution factor of all the most 
important welfare provisions, with the exclusion of pension benefits coming from 
social insurance contributions, was deduct from the equivalent net disposable 
income (see also recommendations of the Social Protection Committee 2001). 
The reason why pension insurance payments are not counted here depends on 
the fact that these benefits can be seen as a replacement of the previous wage 
at the end of the work-career and, thus, their redistribution role is not always 
automatic. These calculations, however, include old-age allowance, which is a 
basic income available for all those elderly who have no access to contributory 
pensions and, thus, would fall into absolute poverty.  
Figure 2.3 and Table A 2.3 show the Gini coefficient before and after 
disbursement of social transfers. The Gini coefficient measures the 
concentration of income and ranges from 0 in case of extreme equality (all 
households have the same income) to 1 in case of extreme inequality (one 
household has the total income at disposal for all households)159. From the 
analysis of this figure, it is immediately clear that a society without social 
transfers would be a more unequal society. The degree of inequality would 
dramatically increase at the expenses of lower social classes if some form of 
                                              
159 For more information on the Gini coefficient, see The Canberra Group 
2001. 
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redistribution was not in place. Estonia, Hungary and Poland, especially, would 
be particularly vulnerable to income inequality, but no country would be an 
exception.  
Abb. 17: Fig. 2.3: Gini coefficient 
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(see also Table A 2.3 in the Appendix) 
 
Ironically, a closer examination shows that the distribution of income was 
less unequal in those countries which were economically less developed. This is 
of interest because if the growth of inequality was strictly linked to the economic 
potential, then there would have been less inequality in Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia visible, precisely because these countries had less developed 
economies. By contrast, it is possible to see that income inequality grew more 
rapidly and drastically in Hungary and Poland primarily because of a political 
decision. These two countries deregulated their markets more quickly, thus 
leaving the door opened for an increase in income differences. Romania, 
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Slovakia and Slovenia, on the other hand, were less determined to implement 
such reforms, especially in the first years of transition160. 
Another important point that needs to be clarified is whether there have been 
variations in the impact of social transfers in income concentration among 
countries and across time. As it has been demonstrated, the presence of social 
transfers has strongly limited the possibility that income inequality would 
excessively increase. Without the existence of welfare provisions, the Gini 
coefficient would increment approximately between 30 and 50 per cent in 
Estonia (2000), Poland (1986, 1991) and Romania (1995, 1997); and between 
50 and 70 per cent in Czech Republic (1996), Hungary (1991, 1994, 1999), 
Poland (1995, 1999), Slovakia (1996) and Slovenia (1997, 1999) (see Table A 
2.3 in the Appendix)161.  
 
3.2 Monitoring the Impact of Social Transfers  
The second part of this analysis deals with the impact of welfare provisions 
among the population and among the beneficiaries. This section analyses the 
change in poverty rates among the total population before and after the 
disbursement of social transfers, and the impact of unemployment 
compensation, means-tested and family benefits on targeted groups. The aim is 
to have a better description of the effectiveness of such provisions, both at 
national level, as part of the general poverty reduction strategy, and also at local 
level, monitoring the impact on those groups of citizens who materially depend 
on these provisions.   
Figure 3.1 shows the poverty rate among the total population (all members 
of households) in seven Central and Eastern European countries with and 
without social transfers. This figure is to be read as follows, the first segment of 
the bar represents the poverty rate with social transfers, while the second 
segment represents the ratio without social transfers. The longer the bar, the 
higher is the ratio. As a general conclusion, it can be affirmed that poverty rates 
greatly vary from country to country and according to how poverty is measured. 
A country may display a low level of poverty when measured at 40 per cent of 
the median, but high if measured at 60 per cent of the median (for detailed 
statistics see Table A 3.1). 
Estonia (2000) is the country that displays the highest poverty rate, followed 
by Poland (1995,1999), Romania (1995, 1997) and Slovenia (1997,1999). The 
situation becomes even worse if we exclude from the net disposable income the 
                                              
160 The situation of the Czech Republic is controversial. Despite the strong 
neo-liberal rhetoric, which privileged drastic liberalization and privatization 
of the economy, Václav Klaus has often been accused of never fully 
implementing shock therapy in the way it was promoted in his electoral 
propaganda. Rather, the Czech government maintained the major control 
over the economy by acquiring the dominant share of the largest banks in 
charge of the privatization of state assets and by artificially maintaining a 
high rate of employment (Cox 1998). Estonia, by contrast, was more 
determined to implement shock therapy and, consequently, the highest rate 
of income inequality does not come as a particular surprise. 
161 In 1992, the Gini coefficient without social transfers of the Czech and 
Slovak Republic would have been almost double (respectively 93 per cent 
and 105 per cent higher). 
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revenues from social transfers. In this case, overall poverty rates in Central and 
Eastern Europe would be much higher. Poverty would change from 10 per cent 
to 29 per cent in Czech Republic (1996); from 20 per cent to 34 per cent in 
Estonia (2000); from 13 per cent to 33 per cent in Hungary (1999); from 15 per 
cent to 33 per cent in Poland (1999); from 14 per cent to 24 per cent in Romania 
(1997); from 12 per cent to 30 per cent in Slovakia (1996); and from 14 per cent 
to 29 per cent in Slovenia (1999).  These results demonstrate the great 
importance of social transfers in the poverty reduction strategy at national level. 
All countries, indeed, seem to rely primarily on social transfers in order to 
artificially lower the number of poor people (calculated at 60 per cent of median). 
This is particularly evident in the Czech Republic (1996=+19), Hungary 
(1999=+20), Poland (1999=+18) and Slovakia (1996=+18) (see RPR Table A 
3.1).  
However, in order to see whether a determined policy is continuing to 
produce the expected positive results, it is also important to measure the ratio of 
poverty reduction (RPR162) within countries across time. The RPR diminishes in 
Czech Republic from +20 points in 1992 to +19 in 1996; from +21 in Slovakia in 
1992 to +18 in 1996; it remains stable in Slovenia (approximately +14), but it 
increases in Hungary from +19 in 1991 to +20 in 1999; in Romania from +9 in 
1995 to + 10 in 1997; and, finally, in Poland from +15 in 1992 (+8 in 1986) to 
+18 in 1999 (see Table A 3.1). In other words, this means that, particularly in 
Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, social transfers have maintained or 
increased the level of effectiveness in poverty reduction, which existed when the 
first income survey was conducted. For the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the 
situation seems to be a bit different, but even in these countries, no drastic 
decline can be observed. 
                                              
162 The RPR is calculated subtracting the poverty rate without transfers from 
the poverty rate with transfers. Example: If the poverty rate in Czech 
Republic in 1992 was equal to 7 per cent with social transfers and 27 per 
cent without social transfers, the RPR will be equal to +20. 
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Fig. 3.1 Poverty rates with and without social transfers
among total population
Source: Author´s calculations using LIS
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(see also Table A 3.1 in the Appendix) 
Abb. 18: Fig. 3.1: Poverty rates with and without social transfers among total population 
Figure 3.2 and Table A 3.2 show the poverty rates among the beneficiaries 
of unemployment compensation (all members of households) before and after 
the disbursement of unemployment benefits. As it can be immediately seen, 
unemployment compensation benefits had a huge impact on reducing poverty 
among this group of citizens. The percentage of beneficiary households which 
find themselves below 60 per cent of median would increase without transfers 
from approximately 25 per cent to 32 per cent in Czech Republic (1996), from 
39 per cent to 46 per cent in Estonia (2000), from 22 per cent to 36 per cent in 
Hungary (1999), from 27 per cent to 55 per cent in Poland (1999), from 16 per 
cent to 29 per cent in Romania (1997), from 16 per cent to 28 per cent in 
Slovakia (1996) and from 24 per cent to 40 per cent in Slovenia (1999). This is 
undoubtedly a remarkable result. If, on the one hand, it is possible to prove that 
access to these provisions is no guarantee for leaving poverty (see also the 
results of Behrendt mentioned above), then, on the other hand, unemployment 
compensation benefits do improve the economic conditions of families in 
need163.  
As far as the ratio of poverty reduction across time is concerned, the RPR 
diminishes in Czech Republic from +11 points in 1992 to +7 in 1996 and in 
Hungary from +15 in 1991 to +14 in 1999; it remains almost unchanged in 
Slovenia (approximately +16) and Romania (+13), but it increases in Poland 
from + 10 in 1992 up to +28 in 1999 and in Slovakia from +11 in 1992 to +12 in 
                                              
163 Only in Czech Republic and Estonia, the ratio of improvement is less than 
ten per cent. 
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1996. Stated another way, in Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia 
these provisions have lost a bit of effectiveness if compared to the first wave of 
surveys, while in Poland and Slovakia they have improved. Again, the success 
of Poland is clear. This might be explained by the generous access to these 
benefits provided until 1999, which has resulted in a significant improvement in 
the economic condition of beneficiary households.  
Abb. 19: Fig. 3.2: Poverty rates with and with unemployment compensation among UC beneficiaries 
 Fig. 3.2 Poverty rates with and without unemployment compensation
among UC beneficiaries
Source: Author´s calculations using LIS
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(see also Table A 3.2 in the Appendix) 
 
Figure 3.3 and Table A 3.3 show the poverty rates among means-tested 
beneficiaries (all members of households) before and after transfers. Also in this 
case, the results clearly show that poverty rates among these groups of citizens 
would be much higher in all poverty brackets. Without benefits, the percentage 
of beneficiary households who would find themselves below 60 per cent of the 
median would increase from 17 per cent to 22 per cent in Czech Republic 
(1996), from 29 per cent to 40 per cent in Estonia (2000), from 31 per cent to 40 
per cent in Hungary (1999), from 20 per cent to 26 per cent in Poland (1999), 
from 32 per cent to 56 per cent in Slovakia (1996), and from 52 per cent to 56 
per cent in Slovenia (1999)164. The extreme positive result of the Slovak 
Republic is undoubtedly remarkable (+24 in 1996). Here, it is clear that Slovak 
policy-makers have particularly used means-tested benefits as the main tool in 
lowering the negative impact of economic transition. Unfortunately, the data 
considered in this study only comes from years prior to 1996, as there is no 
recent data available.  
                                              
164 Please note that no data is available for Romania (1995 and 1997). 
   173
A more indepth analysis on the ratio of poverty reduction across time shows 
that the RPR diminished in the Czech Republic from +20 points in 1992 to +5 in 
1996; in Hungary from +10 in 1991 to +9 in 1999; in Slovenia from +7 in 1997 to 
+4 in 1999; it remained stable in Poland with approximately +5; but it increased 
from +21 in Slovakia in 1992 to +24 in 1996. Interestingly, while in almost all 
countries the RPR has remained almost unchanged, that is to say, there has 
been no clear decline in its power to prevent the fall of beneficiary households 
into poverty, this has not been the case in the Czech Republic. Indeed, while 
approximately 20 per cent of beneficiary households in 1992 were not at risk of 
poverty thanks to the existence of means-tested benefits, this ratio is declined 
up to 5 per cent in 1996.  
Abb. 20: Fig. 3.3: Poverty rates with and without means-tested among MT beneficiaries 
 Fig.3.3 Poverty rates with and without means-tested
among MT beneficiaries
Source: Author´s calculations using LIS
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(see also Table A 3.3 in the Appendix) 
 
Figure 3.4 and Table A 3.4 show the poverty rates among family benefits 
beneficiaries (all members of households) before and after receiving some kind 
of family support. In absence of these benefits, the number of current 
beneficiaries who find themselves below 60 per cent of the median would 
increase from 10 per cent to 17 per cent in Czech Republic (1996), from 19 per 
cent to 24 per cent in Estonia (2000), from 15 per cent to 24 per cent in Hungary 
(1999), from 24 per cent to 41 per cent in Poland (1999), from 15 per cent to 20 
per cent in Romania (1997), from 13 per cent to 22 per cent in Slovakia (1996) 
and from 11 per cent to 17 per cent in Slovenia (1999).  
The RPR diminished only in Hungary from +14 in 1991 to +9 in 1999, but it 
increased in Czech Republic from +6 points in 1992 to +7 in 1996; in Poland 
from +5 in 1992 (+9 in 1986) to +18 in 1999; in Romania from +2 in 1995 to +5 
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in 1997; in Slovakia from +8 in 1992 to +9 in 1996; and in Slovenia from +4 in 
1997 to + 6 in 1999. Again, Poland is the country in which family support 
policies seem to have achieved the best results. Nevertheless, it should also be 
remembered that this positive outcome also indicates that the decision to 
transform the economy through shock therapy has required additional help from 
state through social transfers. Without the existence of family benefits, Polish 
households could not rely sufficiently on resources coming from market income. 
This situation seems to be a bit better in the other countries, where the ratio of 
poverty reduction is smaller, but also the poverty rates among beneficiary 
households without benefits.   
 
 
Abb. 21: Fig. 3.4: Poverty rates with and without family benefits among FB beneficiaries 
 
Fig.3.4 Poverty rates with and without family benefits
among FB beneficiaries
Source: Author´ s calculations using LIS
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(see also Table A 3.4 in the Appendix) 
 
 
 
 
4. Discussion 
Since the 1960s, there has been a clear and increasing interest for the 
evaluation of social policies. The Bureau of Applied Social Research of Merton 
and Lazarsfeld at the Columbia University was probably the first and most 
famous attempt to respond to the necessity of finding standard and rational 
methods to evaluate the effectiveness of social programs. Especially in the 
United States, where there is no strong tradition of state intervention in the 
economy, the money spent on social policies had to be well spent. Too many 
times, however, policy evaluation has focused on the inefficiencies, on what has 
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not worked, rather than emphasising on what has worked, on what has been 
successful in a determined policy-making.  As a response to this negative 
attitude, some author has recently begun to focus on the positive 
consequences, both expected and unexpected, of the implementation of social 
policies: “on what has been successful in an ocean of normal inefficiency” 
(Tendler 1992 quoted in Stame 2000, p.154; translated from Italian). This was 
not only a reaction to the difficulties in funding created by Reagan and Thatcher, 
but it was necessary to improve the effectiveness of the poverty reduction 
strategy on the basis of what had worked, rather than focusing on what had not 
worked.  
Similarly to their American colleagues, social policy analysts in Europe have 
developed the predisposition, even more accentuated, to exaggerate what the 
welfare state has not been able to do, rather than to emphasize what it has 
achieved. Of course, there are good reasons for this attitude. An amplification of 
the positive results might lead policy-makers and politicians to reduce future 
funds, instead of increasing the efforts. This approach, however, has led to the 
belief that social policies are in essence inefficient and subsequently the welfare 
state itself has been accused of incapacity: no matter how much effort was 
invested. In brief, what social policy analysts have often forgotten is an 
adequate response to the key questions of any evaluation, which Stame (2000, 
p.126) correctly identifies as: 
a) What has happened exactly? Have the objects been 
achieved? And if not, what has been achieved?  
b) Was what has been achieved positive (good)? 
c) Was it worthwhile to implement those policies? 
d) How could policy-makers improve them? 
These very simple questions does not hide the reason for the existence of 
the welfare state, in that it is there to improve the living conditions of less 
fortunate citizens, and not to resolve all problems arising from the economic 
transition. 
As indicated earlier, Central and Eastern European countries have 
witnessed a huge increase in income inequality primarily due to the shock of the 
economic transition (Cox 1998, 2003; Ringold 1999). The huge decline in 
household income, for the most part caused by the loss of numerous jobs, has 
created new vulnerable groups, such as the unemployed, the Roma, children, 
and so on (see above, §2). These new vulnerable groups have survived the 
collapse of the command economy thanks to the existence of welfare 
provisions, rather than market resources. Poland is a good example of how the 
situation of households with welfare beneficiaries might dramatically worsen if 
social transfers would not be in place. 
If the main objective of policy-makers was the complete evaporation of 
poverty, then this objective has not been achieved, or, at least, only achieved in 
part. Nevertheless, what has been possible to achieve was a significant 
reduction of poverty through the access to generous welfare benefits, such as 
unemployment compensation, means-tested and family benefits (generosity was 
a key characteristic of these welfare states especially during the first years of 
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transition). Unfortunately, most of the data presented by the Luxembourg 
Income Study consider the reforms prior to 1999. Numerous countries, such as 
Poland, have only recently restricted the access to these provisions (see 
Consensus II: Country Reports, 1999) and, at present, there is still no possibility 
to monitor the latest trends. Nevertheless, the analysis of the data available 
demonstrates how important the existence of welfare benefits has been in 
reducing poverty.  
To those who insist on the necessity to cut welfare expenditures in order not 
to compromise the efficiency of the market, there is now enough empirical 
evidence to point out the inconsistency of such statement. Especially the data 
concerning Poland, the first country to implement shock therapy, reconfirms the 
incapacity of the market to resolve alone the problems arising from the change 
in economic alignment. Even though it is possible to prove that social transfers 
are no guarantee for leaving poverty, they have greatly helped to lower its 
negative effects and to diminish the costs of economic transition. In other words, 
shock therapy would have been even more disastrous, or could not have been 
implemented without the existence of strong social transfers. In this context, the 
welfare state achieved great results in reducing economic deprivation and, thus, 
it was good and worthwhile implementing such policies.  
The last question should now focus on what can policy-makers do to 
improve the lack and inefficiencies of the welfare state, which, of course, have 
been numerous and not always unavoidable, in Central and Eastern Europe? 
Needless to say, a response to this question is extremely difficult and any 
attempt at finding a single, homogenising solution suitable for all countries is 
inevitably problematic. Nevertheless, a general rule can be expressed: the more 
the countries in transition have moved towards a market economic system, the 
more social transfers were required to reduce the negative effects of the change 
in economic alignment.  
In brief, the analysis shows that Eastern Europe needs a more active welfare 
state rather than a diminished welfare state, as neo-liberal supporters would 
recommend. Nevertheless, forty years of communism have made the point clear 
that excessive state paternalism will not be a successful strategy for improving 
the living conditions of citizens. As János Ladányi and Iván Szelényi (1996) 
have pointed out, Central and Eastern Europe has a desperate need for an 
“empowerment state”: a welfare state, which actively invests in the material, 
human and social capital of its citizens. This final objective may be achieved by 
means of social programs, which aim to support the citizens and not only allow 
them to recover, as it has been done so far, from the negative effects of market 
mechanisms.    
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Conclusion 
There can be little doubt that welfare institutions have played, and will probably 
continue to play, a crucial role in limiting the negative effects in income and 
social inequality. They have helped to reduce not only the negative 
repercussions of the economic shock, but have also helped to maintain a sense 
of public responsibility and solidarity, which has reinforced social cohesion 
during these difficult times. Without efficient welfare institutions, Central and 
Eastern European societies would not only be more unequal societies, but 
would be also more atomized and disaggregated societies. In the long run, this 
might seriously damage further reforms or the democratization process itself.     
Despite the existence of numerous inefficiencies, partly due to budget 
constraints but also due to wrong political decisions (such as those concerning 
cuts in welfare expenditures in the hope that the market would resolve all 
economic problems), social transfers have achieved most of the objectives, for 
which they had been created: reducing the negative impacts of economic 
transition. What is required now is, however, a change in mentality: from a 
cushioning welfare state, Central and Eastern European policy-makers and 
politicians should turn into an “empowerment state”. This will be the key of 
success for future social policies.     
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Conclusion 
 
The New Welfare Consensus 
Since the advent of Thatcher and Reagan, the welfare state has come 
under great political pressure (Pierson, 1994). There are many reasons 
that explain this change in welfare “Weltanschauung165”: 1) welfare 
expenditures have exceeded the tolerability threshold of most countries; 
2) it is supposed to produce negative or distorted effects in the 
economy; 3) it creates dependency; 4) it has failed to promote social 
equality; 5) it is no more sustainable because of the new changing 
society (ageing population, gender issue and globalization). What many 
economists have proposed is to dismantle the old welfare system by 
allowing access to private organizations and by decentralising the old 
structure. Private and public responsibilities would also become more 
differentiated and, if misfortune happens, then the free game of the 
market will resolve it.  
The New Right has not only emphasized the failure of the welfare 
state, but also the New Left has put its basis into discussion. In “The 
Third Way”, defined as the “Manifesto” of the “New” Labour Party in the 
United Kingdom, Giddens (1998) has affirmed that the old welfare 
organization has now ended as it no longer has a reason to be. “The 
end of the welfare state as we know it” has become the catch phrase for 
a new form of social solidarity based on the concept of “positive welfare 
state”, which clearly aims at separating itself from the old “negative” one 
(Giddens 1998, 2001). This semantic fascinating “positive welfare state” 
can be reduced with the word “workfare”, sometimes formulated as 
“work for your welfare” or “welfare for work”166. At the core of “workfare” 
lies the notion that no right should be granted without responsibility 
(Giddens 1998, p. 66). Active labour market policies should replace 
passive employment measures, while the new welfare organization 
should witness an increase in decentralization167 and in subventions to 
companies. In Third Way experts’ opinion, this will improve the 
effectiveness of welfare provisions and reduce costs. Employers will be 
facilitated in taking workers on, and the engine of the economy will re-
start (Giddens 1998, 2000).  
Hence, reformers would not only aim to stop “welfare addiction” and 
to block the development of a paternalistic welfare state, which has now 
expired its capacity to accomplish the more basic social functions, but 
also to create a new welfare consensus around which the New Left can 
combine old socialist ideals with the emergent challenges caused by the 
new changing society. Of course, a “positive” welfare state is certainly 
better than a “negative” one; an “active” labour market policy sounds 
undoubtedly more interesting than a “passive” one and a “responsible” 
welfare state is obviously to be preferred to an “irresponsible” one. 
                                              
165 “Weltanschauung” literally means “the way of looking at the world”. 
166 For more information on this topic see Kildal (2001).  
167 See also Finn (2000).  
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Nevertheless, it is still an open question whether this “positive” welfare 
state is really as good as it sounds.  
Indeed, doubts about the difficulties in meeting the standards set by 
Third Way politics have often been emphasized (for a detailed list of 
critics see Giddens 2000). In particular, it is still unclear whether 
“workfare” will create less dependency than the welfare state and 
whether it will cost less. Moreover, as it has become increasingly clear, 
an excessive devolution of responsibilities to the individual might not 
ensure basic social security and might create stigmatization of the 
beneficiaries. In this scenario, one of the major risks is that, instead of 
finding a new welfare consensus, reformers might simply destroy the old 
welfare organization without having the possibility to replace it with a 
new, more efficient one.  
Without any doubt, however, modern welfare states are urgently 
asked to redefine their functions and, in this specific context, a process 
of restructuring would not only be necessary because of endogenous 
factors, as stressed above, but also because of new exogenous 
challenges, such as those connected to the globalization or the 
Europeanization of national social policies.  
 
Globalization and the Issue of “Social Dumping” 
Globalization has now become an important issue with regards to the 
economic, social and political sphere. In very few words, ‘globalization’ 
means that modern nation states are strictly linked to a wider global 
political and economic environment. A decision made in Japan 
produces more consequences in the German economy now than it was 
thinkable three decades before. International relations are thus no more 
simply a matter of “good neighbourhood”, but they are fully part of 
“national politics”. Globalization has meant an improved interaction 
among national economies, but it has also involved more dependence 
on decisions made abroad. On the one hand, it has facilitated the 
interactions among countries improving the chances for a successful 
business, whilst on the other, it has reproduced power relations built for 
more than one century, dividing the richest from the poorest part of the 
world. The restriction (or enlargement) of the world economies to a 
single economy is also produces other distorted effects: 1) limited 
freedom in national politics may create the basis for dependence from 
not well-identified cross-national entities (see discussion in chapter two 
on the institutions shaping post-communist social policy); 2) national 
decision-making is now forced to deal with multiple environments 
simultaneously, increasing the possibility of not effective policies. 
Trying to identify the administrative centre, where economic decisions 
take place, is not an easy task. The “global market”, and the companies 
therein, will very unlikely open an office in Brussels or in Washington 
D.C., where they can send politicians, members of interest groups or 
delegates of trade unions to. The headquarters will, therefore, continue 
to be identified in the office of an American multinational as well as in a 
Chinese farm. Both, to differing extents, will have a limited power in the 
global decision-making. This implies, however, by no means that this 
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limited power will be distributed more equally. For example, it is 
reasonable to state that an American multi-national will continue to have 
substantially more power concerning future decisions, with regards to its 
own situation, than the Chinese farm. This is what the main issue of 
globalization is all about.  
With respect to the implications of globalization for the social security 
systems168, a major debate has confronted those researchers who deal 
with the internationalization of social policies and the associated 
question of “social dumping” or “race to the bottom”. As Alber and 
Standing (2000, pp. 99-101) describe: 
 “The term trade dumping […] implies situations in which standards in 
one country are lowered relative to what they would have been because 
of external pressure from all or part of the global economic system. If 
the analogy to trade dumping is to apply, there ought to be a sense in 
which policies or practices in one country or part of the world are used 
to erode levels of institutions of social protection elsewhere […] A 
feature of both types of state-induced social dumping is that the cost of 
obtaining social protection is shifted from the state and from employers 
onto workers and communities in which workers live. […] Public 
spending is switched from social protection and services to training 
measures for the workforce in a residual welfare state. […] In more 
general terms, social dumping could be interpreted as a process of 
“labour re-commodification” 
As expected, scholars are strongly divided on the issue of 
globalization, with on one side of the spectrum, those who support the 
“classic” or “strong globalization thesis”, arguing that the global market 
is, in effect, causing a “race to the bottom” (Strange 1988, 1996, 1997; 
OECD 1994; Rodrik 1997; Sengenberger and Campbell 1994; Woods 
2000) and, those on the other end of the spectrum, who are more 
sceptical about the effective constraints that globalization may produce 
on national economic and welfare structures (Alber and Standing 2000; 
Beyeler 2003; Garret and Lange 1995; Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Keohane and Milner 1996; Kuhnle 2000; Mishra 1999; Leibfried 2001; 
Pierson 2000a, 2000b; Rieger and Leibfried 1998, 2003; Scharpf 2000; 
Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Teeple 1995; Weiss 1997, 1998; Yeates 
2001a, 2001b). While the former group, supporting the “race to the 
bottom”, tend more to emphasize the inevitability of “social dumping”, 
the latter group sees political and welfare institutions as stable entities, 
which can constrain the governments’ capacity for drastic changes, 
even with presence of significant pressures from the global market.  
As often happens, the truth lies probably in the middle of these two 
opposites, even though the temptation “to adopt a happy medium” might 
be misleading (Vobruba 2003). In fact, if it is true that national 
                                              
168 On globalization and social policy, see Deacon et al. (1997), Mishra 
(1999), Yeates (2001) and George and Wilding (2002). 
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governments still retain a special power in lowering the negative effects 
of globalization, then market openness might also cause welfare state 
expansion (see Rodrik 1997; Garret 1998; Rieger and Leibfried 1998, 
2003; Kapstein 1999; Vobruba 2003; Mau 2004), instead of welfare 
state retrenchment (Scharpf 1991; Mishra 1996; Greider 1997; Gray 
2002).  
What cannot be denied, however, is that a form of labour re-
commodification exists in modern European societies, where the 
privatization of provisions and the reconstruction of the welfare state are 
redefining the boundaries of private and public responsibility toward an 
increase in personal involvement. Individuals are, in fact, called not only 
to accept the radical change of the social contract signed in the post-
war period, which unequivocally linked citizenship and employment to a 
guaranteed basic social security, but also to take private actions in 
response to 1) the withdrawal of the state in areas which were once 
under full jurisdiction of governments; and 2) to find adequate defensive 
strategies to the constraints caused by increasing competition 
attributable to the pressures of the global market. In other words, what 
citizens seem to be urgently required are private solutions to what, 
some time ago, were seen as public problems. 
In the context of EU enlargement, worries have often been expressed 
about the possibility that Western European industries might decide to 
transfer their production facilities to Eastern Europe in order to take 
advantage of lower labour costs, and about the prospect that Central 
and Eastern European citizens might decide to emigrate in mass to the 
richest part of Europe. The issue of social dumping has thus come to 
the attention of European mass media and has opened a violent debate, 
which has seen political leaders and also unions of Western workers 
uniting to defend their interests from what has been seen as an 
imminent attack of the newly emergent economies. 
With a certain inclination to forget the privileges that they gained in 
the antecedent waves of EU affiliation, older EU member states have 
frequently used the “race to the bottom” issue to limit the aspirations of 
Eastern European candidates. While the worries of Southern European 
countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) have primarily involved possible 
limitations in the amount of financial aid they already received to 
subsidize their agricultural products or the diminishment of their regional 
disparities under, respectively, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and Structural Funds, the Northern European countries (principally 
Germany and Austria) are opposed to the rules concerning the free 
movement of workers within the European borders being immediately 
applicable to Eastern European citizens.  
After the never-ending, and sometimes tedious, negotiations, which 
risked reducing the EU enlargement simply as a matter of economic 
transaction169, current and future Member States found an official 
                                              
169 All CEE officials interviewed have made similar comments on the 
excessive fears expressed by EU member states during the accession, EU 
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compromise at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. 
Despite all observers pragmatically agreeing on the most crucial issues, 
most of the questions associated to the problem of how will European 
citizens cohabit in the new risk society remained mostly unresolved. In 
many respects, an important element that might limit the negative 
effects of the “race to the bottom”, while amalgamating, at the same 
time, the disparities among European national welfare systems, might 
be connected to the emergence of a common welfare regime, which 
might also represent the first step toward a wider social Europe. 
 
The Europeanization of National Social Policies 
Since the Treaty of Rome, the process of European Integration170 is 
slowly revolutionizing the geographical map of the old continent. In 
Rokkanian terms, this has been described as a process of 
unfreezing171, or unlocking172, the boundaries of the old nation states. 
This “unfreezing”, or “unlocking”, of the borders, however, does not 
implicitly mean a complete removal of barriers. At the EU level, for 
instance, there is a process of removal associated to a process of 
redrawing in the political-institutional sphere. Furthermore, the EU 
seems to be building new barriers, namely outside the territorial borders 
of the member states, and re-assessing the relations between centre-
periphery. What it can virtually be witnessed is the emergence of two 
separate forces acting at the EU level: a centrifugal force (mainly owned 
by the EU), which tends to push the countries out of the centre of the 
European decision-making; and a centripetal force (mainly owned by 
                                                                                                      
process. The following are two interesting insights of feelings following the 
conclusion of EU negotiations: 1) “More fairness from the EU side would not 
be a bad thing. The EU asymmetric regulation regarding trade, for which we 
must open our borders while the EU member states can still close them to 
our products, is, of course, not fair. But this is part of the game. […] The 
worries of Germany concerning CEE immigrants are unrealistic. Once that 
borders will be opened, it will certainly not happen that all Slovenians 
emigrate to Germany. This might have happened 50 years ago, but now it’s 
unrealistic. At the end, we have more Italians and Austrians in our country, 
than Slovenians abroad. These are political decisions not based on empirical 
evidences. Also with regard to CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), we must 
talk about a political decision and not about a decision based on real 
empirical evidences” (Source: Interview 12); 2) “As one of my colleagues 
said, we are joining the EU, it is not the EU that is joining us. So it is clear 
that negotiations are difficult, but I believe it will be easier once we will be 
part of the EU. As a Polish colleague of mine told me laughing: “Sure, now 
we have a difficult moment, but wait until we will be part of the EU. Then, 
we’ll show them”. (Post Scriptum: this sentence was not meant to have any 
negative connotation” (Source: Interview 10).  
170 For a brief introduction to the debate over European Integration see 
O’Neill (1996), Tsoukalis and Rhodes (1997) and Dehousse (1997). 
171 See Rokkan (1999). 
172 see Bartolini (1998, 2001). A similar analysis based on Rokkan’s theory 
on boundary building can also be found in Ferrera (2000, 2003).  
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the member countries) tending to push the states toward the centre. 
The position achieved by a country in this peripheral-peripheral struggle 
clearly depends on the magnitude of the centripetal force owned, 
identified in terms of economic and political power for the biggest 
member states, but also of bargaining capacity for the smallest ones.  
The question of whether EU institutions are acquiring enough political 
power to efficiently reduce national sovereignty is one of the most 
controversial issues encountered in comparative European politics. 
According to the “multi-level governance” approach, European 
institutions are succeeding in overlapping national autonomy through a 
form of “multi-level governance”, in which sovereignty is shared by 
national and supranational actors (Marks 1992, 1993; Hooghe 1996; 
Marks et al. 1996a, b; Hooghe and Marks 1997, 2001; Benz and 
Eberlein 1999; Graziano 2003). As Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) 
have correctly pointed out, the European Union is, in effect, increasing 
its influences in different policy areas through the emanation of binding 
directives (see also Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Stone Sweet et al. 
2001). In the area of cohesion policy, Conzelmann (1995) states, for 
instance, that the European Commission has direct influence on policy 
formulation and implementation, while others scholars have focused 
their attention on the crucial role played by the Commission in the 
stages of agenda-setting and management (Allen 1996; Pollack 1995, 
2003). Other examples of external pressures can be seen by the 
activities of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), one of the most crucial 
actors in the EU decision-making process, which blocks those national 
laws that are not in line with the rules established at the EU level (Weiler 
1994; Alter 1999; Mattli and Slaughter 1995; Peterson and Bomberg 
1999; Leibfried and Pierson 2000; Pollack 2003).  
In a similar multi-level pattern, Leibfried and Pierson (1995) have 
affirmed that the current “European” welfare state can be understood in 
terms of a “multi-tiered” system with a shared responsibility for individual 
social policies. According to Leibfried and Pierson (1995, pp. 24, 31), 
this “multi-tiered” welfare structure: 
“often generates complex designs to incorporate the design of each 
tier as well as complex decision rules or policy reforms to ensure that 
these interests continue to be met. […] The EU policy-making becomes 
in part a process of comparative state building […] produc(ing) 
decisions according to the lowest-common denominator and “packaged” 
policies”.  
Unquestionably, the idea of a “European” welfare state has attracted 
many supporters, but also numerous enemies. Europe does not 
constitute a “single political community”, but “many political 
communities” with different strategic interests. The emergence of a 
common European welfare state might therefore be in contrast to 
national legislations, as well as to national political objectives. At the 
moment, however, there seems to be no clear consensus among 
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scholars on this issue. Ferrera (2000), for instance, has argued that the 
member states are still able to manipulate the normative of minimum 
requirements of access to welfare benefits. According to Ferrera (2000), 
this is a clear example of how nations still make the major decisions on 
questions related to the implementation of their own social policies (see 
also Ferrera 2003). Similarly, Hantrais (1995) has emphasized how the 
problem of harmonization of EU social policy has been effectively 
abandoned, at least temporarily, in favour of the principle of 
“convergence” that has been expressed in the 1994 White Paper, which 
sought to affirm that future developments on EU social policy should be 
premised on respect of national differences.  
The most recent debate on the “open method of coordination”, 
according to which the common objectives set at the European level in 
respect of national situations must be translated by appropriate national 
policies (NAPs)173, has let some authors affirm that EU institutions will 
be able, in the near future, to increase their role in coordinating national 
social policies (Begg and Berghman 2002; Carmel 2003; De la Porte 
and Pochet 2002, 2004; Ferrera et al. 2002). At this stage, it seems 
plausible that a new form of supra-national organization is increasing 
important over the existing national welfare states that would leave, 
however, a decent level of freedom for national decision-making. 
According to Scharpf (2002, §6), national welfare states are 
“constitutionally constrained by the “supremacy” of all European rules of 
economic integration, liberalization, and competition law, and they must 
operate under the fiscal rules of the Monetary Union”. Nonetheless, he 
does not forget to outline that the attempts to “Europeanize” national 
welfare systems “are politically constrained by the diversity of national 
welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic development and 
hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services but, even 
more significantly, in their normative aspirations and institutional 
structures” (Scharpf 2002, §6). As a consequence, the emergence of a 
two-tier system can be proposed: a “European Model” common to all 
member states based on the single market principle and regulated by 
EU directives associated with a second-tier established on distinct forms 
of social solidarity and synchronized by national decision-making in 
accordance to historical and cultural backgrounds (see Table 4.1). 
 
                                              
173 In the European Council of Lisbon (March 2000), “the Head of States […] 
agreed that policies for combating social exclusion should be based on an 
open method of coordination combining national action plans and a 
programme presented by the Commission to encourage cooperation in this 
field”. Quoted in Social Protection Committee (2002, p.4). 
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 Table 4.1 The EU Two-Tier System: The Single Market Oriented Model 
First-Tier Second-Tier 
 
- Common to all countries: Single-
Market oriented with some universal 
aspiration 
- Legal 
- Compulsory 
- Economic sphere 
- Decisions made by the European 
Commission on the basis of the 
criteria regulating the Single Market 
 
- Differentiated according to national 
peculiarities 
- Semi-legal/tolerated 
- Optional 
- Political sphere 
- Decisions made by national 
governments on the basis of the 
requests coming from the electorate 
 
 
Abb. 22: Table 4.1: The EU Two-Tier System: The Single Market Oriented Model 
In the scheme presented above, the first tier, common to all countries, 
is based on those principles that constitute the foundation of the single 
market (such as the priority for economic stability, market competition, 
and so on) coupled with some universal aspirations promoted in the so-
called “European Social Model”. This first tier has also a legitimate 
strong legal framework, provided by the superiority of the EU Court of 
Justice, on national decisions, is compulsory, and primarily involves the 
economic sphere through decisions taken by the European 
Commission. The second tier, is differentiated according to national 
peculiarities; is semi-legal in the sense that it is tolerated by EU 
institutions as long as it does not compromise the stability of the Single 
Market; and, is optional in that it is not essential for EU membership and 
primarily involves the political sphere since decisions are taken by 
national governments on the basis of the requests coming from their 
electorate.  
As far as the role of the EU in reforming Central and European 
welfare states is concerned, there can be little doubt that, despite the 
existence of serious ambiguities in the EU policy-making, primarily due 
to the incapacity of proposing a clear agenda different from that 
proposed by the most influential international financial institutions (see 
Ferge 2002; also chapter 2 in this book), the prospects of enlargement 
and the existence of numerous financial assistance programmes (such 
as PHARE) have reinforced values based on solidarity, which otherwise 
would have been sacrificed to the reasons of the market174. To this 
extent, the reforms’ objectives proposed at national level on the basis of 
                                              
174 For a recent debate on the role played by the EU “soft regulation” in 
influencing Eastern European social policies see Ferge and Juhász (2004) 
and Lendvai (2004). For more information on the concept of “cognitive 
Europeanization” see Guillén and Álvarez (2004). 
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the requests coming from international organizations were forced to find 
a compromise to the reforms’ objectives and priorities relevant at EU 
level, resulting in hybrid social policies.  
C
he 
w
ng support for redistributive policies 
(s
 recombining old and current 
ad
 
onclusion 
The first part of this book has discussed the most debated theories on 
welfare state dynamics (chapter one) and on institution building (chapter 
two), attempting to elucidate the factors responsible for the development 
of new welfare institutions in East Central Europe. In order to develop a 
clearer conceptual framework, this part has proposed a synthetic theory, 
which has been called “neoclassical social policy”. The neoclassical 
social policy approach looks at the development of welfare institutions 
as the outcome of complex negotiations among historical legacies, 
political and institutional settings, and also views the development of 
welfare institutions as the consequence of strategic interactions of 
national and international actors. In this difficult process of welfare state 
building, neoclassical social policy also calls attention to the set of 
formal and informal rules, which have governed and still continue to 
govern social behaviour. Part II has shown that institutions, political 
organizations and individuals created, sustained and reinvented t
elfare state around the social world in which they were embedded.  
To respond to the central question of this book, it should be clarified 
whether the post-communist capitalism (or capitalisms) will: 1) 
reproduce the welfare state already in place in Western Europe; 2) 
result in a common peculiar Eastern European welfare state; or 3) 
create so many welfare states as there are economies in transition. This 
research identifies the emergence of a peculiar Eastern European 
model of solidarity coming from the fusion of pre-communist (Bismarck 
social insurance), communist (universalism, corporatism and 
egalitarianism) and post-communist features (market-based schemes), 
and maintained together by a stro
ee part two and chapter eight).  
This statement, which above all concerns the emergence of a new 
and distinct model, is clearly in contrast to the common assumption that 
sees Central and Eastern European welfare states as inexorably 
doomed to disappear under the pressures of globalizing forces. The fact 
that these welfare systems in transition are assuming some 
characteristics of the new environment (western world) is not a sufficient 
indicator to affirm that a “welfare state transfer” is occurring. Sharing 
similarities with the western world (for example, the privatization of 
provisions) by no means implies being identical. Rather, a more 
important observation involves the issue of whether Central and Eastern 
European welfare states are successfully
aptive radiations into a new organism. 
It can be seen that the social policy vacuum required Central and 
Eastern European welfare states to adapt to the new environment, 
recombining and re-arranging previous characteristics (or pre-
adaptations) into a new social organism (see Part II). As Parsons (1966) 
would put it, this continuous process of upgrading previous sub-
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structures, in which differentiation and integration are synthesized in a 
new, more complex scheme, has been at the heart of the creation of a 
un
erment state”. This will 
e the key of success for future social policies. 
 
 
 
 
ique Central and Eastern European model of solidarity. 
In making such a claim, one last important point needs to be made, 
that is in which manner will this new European model of solidarity fit into 
the future EU welfare regime (assuming it will take the form illustrated). 
In recalling the term “divergence convergence” introduced by Laszlo 
Bruszt (2002) to define the transformation of Eastern European 
markets, it is argued that although these welfare states in transition 
display substantial variations within the region, this does not preclude 
the alignment towards a common, European-friendly welfare system. 
The “path of creation”, described in previous chapters, allows East 
Central Europe to resist the unifying forces of a single, Europeanized 
welfare regime, and maintain most of its characteristics, even with 
increasing requests coming from EU institutions. The final version might 
take the form of, as illustrated above, a two-tier model, where a “single 
market-oriented welfare regime” is placed side by side to a “unique” 
Eastern European model. As the analysis of the impact of social 
transfers has called attention to, however, rather than reducing the role 
of the welfare state, Central and Eastern European policy-makers and 
politicians should now turn towards an “empow
b
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Appendix 
 
Abb. 23: Table A 1: LIS Datasets used 
 Table A 1. LIS Datasets used
Country and Year LIS unweighted households Source
Czech Rep. 1992 16 234 Czech Microcensus 1992
Czech Rep. 1996
Estonia 2000
Hungary 1991
Hungary 1994
Hungary 1999
Poland 1986
Poland 1992
Poland 1995
Poland 1999
Romania 1995
Romania 1997
Slovakia 1992
Slovakia 1996
Slovenia 1997
Slovenia 1999
28 148 
6 068 
2 019 
1 992 
2 013 
10 646 
6 602
32 009 
31 423
31 571
32 187 
15 990
16 336
2 577 
3 859 
Czech Microcensus 1996
Household Budget Survey
Hungarian Household Panel Survey
Hungarian Household Panel Survey
Hungarian Household Panel Survey
Polish Household Budget Survey
Polish Household Budget Survey
Polish Household Budget Survey
Polish Household Budget Survey
Romania Integrated Household
Survey
Romania Integrated Household
Survey
Slovak Microcensus 1992
Slovak Microcensus 1996
Slovenian Household Budget Survey
Slovenian Household Budget Survey
LIS Survey
 
Abb. 24: Table A 2.1: Decile Shares 
 Table A 2.1 Decile Shares
19,0 36,9 44,0
16,6 35,5 47,9
11,6 32,6 55,9
14,7 35,9 49,5
13,7 33,5 53,0
15,1 34,5 50,5
15,2 36,7 48,2
15,6 35,6 48,8
11,9 35,5 52,7
14,7 34,7 50,5
15,2 35,4 49,5
15,3 35,4 49,2
19,6 37,9 42,5
16,4 37,5 46,0
16,0 37,6 46,4
16,2 37,4 46,3
Czech Rep.92
Czech Rep.96
Estonia00
Hungary91
Hungary94
Hungary99
Poland86
Poland92
Poland95
Poland99
Romania95
Romania97
Slovakia92
Slovakia96
Slovenia97
Slovenia99
Decile 1-3 Decile 4-7 Decile 8-10
Source: Author´s calculations using LIS.
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Abb. 25: Table A 2.2: Percentiles DPI 
Table A 2.2 Percentiles DPI
65 155 89 2,37
59 179 119 3,01
46 234 188 5,08
54 182 128 3,39
50 209 159 4,19
54 194 140 3,57
50 177 126 3,51
54 184 130 3,42
47 189 142 4,04
52 187 135 3,59
52 180 127 3,42
53 180 127 3,38
66 149 83 2,25
56 162 106 2,88
51 166 114 3,24
53 167 114 3,15
Czech Rep.92
Czech Rep.96
Estonia00
Hungary91
Hungary94
Hungary99
Poland86
Poland92
Poland95
Poland99
Romania95
Romania97
Slovakia92
Slovakia96
Slovenia97
Slovenia99
Percentile
10th (DPI)
Percentile
90th (DPI)
Percentile
Distance
90th-10th (DPI) P90/P10 (DPI)
Source: Author´s calculations using LIS.
 
Abb. 26: Table A 3: Gini coefficient 
 Table A 3 Gini Coefficient
,207 ,399 93%
,259 ,424 64%
,361 ,506 40%
,283 ,484 71%
,323 ,553 71%
,295 ,497 68%
,271 ,365 35%
,274 ,414 51%
,318 ,525 65%
,293 ,493 68%
,277 ,357 29%
,277 ,359 30%
,189 ,391 105%
,241 ,425 76%
,250 ,404 62%
,249 ,405 63%
Czech Rep.92
Czech Rep.96
Estonia00
Hungary91
Hungary94
Hungary99
Poland86
Poland92
Poland95
Poland99
Romania95
Romania97
Slovakia92
Slovakia96
Slovenia97
Slovenia99
Gini  DPI
Gini DPI minus
Social Transfers
increase by
%
Source: Author´s calculations using LIS.
 
 
   191
 e A 3.1: Change in overall poverty rates DPI & DPI minus 
social transfers 
Abb. 27: Tabl
 Table A 3.1 Change in Overall Poverty Rates DPI & DPI minus Social Transfers
1 2 7 21 23 27 20 21 21
2 5 10 21 25 29 19 20 18
7 12 20 26 30 34 19 17 14
4 8 14 26 29 33 21 21 18
6 10 15 31 35 38 25 25 23
3 7 13 26 30 33 23 23 20
4 10 17 16 20 25 12 10 8
3 8 14 20 24 29 16 16 15
7 12 18 29 32 35 22 20 18
4 9 15 26 29 33 21 21 18
4 9 15 14 19 24 10 10 9
4 8 14 13 18 24 10 10 10
1 2 6 19 23 27 19 21 21
4 7 12 23 26 30 19 19 18
5 9 15 21 25 30 17 16 15
4 8 14 21 25 29 16 17 15
Czech Rep.92
Czech Rep.96
Estonia00
Hungary91
Hungary94
Hungary99
Poland86
Poland92
Poland95
Poland99
Romania95
Romania97
Slovakia92
Slovakia96
Slovenia97
Slovenia99
DPI (OPR 40%
of median)
DPI (OPR 50%
of median)
DPI (OPR 60%
of median)
DPI-Social
Transfers
(OPR 40% of
median)
DPI-Social
Transfers
(OPR 50% of
median)
DPI-Social
Transfers
(OPR 60% of
median)
RPR  (OVP 40%
of Median)
RPR (OVP 50%
of Median)
RPR  (OVP 60%
of Median)
Sour uthor´s calculations using LIS.ce: A  
mployment 
compensation beneficiaries with and without benefits 
 
 
Abb. 28: Table A 3.2: Change in poverty among une
 Table A 3.2 Change in Poverty Rates among unemployment compensation beneficiaries with and without benefits
3 6 12 8 13 23 6 7 11
9 16 25 15 24 32 6 7 7
18 29 39 27 37 46 9 8 7
4 7 13 14 20 28 10 13 15
9 13 19 14 19 35 6 6 17
6 13 22 15 23 36 9 10 14
, , , , , , , , ,
3 7 13 9 16 23 6 9 9
7 13 22 26 37 47 20 24 25
7 16 27 32 45 55 25 29 29
5 12 21 13 22 33 8 10 13
4 10 16 13 20 29 9 9 13
2 4 10 6 12 21 4 8 10
6 10 16 14 20 28 8 10 12
10 18 30 21 35 46 11 17 16
7 14 24 18 29 40 12 14 16
Czech Rep.92
Czech Rep.96
Estonia00
Hungary91
Hungary94
Hungary99
Poland86
Poland92
Poland95
Poland99
Romania95
Romania97
Slovakia92
Slovakia96
Slovenia97
Slovenia99
DPI  (UCBPR
40% of
median)
DPI  (UCBPR
50% of
median)
DPI  (UCBPR
60% of
median)
DPI-UC
(UCBPR 40%
of median)
DPI-UC
(UCBPR 50%
of median)
DPI-UC
(UCBPR 60%
of median)
RPR (40% of
Median)
RPR (50% of
Median)
RPR (60% of
Median)
Sour uthor´ s calculat ions using LIS.ce: A  
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Abb. 29: Table A 3.3: Change in poverty among means-tested 
beneficiaries with and without benefits 
 Table A 3.3 Change in Poverty Rates among means-tested beneficiaries with and without benefits
4 9 21 13 23 41 10 14 20
5 9 17 8 14 22 4 5 6
14 21 29 25 30 40 12 9 11
3 8 17 6 14 28 3 6 11
7 13 16 11 17 22 4 4 5
5 16 31 18 31 40 13 15 9
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
5 9 15 9 14 20 4 5 5
5 12 20 10 18 26 5 6 5
, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
2 6 15 15 25 36 13 19 21
7 16 32 24 35 56 17 18 24
25 40 51 34 50 58 9 10 7
22 38 52 41 51 56 19 13 4
Czech Rep.92
Czech Rep.96
Estonia00
Hungary91
Hungary94
Hungary99
Poland86
Poland92
Poland95
Poland99
Romania95
Romania97
Slovakia92
Slovakia96
Slovenia97
Slovenia99
DPI (MTBPR 40%
of median)
DPI (MTBPR 50%
of median)
DPI (MTBPR 60%
of median)
DPI-MT (MTBPR
40% of median)
DPI-MT (MTBPR
50% of median)
DPI-MT (MTBPR
60% of median)
RPR  (40% of
Median)
RPR (50% of
Median)
RPR (60% of
Median)
Sour uthor´s calculations using LIS.ce: A  
Abb. 30: Table A 3.4: Change in poverty among family support 
beneficiaries with and without benefits 
 
 
 Table A 3.4 Change in Poverty Rates among family support beneficiaries with and without benefits
1 2 4 2 5 10 1 3 5
2 5 10 5 10 17 3 5 7
7 12 19 13 18 24 5 5 6
3 5 9 11 16 23 8 11 14
5 9 13 14 20 26 9 10 13
3 7 15 8 17 24 5 10 9
7 14 26 12 23 35 5 9 9
2 6 11 5 10 16 3 5 4
7 12 20 11 18 26 4 5 6
6 13 24 18 30 41 12 17 17
4 9 17 6 12 19 2 2 2
4 9 15 7 12 20 3 4 5
0 2 4 2 6 12 2 4 8
5 7 13 9 15 22 4 7 10
4 9 14 7 12 18 4 3 3
3 6 11 6 11 17 3 5 5
Czech Rep.92
Czech Rep.96
Estonia00
Hungary91
Hungary94
Hungary99
Poland86
Poland92
Poland95
Poland99
Romania95
Romania97
Slovakia92
Slovakia96
Slovenia97
Slovenia99
DPI (FBBPR
40% of median)
DPI (FBBPR
50% of median)
DPI (FBBPR
60% of median)
DPI-FB
(FBBPR 40%
of median)
DPI-FB
(FBBPR 50%
of median)
DPI-FB
(FBBPR 60%
of median)
RPR  (40% of
Median)
RPR (50% of
Median)
RPR (60% of
Median)
Sourc uthor´s calculations using LIS.e: A  
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List of Useful Web Sites 
 
Web sites of Ministries of Labour, Social and Family Affairs  
Bulgaria 
Bulgarian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
http://www.mlsp.government.bg/ 
Bulgarian National Social Security Institute 
http://www.noi.bg/ 
 
Czech Republic 
Ministry of Health 
http://www.mzcr.cz/ 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
http://www.mpsv.cz/ 
Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs  
http://www.vupsv.cz/ 
 
Estonia 
Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs 
http://www.sm.ee/ 
 
Hungary 
Hungarian Ministry of Health   
http://www.eum.hu/  
Hungarian Ministry of Social and Family Affairs 
http://www.szcsm.gov.hu/ 
 
Latvia 
Ministry of Welfare 
http://www.lm.gov.lv/ 
 
Lithuania 
Ministry of Health 
http://www.sam.lt/ 
Ministry of Social Protection and Labour 
http://www.socmin.lt/ 
 
Poland  
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
http://www.mpips.gov.pl/ 
ZUS –Zaktat Ubezpieczen Spotecznych- (Social Insurance Institution) 
http://www.zus.pl/ 
 
 
Romania 
Ministry of Labour and Social Protection 
http://www.mmps.ro/ 
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Slovak Republic 
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic 
(MISAF SR)  
http://www.employment.gov.sk/en/ 
Social Insurance Agency: 
http://www.socpoist.sk/ 
 
Slovenia 
Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs 
http://www.sigov.si/mddsz/ 
 
Other Useful web sites 
Auswärtiges Amt [German Federal Foreign Office] (2003),  
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania. Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, History Section, Auswärtiges Amt: Bonn.  
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos.  
 
Elections around the World (2003), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania. Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia.  
http://www.electionworld.org
 
EU DG-Employment and Social Affairs Directorate General official 
web site 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/employment_social/index_en.htm 
 
EU DG-Enlargement official web site 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index.htm
 
EU -EuropeAid-Evaluation Unit- 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation/index.htm 
 
Governments on the WWW 
http://www.gksoft.com/govt/en/
 
ILO –International Labour Organization- 
http://www.ilo.org/
 
ILO Subregional Office for Central and Eastern Europe 
http://www.ilo-ceet.hu/
 
MISSCEEC –Mutual Information System on the Candidate 
Countries – 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/missceec/index_en.htm  
 
Parties and Elections in Europe (2003),  
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania. Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, © by Wolfram Nordsieck.  
http://www.parties-and-elections.de. 
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OECD -Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development- 
http://www.oecd.org/
 
Social Policy Virtual Library 
http://www.bath.ac.uk/~hsstp/world3.htm
 
SOSIG -Social Sciences Information Gateway – 
http://www.sosig.ac.uk/
 
UNDP –United Nations Development Reports– 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/default.cfm 
 
Virtual Library 
http://vlib.org/ 
 
World Bank 
http://www.worldbank.org
 
World Bank - PovertyNet – 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/data/index.htm 
 
World Health Organization (WHO) 
http://www.who.int/home-page/ 
 
WHO -The European Observatory on Health Care Systems – 
http://www.euro.who.int/observatory/toppage
 
WWW Virtual Library: Evaluation 
http://www.policy-evaluation.org
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